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INTRODUCTION FROM THE CHAIR 
Today’s Assembly is a very different institution to the 
one established in 1999, and devolution in Wales 
continues to develop. The Assembly is on the verge 
of becoming the Welsh Parliament. It will soon be 
operating on the basis of a new reserved powers 
model under the Wales Act 2017—with responsibilities 
for the first Welsh taxes in 800 years, including income 
tax-varying powers—and establishing its proper 
place in the UK’s changing constitutional landscape. 
Many who engage with and study the Assembly 
recognise that, with only 60 Members, it lacks the 
capacity it needs. This matters. Assembly Members 
have crucial roles to play in holding the Welsh 
Government to account, scrutinising and overseeing 
policy, legislation and spending, championing 
constituents’ interests, and engaging the people of 
Wales in our maturing democracy. When these roles 
are fulfilled effectively, there is a real, direct and 
positive impact on the lives of people and their 
communities. 
As an independent, impartial Panel, we have used 
our expertise and experience to conclude that a 60 
Member Assembly does not have the capacity it 
needs to fulfil its responsibilities, now and in the future. 
More Assembly Members are needed if the Assembly 
is to work effectively in meeting the scrutiny and 
legislative challenges and opportunities that it faces 
today as well as in the future. There is therefore a 
compelling case for a substantial increase in size. 
I have no doubt that many will question whether 
money should be spent on more politicians at a time 
of austerity. However, as we explain in our report, 
while the additional cost may be significant in 
absolute terms, it should be kept to a minimum and 
will represent a very small proportion of the money 
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spent by the government that the Assembly 
oversees. We believe that even marginal 
improvements in the scrutiny of Welsh Government 
spending and policy decisions will reap significant 
dividends to the taxpayer. 
Changing the Assembly’s size also provides an 
opportunity to reform and revitalise the electoral 
system so that the Assembly better reflects the 
communities it serves. Similarly, giving 16- and 17-
year-olds the right to vote could become a powerful 
way to involve and engage the young people of 
Wales in our democracy, increasing their political 
awareness and participation now and in the future. 
After all, it is their future. 
Calling for more politicians is unpopular. We 
understand that. Nevertheless, we believe that, as 
devolution in Wales enters its next phase, the 
Assembly cannot continue as it is without risking its 
ability to deliver for the people and communities it 
serves. This report is a call to action. From April 2018 
the Assembly will finally have the powers it needs to 
address these issues itself, and to ensure that the 2021 
election delivers a parliament that truly works for the 
people of Wales. 
 
Professor Laura McAllister CBE, FLSW, FRSA 
Chair, Expert Panel on Assembly Electoral Reform 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Expert Panel on Assembly Electoral Reform 
01. The Expert Panel on Assembly Electoral Reform was appointed by the Llywydd 
and Assembly Commission in February 2017, and tasked with making 
recommendations on the number of Members the Assembly needs, the 
system by which they should be elected, and the minimum voting age for 
Assembly elections. We were asked to report by autumn 2017, and to make 
recommendations which, provided the required political consensus is 
achieved, could be implemented in time for the Assembly election in 2021. 
How many Members does the Assembly need? 
02. The role, responsibilities and powers of the Assembly have changed 
considerably since 1999. The pressures on the Assembly are likely to continue 
to increase as a result of a move to a reserved powers model, the devolution 
of taxation and borrowing powers (including income tax-varying powers), 
further devolution of areas of policy and Brexit. 
03. Alternative approaches to enhance the capacity of the institution have been 
explored and implemented, without addressing the fundamental limitation of 
the severely limited time available to 60 Members to fulfil their varied and 
complex roles as legislators, scrutineers, representatives, employers and 
politicians. 
04. The impact of scrutiny and oversight carried out by the Assembly and its 
Members is difficult to measure objectively, but we are clear it has a positive 
impact on the lives of the people of Wales. 
05. There is a compelling case, supported by comparisons with other UK and 
international legislatures, that the size of the Assembly needs to increase. Our 
analysis of the evidence points towards an appropriate size for the Assembly 
of at least 80 Members, and preferably closer to 90 Members. Increasing the 
Assembly to this size would deliver meaningful benefits for the capacity of the 
institution and corresponding dividends for the people of Wales. Such benefits 
would be greater at the upper end of our range. 
06. Estimates provided to us by the Assembly Commission of the recurrent costs 
associated with our proposals range from some £6.6 million per year for 20 
additional Members to £9.6 million per year for 30 additional Members. There 
would also be some one-off costs associated, for example, with the 
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adjustment of the Siambr and Members’ office accommodation. The 
Commission estimates that these would be approximately £2.4 million for 20 
additional Members and £3.3 million for 30 additional Members. 
07. We recognise that these costs are significant, but note that they amount to a 
very small proportion of the sums expended by the Welsh Government. Even 
marginal improvements in the scrutiny of the Welsh Government’s 
expenditure could reap significant dividends to the taxpayer as a result of 
improved legislation, policy and decision-making. Nevertheless, it is 
incumbent on the Remuneration Board and the Assembly Commission to 
consider carefully how the current levels of staffing, service provision and 
financial resources provided to support Members should be altered in the 
case of a larger Assembly, so that the cost of implementing our 
recommendations is kept to an absolute minimum. Popular acceptance of a 
larger Assembly could be dependent on this. 
How should Assembly Members be elected? 
08. Increasing the size of the Assembly requires reform of the way in which 
Members are elected. We identified ten principles against which we 
evaluated a wide range of electoral systems. 
09. The Assembly has a strong and commendable reputation for gender 
representation, and we considered mechanisms which could be 
incorporated into the electoral arrangements to safeguard the progress 
made in Wales to date. Such mechanisms will support and encourage the 
election of a diverse Assembly, including integrated gender quotas, provisions 
to improve the availability of anonymised candidate diversity information, 
and enabling candidates to stand for election on the basis of job sharing 
arrangements. 
10. Using our principles, we narrowed our focus to three potential systems which 
could be appropriate for the Welsh context. Our preferred option, if our 
recommended integrated gender quota is implemented, is the Single 
Transferable Vote. If our recommendations to support diversity of 
representation are not implemented—whether through lack of political 
consensus or the limitations of the Assembly’s legislative competence—then a 
Flexible List Proportional Representation system would provide a viable 
alternative. While not our favoured option, a Mixed Member Proportional 
(also known as an Additional Member System) would provide a ‘least 
change’ status quo option. 
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11. On the basis of insufficient time before 2021 and the lack of a boundary 
review body with statutory responsibility for Assembly boundaries, we ruled out 
a full boundary review before 2021. We ruled out reinstating co-terminosity 
with Westminster parliamentary constituencies on the basis of (i) uncertainty 
about the implementation of the UK parliamentary boundary review and (ii) it 
being preferable for Assembly constituencies to be influenced by factors 
entirely relevant to Wales. 
12. Focusing on existing electoral or administrative areas which could be used as 
building blocks, we identified two alternative models for multimember 
Assembly constituencies. Our preferred option for electing an Assembly of 89 
or 90 Members, i.e. at the upper end of our recommended size bracket, is for 
20 constituencies based on current Assembly constituencies. Alternatively, our 
indicative modelling suggests that 17 constituencies based on local authority 
areas could be a viable alternative for the purposes of electing an Assembly 
of 83 or 84 Members, i.e. towards the middle of our size bracket. Should the 
Assembly choose to legislate for the status quo option of a Mixed Member 
Proportional System, the existing Assembly constituencies and regions could 
be used for this purpose. 
13. Assembly constituencies should not be allowed to become ossified again. 
Our proposals include mechanisms for periodic review of boundaries or seat 
apportionments, as appropriate. 
What should be the minimum voting age for Assembly elections? 
14. On the basis of the existing evidence, research and literature, and the 
additional evidence and views we have gathered, we believe a reduction in 
the minimum voting age to 16 with effect from 2021 would be a powerful way 
to raise political awareness and participation among young people. 
15. Furthermore, if the Welsh Government proceeds with its proposals to reduce 
the minimum voting age for local elections in Wales to 16 with effect from 
2022, it would be extremely anomalous and create additional administrative 
and political issues if the voting age for Assembly elections were not similarly 
reduced. 
16. To ensure that young people are encouraged and supported to exercise their 
right to vote, any reduction in the minimum voting age should be 
accompanied by appropriate, effective and non-partisan political and 
citizenship education. This must ensure that young people hear political views 
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from across the spectrum, and are equipped to make up their own minds 
about how to exercise their democratic right. 
Implementation of our recommendations 
17. The Assembly’s role and responsibilities have been evolving since 1999, and 
face further changes as a result of the transition to a reserved powers model 
of devolution, the devolution of taxation and borrowing powers, and Brexit. 
18. Our task was to make recommendations which could be sustainable, 
appropriate for the Welsh context, and which could be implemented with 
effect from 2021 if the necessary degree of political support can be 
achieved. 
19. We believe we have done this. Our analysis of the role, capacity and size of 
the Assembly leads us to believe that the recommendations set out in our 
report should be implemented within this timescale. The Assembly is already 
overstretched. We believe it does not have the capacity as an Assembly of 
60 Members to respond to the challenges it faces. 
20. Calling for more politicians is unpopular, but our analysis of the evidence 
demonstrates that all the alternatives to an increase in size have been tried 
and tested without adequately addressing the capacity gap we have 
identified. 
21. The Assembly Commission announced earlier this year that, following 
unanimous agreement by all parties in the Assembly, it would introduce 
legislation to change the name of the institution to the Welsh 
Parliament/Senedd Cymru in order to reflect its constitutional status as Wales’s 
national legislature. Implemented alongside this important reform, our 
recommendations offer an opportunity to reinvigorate Welsh democracy, 
and to enthuse and energise voters by extending the franchise and 
establishing an electoral system founded on the principles we have identified, 
so that the 2021 election delivers a legislature with the capacity it needs to 
represent the people and communities it serves. Our report is a call to action 
to the Assembly to ensure that it becomes a Welsh Parliament that truly works 
for the people of Wales. 
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LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
A list of our recommendations is set out below. 
Recommendation 1. The size of the Assembly should be increased to at least 80 
Members, and preferably closer to 90 Members, to ensure that the parliament 
elected in 2021 has sufficient capacity to fulfil its policy, legislative and financial 
scrutiny responsibilities, and that Members can also undertake their representative, 
campaigning, political and other roles. ............................................................... Page 28 
Recommendation 2. The Remuneration Board and Assembly Commission should 
consider how the total staffing support, services and financial resources provided 
to Members can be altered in the case of a larger Assembly, so that the cost of 
implementing our recommendations is kept to an absolute minimum. ......... Page 31 
Recommendation 3. The Assembly must exercise restraint in the way it makes use 
of any increase in the size of the institution—for example in relation to the number 
and size of committees, the appointment of office holders, and the maximum size 
of the Welsh Government—in order to ensure that the potential benefits for the 
quality and quantity of scrutiny are realised and additional costs are kept to an 
absolute minimum. ................................................................................................... Page 89 
Recommendation 4. If our recommendations on legislative interventions to 
support and encourage diversity of representation are implemented, the Assembly 
should be elected by Single Transferable Vote with effect from 2021. If, however, 
these recommendations are not implemented, the Assembly should be elected on 
the basis of a Flexible List electoral system with effect from 2021. ................. Page 102 
Recommendation 5. We recommend that the multimember Assembly 
constituencies upon which a Single Transferable Vote or Flexible List system  
are based should return no fewer than four and ideally no more than six  
Members. ................................................................................................................. Page 106 
Recommendation 6. Should the Assembly implement either a Single Transferable 
Vote or Flexible List electoral system in 2021, we recommend that an Assembly of 
89 or 90 Members should be elected on the basis of 20 Assembly constituencies 
formed by pairing the current 40 Assembly constituencies. A multimember 
constituency model based on combining or splitting local authority areas could be 
a viable alternative for the election of an Assembly of 83 or 84 Members on the 
basis of either STV or Flexible List, should the Assembly decide that variations in 
district magnitude were acceptable. ................................................................. Page 106 
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Recommendation 7. The Assembly should consider whether, in the apportionment 
of seats to constituencies or regions, additional weighting should be applied to 
voters in specific parts of Wales, for example on the basis of the distance from 
Cardiff Bay, rurality or deprivation of the area in which they are registered to vote.
 ................................................................................................................................... Page 107 
Recommendation 8. The Welsh Government, in developing its proposals for local 
government electoral reform, should have regard to our recommendations and 
report, particularly in relation to the design and operation of the Single 
Transferable Vote electoral system. .................................................................... Page 114 
Recommendation 9. The Assembly should request that the Secretary of State 
commences section 106 of the Equality Act 2010 in relation to Assembly elections, 
or transfers the power to do so to the Welsh Ministers. Otherwise, legislation to 
reform the Assembly’s electoral arrangements should include provision that would 
secure the availability of information regarding diversity. ............................... Page 117 
Recommendation 10. In order to safeguard the achievements of the Assembly 
and political parties in Wales in relation to gender-balanced representation, we 
recommend that a gender quota is integrated within the electoral system put in 
place for 2021. If this does not happen—whether through lack of political 
consensus or the limits of the Assembly’s legislative competence—we propose that 
political parties be expected to take steps to ensure their candidate selection 
processes support and encourage the election of a gender-balanced parliament 
for Wales. This should include voluntary adoption by parties of the quotas we have 
outlined. ................................................................................................................... Page 125 
Recommendation 11. Electoral law, Assembly procedures and the Remuneration 
Board’s Determination on Members’ Pay and Allowances should be changed to 
enable candidates to stand for election on the basis of transparent job sharing 
arrangements. The guiding principles of such arrangements should be that 
candidates clearly articulate the basis of their job sharing agreement to voters, 
that job sharing partners are treated as if they are one person, and that job sharing 
Members should give rise to no additional costs beyond those of a single Assembly 
Member. ................................................................................................................... Page 127 
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Recommendation 12. Before making any order prescribing the design of ballot 
papers for use in Assembly elections, in addition to the consultation with the 
Electoral Commission required by section 7(1) of the Political Parties, Elections  
and Referendums Act 2000, the Welsh Ministers should also undertake such other 
consultation as may be appropriate, to ensure that the information included and 
the layout of the ballot paper is appropriate for the electoral system and for  
Wales. ....................................................................................................................... Page 150 
Recommendation 13. Legislative action must be taken to put in place boundary 
or seat apportionment review mechanisms which provide for a full review before 
the 2026 election, whether or not our proposals for reform are implemented. Such 
mechanisms must take account of any changes to the Assembly franchise, as well 
as other demographic or population changes................................................. Page 175 
Recommendation 14. The minimum voting age for Assembly elections should be 
reduced to 16 with effect from the 2021 election. ........................................... Page 199 
Recommendation 15. If the Assembly does legislate to lower the minimum voting 
age for Assembly elections to 16, the Assembly Commission should work with the 
Welsh Government, the Electoral Commission, political parties and others to 
support and encourage young people to exercise their right to vote, most 
importantly through appropriate political and citizenship education and  
public awareness-raising, but also by such other means as may be  
appropriate. ............................................................................................................ Page 204 
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Recommendation 16. The citizenship education put in place to accompany any 
reduction in the minimum voting age must:  
i Recognise the diversity of settings within which 16- and 17-year-
olds may receive education and training, to ensure that those 
outside traditional school settings are also supported and 
encouraged to exercise their vote;  
ii Go beyond simply outlining democratic structures and formal 
processes, to engage and inform young people about the issues 
which matter to them;  
iii Ensure that young people have opportunities to learn about a full 
range of political opinions in a non-partisan way;  
iv Be delivered by teachers and educators who have themselves 
received high quality training in order to ensure that citizenship 
education is taken seriously, and to avoid both political bias and 
the perception of political bias;  
v Be subject to review after a suitable period to ensure its design 
and delivery met its objectives. ............................................. Page 204 
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01. THE EXPERT PANEL ON ASSEMBLY 
ELECTORAL REFORM 
Background 
01.01. In January 2015, the Fourth Assembly Commission considered the capacity 
of the Assembly, and published a report which unanimously concluded that: 
 With only 60 Members, the National Assembly is underpowered and 
overstretched.1 
01.02. At the time the Commission published its report, the Assembly did not have 
legislative competence over its size. However, with effect from a Principal 
Appointed Day (expected to be 1 April 2018) the Wales Act 2017 will devolve 
powers to the Assembly over its size and electoral arrangements, including who is 
eligible to vote in Assembly elections. 
01.03. The Fifth Assembly Commission, drawing on the work of its predecessors, 
announced in November 2016 that it intended to lead work to explore the use of 
these powers in order to address the capacity of the Assembly.2 Acting on behalf 
of the institution, in February 2017 the Llywydd and the Commission announced 
the establishment of an Expert Panel on Assembly Electoral Reform.3 
  
                                            
1 National Assembly for Wales Commission, The future of the Assembly and its capacity to deliver for 
Wales, January 2015 
2 National Assembly for Wales Commission, ‘Commission agrees its ambitions for the future’, 14 
November 2016 
3 National Assembly for Wales Commission, ’Written statement on the Expert Panel on Assembly 
Electoral Reform’, 1 February 2017 
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Role of the Expert Panel 
01.04. The remit we have been given is: 
 To review, and complement if necessary, the existing evidence and 
research relating to the size and electoral arrangements for the 
National Assembly; 
 From that evidence base, and in order to inform the preparation of any 
necessary legislation, to make recommendations to the Assembly 
Commission on what should be the size of the membership of the 
National Assembly, the electoral system that should be used to elect its 
Members and the minimum voting age for National Assembly elections. 
01.05. Our work is one element of a wider programme of work to reform the 
Assembly and shape the future of Welsh democracy. The Assembly Commission 
has announced it intends to introduce legislation in 2018 to change the name of 
the Assembly to the Welsh Parliament/Senedd Cymru. In the announcement, the 
Llywydd emphasised the changing role of the Assembly as it has matured and 
developed since 1999 and the need to: 
 …take the opportunity not just for the important symbolic act of 
changing the name of the institution, but also for more fundamental 
reform of our electoral and internal arrangements. In leading this work 
on behalf of the institution itself, the Commission is aiming to maximise 
political consensus across all parties. Above all, we are aiming to 
deliver a parliament for Wales that commands the trust of those we 
serve, reflects the weight of responsibility that we carry, and equips our 
democratic system to address the challenges that we face as a 
nation.4 
01.06. To this end, we have been tasked with reporting by autumn 2017, and 
making recommendations which, provided the required degree of political 
support is achieved, could be implemented in time for the National Assembly 
election in 2021. 
  
                                            
4 National Assembly for Wales Assembly Commission, ’Written statement: Assembly reform 
programme’, 13 June 2017 
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02. METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH 
Approach to our terms of reference 
02.01. As independent experts, our role has been to make robust, impartial, 
evidence-based recommendations on the matters within our terms of reference. 
Details of how we addressed each of the issues within our remit can be found in 
the relevant part of this report: 
 In Part 2, we outline Members’ roles, and explore the functions, capacity 
and size of the Assembly. 
 In Part 3, we discuss the appropriate electoral system for the election of 
the Assembly, including ballot structure and electoral boundaries, and 
the sustainability of the electoral system. 
 In Part 4, we consider the minimum voting age for Assembly elections. 
02.02. These issues are interrelated. For example, our initial work on assessing the 
number of Members the Assembly needs was the key driver of our work on 
electoral systems. In Part 5, we provide an overview of our work, our conclusions, 
and how our recommendations contribute to the reform of the Assembly into a 
sustainable parliament that delivers effectively for Wales. 
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Methodology 
02.03. As Panel members, we each bring expertise and experience from our 
respective fields, including electoral systems, parliamentary work and capacity, 
the constitutional position of the Assembly, and wider issues such as equalities, 
diversity and engagement. Throughout our work we have drawn on existing 
research and analysis to inform our conclusions. We have also supplemented our 
own expertise and the existing evidence by inviting targeted evidence from 
specialists, and by issuing a general invitation for interested individuals, groups and 
organisations, and the public, to share their views. A list of published submissions 
can be found in Annex E. We are grateful to all those who have contributed to our 
work. 
02.04. We have approached our work impartially and with political neutrality. 
Nevertheless, fundamental constitutional issues such as these cannot, and should 
not, be considered wholly in isolation from the political realities of representative 
democracy. To that end, we welcome the helpful and constructive way in which 
the Llywydd, and the Political Reference Group she chairs, have engaged with our 
work. Our conclusions and recommendations are our own, but the Political 
Reference Group has been a valuable sounding board as our thinking developed, 
providing us with a forum to test our thinking and help us to provide workable 
options which could be implemented from 2021. 

PART 2:  
THE ASSEMBLY 
AND ITS 
MEMBERS
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03. THE SIZE OF THE ASSEMBLY 
Background 
03.01. Assembly Members, like other parliamentarians, carry a range of 
responsibilities. As a body, the Assembly makes laws in the areas devolved to it. All 
Members are responsible to their constituents and carry out representative 
functions, including casework, local campaigning and furthering the interests of 
their electorate. Of the 60 Members in the National Assembly for Wales, at any one 
time up to 14 may hold executive roles as part of the Welsh Government, including 
the roles of First Minister and Counsel General.5 The remaining Members undertake 
the fundamental functions of parliamentarians to hold the Welsh Government to 
account for its decisions and actions in relation to spending, policy, legislation, 
taxation and borrowing, and to articulate alternative visions for the future. 
03.02. In its written submission, the Sir Bernard Crick Centre for the Public 
Understanding of Politics at Sheffield University suggested that the Assembly’s 
evolution in terms of power and competence has “led to the emergence of a 
‘capacity gap’ that may lead to a situation of institutional exhaustion if it is not 
remedied in the near future”.6 It highlighted in particular the balance between the 
capacity of the legislature and the executive: 
 There is a fairly clear ratio within comparative politics in relation to 
parliaments and legislatures where the executive is derived from the 
legislature. Too few members and the need to appoint an executive 
essentially hollows-out the capacity of the legislature and leaves the 
executive possibly over-dominant; too many members and the 
legislature risks becoming bloated and inefficient with few 
opportunities for career progression for individual members.7 
03.03. The size of the Welsh Government has changed over time to reflect the 
Assembly’s role and powers. When the Assembly was first established, its Standing 
Orders limited the size of the Cabinet to nine. The limit was increased to 14 by 
section 51 of the Government of Wales Act 2006. Even before that increase in 
                                            
5 The maximum size of the Welsh Government is prescribed by section 51 of the Government of 
Wales Act 2006. 
6 EP09 Sir Bernard Crick Centre for the Public Understanding of Politics, Sheffield University 
7 Ibid 
A PARLIAMENT THAT WORKS FOR WALES 
24 
executive capacity, it was felt by many Members and observers that the Assembly 
was too small to carry out its functions.8 We have therefore focused primarily on 
the capacity of the Assembly to fulfil its non-executive functions, as it is here that 
the capacity constraints resulting from the Assembly’s size are seen to impact most 
obviously. 
Methodology 
03.04. There is no single authoritative and agreed formula by which the optimum 
size of a legislature may be assessed.9 Our conclusions on the number of Members 
the Assembly needs are therefore based on balanced analysis of a range of 
different factors. 
03.05. In chapter 04 we assess the role of the Assembly and the way in which its 
powers have developed since its establishment. The role of the Assembly has 
changed significantly since it began its work, and will continue to develop in the 
coming years, whether as a result of the move to a reserved powers model of 
devolution under the Wales Act 2017, the devolution of taxation and borrowing 
powers (including income tax-varying powers), further devolution of responsibilities, 
Brexit, or all of these. 
03.06. In chapter 05 we explore potential approaches to increasing or enhancing 
the capacity of the Assembly to respond to changes in the Assembly’s role without 
increasing the number of Members, for example changes to working practices; 
the structure of the Assembly’s working week; the number of sitting weeks; 
induction, training and professional development; involvement of experts, the 
public and stakeholders in scrutiny; and the support and resources available to 
Members. 
03.07. In chapter 06 we consider the roles fulfilled by Assembly Members. 
Members consistently report working long hours fulfilling a wide range of different 
tasks. There is no job description for the role of Assembly Member, but their roles 
are much broader than their participation in formal Assembly business. Such 
                                            
8 For example, see Commission on the Powers and Electoral Arrangements of the National 
Assembly for Wales, Report of the Richard Commission, 2004. 
9 The cube root law of assembly sizes, first proposed by Rein Taagepera, suggests that the size of 
single chamber national legislatures can be calculated as the cube root of the population size. 
There is debate in the academic literature about the accuracy of the cube root law. But the key 
point is that it applies to national parliaments, and therefore there are questions over its 
applicability to ‘sub-national’ legislatures such as the National Assembly for Wales. 
A PARLIAMENT THAT WORKS FOR WALES 
25 
broader roles—for example constituency or regional representation, casework and 
campaigning—cannot be separated from their formal Assembly business roles. 
03.08. In chapter 07, we explore the policy, legislative and financial scrutiny roles 
undertaken by the Assembly and its Members, and the impact of such scrutiny on 
the lives of the people of Wales. We conclude that policy, financial and legislative 
scrutiny and oversight are fundamental elements of the roles of parliamentarians. 
For such scrutiny to be effective, the Assembly and its Members must have 
sufficient time, resources and capacity to plan, deliver and follow up on their 
scrutiny work. 
03.09. In chapter 08 we explore the specific capacity constraints facing the 
Assembly’s committee system—a key vehicle for carrying out the Assembly’s 
scrutiny functions. We conclude that the Assembly is currently too small to carry 
out its scrutiny responsibilities effectively. An increase in the size of the Assembly 
which resulted in greater specialisation for Members on committees could 
undoubtedly improve the quality of scrutiny undertaken, but the extent to which 
this is realised will depend on how any additional resource is deployed. 
03.10. In chapter 09 we compare the Assembly with other UK and international 
parliaments and assemblies, concluding that the Assembly is objectively small 
when compared to other legislatures in the UK and elsewhere. 
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How many Members does the Assembly need? 
03.11. On the basis of our analysis, we are persuaded that all the options to 
maximise the capacity of the existing Assembly have been tried, and that there 
are compelling arguments that the number of Members should be increased. 
03.12. These arguments are not new. In 2004, the Richard Commission, in the 
context of its recommendations that the executive and legislature should be 
formally separated and that the Assembly should be given primary law-making 
powers, recommended that the size of the Assembly should be increased to 80 in 
order to provide sufficient capacity to be able to respond to the uncertain 
challenges ahead.10 Peter Price, a member of the Richard Commission, stated 
that: 
 The Richard Commission (of which I was a Member) reached 
agreement on the size of the Assembly. We observed and analysed its 
work, leading us to conclude that it was already barely able to give 
proper democratic challenge and scrutiny at Committee level. It 
would certainly need more members when it had primary legislative 
powers. 
 
[…] 
 
While the Assembly gained primary legislative powers, the linked 
proposal of the Richard Commission was ignored—too hot to handle 
for too many politicians who knew perfectly well that the Assembly 
was and is too small to achieve its high ambitions. 
 
It is a matter of deep regret that so many subsequent opportunities to 
give Wales the Assembly which it needs to provide the spur of scrutiny 
to increase the effectiveness of government have been lost.11 
03.13. In his posthumous autobiography, Rhodri Morgan, the former First Minister of 
Wales, said that the Richard Commission’s recommendation on size had not been 
implemented because it: 
                                            
10 Commission on the Powers and Electoral Arrangements of the National Assembly for Wales, 
Report of the Richard Commission, 2004 
11 EP33 Peter Price, European Strategy Counsel 
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 …would screw up any chances of getting the other conclusions on 
law-making powers through—the people of Wales were simply not 
ready to accept any argument for more AMs, however logical the 
reasoning over increased work on the legislative front needing more 
legislators to carry it out.12 
03.14. The Assembly has changed significantly in the 13 years since Richard’s 
recommendations in 2004, developing into a legislature with greater policy, 
legislative and fiscal powers, and increased control over its own arrangements. On 
this basis, our analysis points towards an appropriate size for the Assembly of 
between 80 and 90 Members. We are persuaded that increasing the Assembly to a 
size within that range would deliver meaningful benefits for the capacity of the 
institution and corresponding dividends for the people of Wales. 
03.15. Within this range, clearly, there would be a noticeable difference between 
the lower and upper ends. A figure close to 80 would undoubtedly strengthen the 
institution and make it better able to fulfil its responsibilities effectively. However, at 
the upper end of our range, the benefits would be greater, providing a more 
meaningful difference in the ability of many Members to specialise, with 
consequent benefits for scrutiny and representation. The upper end of the range 
would also lessen the risk that the question of capacity would need to be revisited 
in the foreseeable future, should the responsibilities of the Assembly increase 
further. 
03.16. We have also assessed the impact of having a parliament of more than 90 
Members. We recognise that the potential public concern about the costs of an 
increase would grow. On the other hand, we also recognise that the benefits in 
terms of capacity and potential specialisation would continue to rise. However, in 
our view, the marginal gains would diminish quite rapidly. We are not, therefore, 
persuaded that the benefits for enhanced scrutiny of an Assembly of more than 90 
Members would necessarily outweigh the resultant increase in costs. 
  
                                            
12 Morgan, R. (2017) Rhodri: A Political Life in Wales and Westminster, University of Wales Press, p.245 
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Recommendation 1. The size of the Assembly should be increased to at least 80 
Members, and preferably closer to 90 Members, to ensure that the parliament 
elected in 2021 has sufficient capacity to fulfil its policy, legislative and financial 
scrutiny responsibilities, and that Members can also undertake their 
representative, campaigning, political and other roles. 
 
03.17. A March 2017 opinion poll for BBC Wales showed that a majority of Welsh 
voters were keen for the Welsh Government to take more powers over day to day 
life in Wales, but did not support an increase in the number of Members.13 We 
recognise that it will always be challenging to make the case for more politicians. 
Clearly, any case for a larger Assembly must be based on robust evidence. As an 
independent, expert Panel, we are, therefore, well-placed to examine the case 
and make recommendations in a neutral and sustainable manner. Our 
recommendations will provide the basis for a sustainable legislature which will not 
need to revisit these issues in the foreseeable future. To ensure that this is the case, 
and that current pressures are alleviated rather than perpetuated, the Assembly 
must establish appropriate structures and ways of working, and deploy any 
additional capacity effectively. 
  
                                            
13 BBC Wales, ‘EU migrants should have skills, public tells BBC Wales poll’, 1 March 2017 
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Financial implications 
03.18. Table 1 provides an estimate of the additional recurrent annual costs which 
could arise from an additional 20 or 30 Assembly Members. These figures were 
provided to us by the Assembly Commission. For the purposes of these estimates, 
the Commission has split the additional recurrent annual costs into core and 
variable elements. 
Table 1 Estimated recurrent annual costs of an additional 20 or 30 Members 
  £000 
  20 additional Members 30 additional Members 
Core recurrent annual costs 5,970  8,860  
Variable recurrent annual costs 650  780  
Total recurrent annual costs 6,620  9,640  
 
03.19. The Commission’s estimate of the additional recurrent annual costs 
associated with our proposals ranges, therefore, from some £6.6 million to £9.6 
million per annum. 
03.20. In 2017–18, the Commission’s annual budget was £53.7 million. The 
additional recurrent costs in the table represent 12 and 18 per cent of that budget 
respectively. 
03.21. In addition, there would also be some one-off costs associated, for 
example, with adjustment of the Siambr and Members’ office accommodation. 
The Commission estimates that these would be approximately £2.4 million for 20 
additional Members and £3.3 million for 30 additional Members. A more detailed 
breakdown of the costs, and the Commission’s underlying assumptions, is set out at 
Annex F. 
03.22. These costs are significant. However, they should be considered in the 
broader context of democratic representation in Wales. For example, one certain 
consequence of Brexit is that there will no longer be Welsh MEPs, with a 
corresponding and significant reduction in the cost of politics and representation 
in Wales. In response to a written question in 2013, HM Treasury estimated the 
expenditure per MEP was £1.79 million.14 Wales is represented by four MEPs. 
                                             
14 PQ HL4062 [on parliamentary costs], 8 January 2013. Responding to the resulting coverage, the 
European Parliament did not dispute the figures, but did highlight costs of translation, leasing office 
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03.23. The bulk of the recurrent costs identified are driven directly by the number 
of Members. These include, for example, the salaries of Members and their support 
staff, allowances available to Members, and the cost of running constituency 
offices. A smaller, but nonetheless significant, proportion is dependent on decisions 
taken by a future Assembly about its working practices and the consequent cost 
of parliamentary support services provided to Members by the Assembly 
Commission. 
03.24. It is incumbent, therefore, on both the Remuneration Board and the 
Assembly Commission to consider in detail the financial implications of the models 
of support they put in place for an Assembly with enhanced Member capacity. 
03.25. We recognise the recent attention given to the cost of the services to 
Members provided by the Assembly Commission, and some criticism of its overall 
increase, and note that the Chief Executive and Clerk is leading a review of its 
staffing capacity. Prior to the 2021 election, the Remuneration Board will review 
the financial support available to Members in the next Assembly. 
03.26. The cost estimates provided to us are, necessarily, based on the services 
and system of financial support currently in place. Decisions taken by both the 
Remuneration Board and the Commission in the past, however, have been taken 
at least partly on the basis of compensating for the lack of Member capacity in an 
Assembly of only 60 Members. In a larger Assembly, those assumptions should be 
revisited so that, for example, the Commission attempts to avoid even the limited 
staffing growth suggested in the estimates provided to us, and the Remuneration 
Board considers whether there should be any reduction in the level of the staff and 
financial support it provides. 
03.27. We urge both the Remuneration Board and the Assembly Commission to 
consider how the current levels of staffing, service provision and financial resources 
provided to support Members should be altered in the case of a larger Assembly, 
so that the cost of implementing our recommendations is kept to an absolute 
minimum. Popular acceptance of a larger Assembly could be dependent on this. 
03.28. Ultimately, though, any consideration of cost must recognise that the 
scrutiny and oversight role of the Assembly, if carried out effectively, positively 
affects the lives of people in Wales by improving the quality of Welsh legislation, 
and influencing Welsh Government policy and decision-making. Although the cost 
                                                                                                                                                 
space, and the additional travel, staffing and building upkeep costs arising from the European 
Parliament’s two working seats. 
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of parliamentary democracy in Wales is significant in absolute terms, it amounts to 
a very small proportion of the sums expended by the government it oversees. Even 
marginal improvements in the scrutiny of the Welsh Government’s expenditure and 
policy-making would, therefore, reap significant dividends to the taxpayer. To this 
end, we agree with the view of the Silk Commission that: 
 Good scrutiny means good legislation, and good legislation pays for 
itself.15 
 
Recommendation 2. The Remuneration Board and Assembly Commission should 
consider how the total staffing support, services and financial resources provided 
to Members can be altered in the case of a larger Assembly, so that the cost of 
implementing our recommendations is kept to an absolute minimum. 
 
  
                                            
15 Commission on Devolution in Wales, Empowerment and responsibility: legislative powers to 
strengthen Wales, 2014 
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04. THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE 
ASSEMBLY 
Development of the Assembly’s role and powers 
04.01. The present Assembly is substantially different from that first elected in 1999. 
As Figure 1 shows, over time the institution has acquired greater legislative, policy 
and fiscal responsibilities, and there are further changes ahead. The Wales Act 
2017 will introduce a reserved powers model of devolution, the first Welsh taxes in 
800 years are starting to come on stream, and the Assembly will have income tax-
varying powers with effect from 2019. 
04.02. Nevertheless, while the role and responsibilities of the Assembly and its 
Members have changed significantly since 1999, these very different functions are 
still carried out by 60 individuals. 
 
Figure 1 Development of the Assembly’s role and powers since 1999 
 
Assembly established by the Government of Wales Act 1998, with limited 
powers to make secondary legislation. 
 
Assembly resolves to informally separate its executive and legislative functions, 
and establishes the Richard Commission on the Powers and Electoral 
Arrangements of the National Assembly for Wales. 
 
Richard Commission reports, making recommendations to increase the powers 
and size of the Assembly. 
 
Government of Wales Act 2006 formally separates the legislature and 
executive, and provides the Assembly with primary legislative powers within the 
framework of Legislative Competence Orders. 
 
Following a referendum, the Assembly gains primary legislative powers without 
involvement from Westminster or Whitehall. UK Government establishes the Silk 
Commission to consider the future of the devolution settlement in Wales. 
 
Silk Commission publishes Part I of its report, making recommendations on the 
financial powers of the Assembly. 
1999 
2002 
2004 
2007 
2011 
2012 
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Silk Commission publishes Part II of its report, making recommendations on the 
Assembly’s future legislative powers and arrangements. 
 
UK Government publishes Powers for a Purpose, providing the basis for the 
development of a reserved powers model of devolution for Wales. 
 
Assembly passes Tax Collection and Management (Wales) Act 2016, in 
preparation for exercising the taxation and borrowing powers devolved by the 
Wales Act 2014. 
 
Commencement of reserved powers model of devolution under the Wales Act 
2017, and coming on stream of Welsh taxes. 
 
Activation of income tax-varying powers, as provided by the Wales Act 2014. 
 
  
2014 
2015 
2016 
2018 
2019 
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Brexit and the future of Wales and the UK outside the 
European Union 
04.03. The UK’s decision to leave the EU is likely to bring further changes to the 
Assembly’s role and workload. The Assembly has a critical role in ensuring that the 
voice of the Welsh people is heard in the Brexit negotiations. It will need to play its 
part in overseeing the negotiations, and scrutinising the legislation which will follow. 
04.04. The precise nature of the impact of Brexit on the Assembly’s role, powers 
and workload is not yet clear, as we cannot know with any certainty at this point 
what the constitutional arrangements will be in the post-Brexit UK, nor what the 
repatriation of powers from the EU will mean for the responsibilities and legislative 
competence of the Assembly. However, the UK Government has indicated that it 
anticipates the responsibilities of the Assembly, the Northern Ireland Assembly and 
the Scottish Parliament will increase. Speaking in the House of Commons in March 
2017, the Secretary of State for Exiting the EU stated that following the UK’s exit 
from the EU: 
 We will see a significant increase in the amount of powers given to the 
devolved institutions…16 
04.05. This was reiterated by the Secretary of State for Wales in September 2017: 
 We are now in another period of change for Welsh devolution—the 
devolution of powers that are repatriated when we leave the EU. We 
have been clear from the outset that the outcome of the process will 
be an increase in the decision-making powers of the Assembly and 
the Welsh Government.17 
04.06. We note that the Welsh Government has expressed concern that the EU 
(Withdrawal) Bill could reduce the powers available to the Assembly. In a press 
release accompanying the publication of a Legislative Consent Memorandum 
which sets out the Welsh Government’s view that the Assembly should withhold its 
consent to the Bill as currently drafted, the First Minister stated: 
                                            
16 House of Commons, 30 March 2017 c440 
17 Wales Office, ‘Welsh Secretary marks 20 years of devolution in Wales’, 18 September 2017 
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 The EU (Withdrawal) Bill, as it currently stands, would allow the UK 
government to hijack powers which should come to Wales post-Brexit. 
 
Our position is clear and unequivocal; we do not accept the bill in its 
current form and recommend that the Assembly does not grant its 
consent. 
 
This is not about stopping Brexit. This is about protecting the interests of 
the people of Wales. We simply cannot back any law which would 
see Wales lose influence over areas that are rightfully ours to control.18 
04.07. The UK Government has also indicated its view that, post-Brexit, certain 
policy areas would benefit from the establishment of common frameworks across 
the UK. Huw Irranca-Davies AM, Chair of the Assembly’s Constitutional and 
Legislative Affairs Committee, stated in June 2017 that: 
 Overall, the key issue that needs to be addressed by the UK 
Government is the creation of a legal and constitutional context that 
serves the devolved nations and UK following exit from the EU. That 
context needs to be developed in partnership with devolved nations 
rather than being imposed upon them.19 
04.08. It is clear that the Assembly will have a role to play in scrutinising the 
establishment and operation of any such legal, constitutional and policy 
frameworks, whatever form they take. We can therefore expect that the 
Assembly’s role during the Brexit process, and within the post-Brexit UK, will include 
shaping public policy in Wales in areas previously reliant on approaches set at 
European level; scrutinising a large volume of primary legislation, secondary 
legislation and Legislative Consent Memoranda; scrutinising intergovernmental 
working; facilitating and undertaking joint scrutiny with other legislatures; and 
influencing the debate on where powers returned from the EU should lie. 
04.09. While there may be uncertainty about the powers the Assembly has as a 
consequence of Brexit, it is clear that its workload will certainly not be reduced 
and is likely to grow. 
                                            
18 Welsh Government, ‘First Minister takes step to protect Wales post-Brexit’, 12 September 2017 
19 Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee, ’Brexit cannot be imposed on devolved nations, 
says National Assembly committee’, June 2017 
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05. INCREASING CAPACITY WITHOUT 
MORE MEMBERS 
Background 
05.01. During our work, the McCormick Commission on Parliamentary Reform 
published its report, setting out recommendations for the reform of the Scottish 
Parliament.20 In its report, the McCormick Commission encouraged the Scottish 
Parliament to explore options to maximise the capacity of the existing Parliament 
before more radical proposals, for example an increase in the number of 
Members, are considered. 
05.02. Similarly, and in the light of the anticipated changes to the Assembly’s role 
outlined in chapter 04, we have considered whether there is potential to increase 
the capacity of the Assembly without an increase in the number of Members. 
Could the Assembly find new ways of working? 
05.03. Speaking in 2013, the then Secretary of State for Wales, the Rt Hon David 
Jones MP, recognised that the Assembly was an evolving institution, but suggested 
that it should focus on how it operated and engaged with the people of Wales: 
 My challenge to the Assembly—and remember that I speak as a friend 
and former Assembly Member—is to grow as a democratic institution, 
find a way of engaging more purposefully with the people Wales who 
elect it, and connect more directly in the debating chamber with the 
devolved issues that really matter to their electors. What we need is 
not a Cardiff Bay bubble, but a legislature that is truly representative of 
the people of Wales and which robustly reflects their sometimes widely 
divergent views.21 
05.04. We agree that such a focus is vital for any legislature—no parliament or 
assembly should be complacent about its procedures or practices, or the way it 
listens to and engages with the people it represents. Nevertheless, we are also 
mindful of the note of caution put forward by a former Clerk of the House of 
Commons, Lord Lisvane, who stated: 
                                            
20 Commission on Parliamentary Reform, Report on the Scottish Parliament, June 2017 
21 Wales Office, ’Speech: Wales in the continuing union’, 24 June 2013 
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 “New ways of operating” is also a tempting concept, and new 
technology has a part to play. But unless you are prepared to make 
profound changes (such as a virtual Chamber and virtual committees, 
so that Members need not be present, and Parliamentary buildings 
become irrelevant) the currency is always going to be Member time, 
whether Chamber time or Committee time.22 
05.05. The Assembly’s procedures and ways of working have evolved and 
developed throughout its lifetime, both in response to the changing devolution 
settlement and to developments in technology and best parliamentary practice. 
05.06. Plenary procedures have developed and evolved to ensure they are 
relevant, engaging for the public, and effective tools for Members to scrutinise the 
Welsh Government. For example, in the Fifth Assembly, Standing Orders have been 
changed to introduce: 
 Topical questions and emergency questions, in place of the previous 
system of urgent questions; 
 Opportunities for committee chairs to make statements about 
committee inquiries, consultations or activity; 
 90 second statements, enabling Members to raise the profile of specific 
issues of importance to them and their constituents; 
 Debates on an individual Member’s legislative proposals, increasing the 
range of ways in which backbench Members can raise issues in the 
Siambr and present their alternative visions for Wales. 
05.07. Similarly, committees have explored different ways of working. For example, 
in the Third and Fourth Assemblies, committees made use of their powers to 
establish subcommittees to increase their capacity to undertake scrutiny work. 
However, this proved challenging and limited in its effect because of the small size 
of the Assembly. Nevertheless, it remains an option open to committees, and in 
October 2017 the External Affairs and Additional Legislation Committee 
established a subcommittee for the purpose of scrutinising the Regulation of 
Registered Social Landlords (Wales) Bill. Committees have also approached 
scrutiny in innovative ways, for example by making greater use of public 
engagement, digital outreach, visits and social media. Throughout the Fourth and 
Fifth Assemblies, committee chairs, individually and through the establishment of a 
                                            
22 EP03 Lord Lisvane 
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Chairs’ Forum, have driven an increased focus on strategic planning of work 
programmes and improved communication of committees’ work to aid public 
and stakeholder understanding. 
Could non-Members play a greater role in scrutiny? 
05.08. There have been suggestions that the scrutiny capacity of the Assembly 
could be increased by making more effective use of non-Members, for example 
by involving MPs or councillors in pre-legislative scrutiny or the oversight of the 
Welsh Government.23 This was also considered by the Silk Commission, which 
stated in its 2014 report that: 
 A number of possible remedies to the ‘capacity gap’ have been 
suggested. One is to add unelected, non-voting members to 
committees, or to create a second Chamber. These are 
democratically problematic and we do not recommend them. 
Greater flexibility on the number and size of committees; increased 
research staff capacity; and better use of Assembly Members’ time—
‘smarter working’—are other suggested remedies. Each may bring 
some relief, and we encourage the National Assembly and its Business 
Committee to consider them. However, they cannot provide the long-
term solution needed. We are convinced that the National Assembly 
requires more backbench members who will be able to scrutinise 
Welsh Government legislation and policy more thoroughly.24 
05.09. The Assembly’s committees draw on external expertise and advice to assist 
them in their work. A budget is available to them to retain specialist expert advice 
or to commission research. Committees have used these funds in a variety of ways, 
including the establishment of stakeholder reference groups, and the appointment 
of expert advisers. Committees have also embedded public engagement and 
outreach in their approach to scrutiny, to bring the perspective of members of the 
public, stakeholders and experts into the design, delivery and evaluation of 
scrutiny. An academic fellowship scheme and PhD candidate internships have 
been established to assist committees and Members, via the Assembly’s Research 
Service, to access expertise via briefings, Member enquiries and proactive 
Research Service publications. Assembly committees also undertake joint scrutiny 
                                            
23 UKIP, Raising the dragon: UKIP manifesto Welsh Assembly elections 2016, April 2016 
24 Commission on Devolution in Wales, Empowerment and responsibility: legislative powers to 
strengthen Wales, 2014 
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with other legislatures, for example holding concurrent sessions with the House of 
Commons Welsh Affairs Committee and working with other Westminster or Scottish 
Parliament committees on policy areas of mutual interest. 
05.10. Similarly, Members also access additional expertise and work with 
stakeholders as members of cross-party groups, or by working in partnership with 
external organisations, campaign groups or groups of constituents as part of their 
representative roles. 
Could the Assembly’s working week be extended? 
05.11. Formal business in the Assembly is undertaken between Mondays and 
Thursdays (see Table 2). In a typical week, Members travel to Cardiff on Monday 
mornings, and committees meet on Monday afternoons. Tuesday mornings see 
some committee meetings and group meetings for political parties. The first 
Plenary session of the week takes place on Tuesday afternoon. On Wednesdays, 
committees meet in the morning, and the second Plenary session takes place in 
the afternoon. Thursdays are dedicated to committee meetings. Fridays are 
reserved for constituency and regional business. 
Table 2 Assembly working week 
 AM PM 
Monday 
Constituency/regional business 
and/or travel to Cardiff Bay 
Committee meetings 
Tuesday 
Committee meetings and political 
party group meetings 
Plenary 
Wednesday Committee meetings Plenary 
Thursday Committee meetings 
Friday Constituency/regional business 
 
05.12. With the exception of the Standards of Conduct, Petitions, and Scrutiny of 
the First Minister committees, Assembly committees meet weekly. Meeting slots are 
allocated by the Business Committee in a fortnightly timetable, in which the 
majority of the committees are allocated one Wednesday morning meeting slot 
and one Thursday all day meeting slot, giving them a day and a half of meeting 
time per fortnight. Committees can also seek permission from the Business 
Committee to hold additional meetings or undertake visits or informal 
engagement activity outside these slots. The alternating timetable, which was 
introduced at the beginning of the Fourth Assembly, increases the scope for 
committees to undertake visits or hold formal meetings away from the Assembly 
estate on Thursdays, when Members do not have competing Plenary 
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commitments. Further changes to the timetable took place at the beginning of 
the Fifth Assembly, when the number of committees meeting regularly on a 
Monday was increased from one to three. 
05.13. The Hansard Society found that Members elected for the first time in 2011 
found that the regimented nature of the Assembly timetable—combined with strict 
whipping arrangements resulting from the political balance in the Fourth Assembly, 
the small size of the Assembly and the associated visibility of any absences from 
committee or Plenary meetings—made it difficult to engage with other elements 
of the role, including engagement with external organisations, groups or the 
public.25 For example, meetings had to be “squeezed in during the early morning 
before business starts, during the one-hour pause in business for lunch, or at the 
very end of the day”. These gaps are also targeted by lobbyists and campaigners, 
whether in person or by email. Campaigners also target Plenary times for email 
correspondence, as Members are at their computers. 
05.14. One of the founding principles of the Assembly is that family friendly 
working should be embedded in its culture, ethos and procedures. We 
acknowledge that ‘family friendly’ can be interpreted in different ways by 
Members according to their personal circumstances. For example a Member 
representing a constituency or region within the inner area might find it more 
conducive to family life or the fulfilment of caring responsibilities if formal business 
were to be spread over a greater number of days, but finish earlier each day, 
whereas a Member representing a constituency or region in the outer area who is 
unable to commute from their family home to the Assembly each day might prefer 
the reverse. Nevertheless, the principle is given effect by Standing Order 11.10, 
which requires that the Assembly’s timetable must have regard to: 
 …the family and constituency or electoral region responsibilities of 
Members and their likely travel arrangements; and should normally 
seek to avoid timetabling business before 9.00am or after 6.00pm on 
any working day.26 
05.15. Today, these parameters are not adhered to strictly (Plenary business 
frequently runs later, for instance) and it is, of course, within the gift of the Assembly 
to change its Standing Orders. Nevertheless, a significant move away from the 
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principle of family friendly working would be a regressive step, and could present a 
barrier to the diversity of the institution’s membership. 
05.16. In addition, the requirement for Members to sit on multiple committees, 
which results from the Assembly’s small size, places constraints on the number of 
committees which can meet simultaneously, limiting the scope to increase 
capacity by increasing the time available to each committee. Similar limits on the 
scope to increase meeting time, for example by the dual running of Plenary and 
committees, result from the expectation embedded in the Assembly’s culture that 
there will be full attendance at committee and Plenary as far as possible. This has 
its roots in the recommendations made on the establishment of the Assembly by 
the National Assembly Advisory Group, and is given effect by the Assembly’s 
Protocol on Conduct in the Chamber and the committee timetable established by 
the Business Committee. 
05.17. There are also practical reasons for the expectation of full attendance—the 
small size of the Assembly means that a high proportion of Members are active in 
Plenary meetings each week compared to larger legislatures. Timetabling formal 
committee business during Plenary meetings would likely have a detrimental 
impact on attendance and participation in both committee and Plenary 
meetings. For example, Sophie Wilson of the Institute for Government highlighted 
the potential impact on parliamentary committees of poor or variable attendance 
at committee meetings, particularly in relation to larger committees: 
 Large committees often find that a slightly different cast list attends 
each meeting, so each member ends up hearing a different 
combination of evidence and drawing different conclusions.27 
05.18. Daniel Greenberg, a former Parliamentary Counsel, suggested that 
alleviation of the individual burden on Members, and thereby the barriers to 
effective scrutiny: 
 …could be achieved in part by formalising work in preparation for and 
in connection with Committee membership, building on existing 
relationships between AMs’ offices and Commission staff. Identifying 
an expanded formal work stream for Committee papers, for example, 
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could ring-fence time and attention both of AMs and, crucially, their 
support staff.28 
Could the number of sitting weeks be increased? 
05.19. When it was established, in order to take account of the advice of the 
National Assembly Advisory Group in respect of family friendly working practices, 
the Assembly agreed to align recesses with school holidays where possible. In the 
early years of the Assembly, it sat for fewer weeks each year than the Westminster 
and Scottish Parliaments and the Northern Ireland Assembly. As the responsibilities 
and workload of the Assembly have increased, however, the number of sitting 
weeks has risen also so that, today, it is in line with the other parliaments of the UK. 
05.20. In the last directly comparable year (a non-election year), September 2014 
to September 2015, the Scottish Parliament sat for 36 weeks compared to the 
Assembly’s 35. In 2016, the House of Commons sat for 36 weeks. Between 
September 2016 and September 2017 the Assembly and the Scottish Parliament 
both sat for 36 weeks. The House of Commons was programmed to sit for just over 
35 weeks during the same period (had the UK general election not been called).29 
Could improved training increase capacity? 
05.21. The increasing powers and responsibilities of the Assembly and its Members 
have brought a corresponding increase in the range and specialism of the skills 
they require. To help equip Members with the skills they need, the Assembly 
Commission established a Members’ Professional Development team with 
responsibility for induction of Members and their staff, and an ongoing training and 
professional development programme. 
05.22. The programme of professional development covers all aspects of 
Members’ roles, including legislative scrutiny and amendment, questioning, and 
financial and policy oversight. Between April 2016 and March 2017, 44 Members 
and 162 Members’ support staff participated in training and development 
activities. 
05.23. The Hansard Society has noted that Members have been criticised publicly 
for the cost and subject of the training they have received, and suggested that 
this was “unfair and unhelpful”. It noted that: 
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29 See chapter 06 for further discussion of recess periods. 
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 …training and development provision is commonplace in most work 
environments, and to deny AMs the opportunity to improve their 
scrutiny of government and their service to constituents seems 
perverse. People from a range of backgrounds will have a range of 
skills, and expecting every politician to arrive ‘fully-formed’ at election 
is unrealistic and would restrict representation only to those who have 
spent many years working in politics.30 
Are the right support and resources available to 
Members? 
05.24. Members are provided with a range of different resources and support, 
primarily by the Remuneration Board and the Assembly Commission (see Figure 2 
for examples). The Welsh Government provides additional support to Members 
who hold executive positions. Some resource and support is also provided by 
external organisations, for example groups or organisations may provide 
secretariat support to cross-party groups, or provide briefing material or research 
to Members. 
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Figure 2 Support and resources available to Members 
ASSEMBLY BUSINESS 
Support and resources include access to the Commission’s research, library, legal, 
clerking, communications and translation services; the Policy, Research and 
Communications fund; Record of Proceedings and transcripts; ICT provision; 
comprehensive support for the development of Member Bills; support from the 
Members’ Business Support service; Remuneration Board funds to employ 
Members’ own support staff; specific support for office holders in the exercise of 
their functions; training and professional development; committee expert advisers 
or commissioned research; external advice from lobbyists or campaign groups. 
CARDIFF BAY OFFICE 
Including security, office accommodation support, office space and parking in 
Cardiff Bay, health and safety support, and canteen facilities. 
CONSTITUENCY/REGIONAL OFFICES 
Financial support to cover the cost of running a constituency or regional office, 
including the employment of support staff, and the provision of ICT and office 
equipment. 
COMMUNICATIONS AND ENGAGEMENT 
Including access to the Policy, Research and Communications fund, support for 
holding events on the Assembly estate, printing costs for Member surgeries, and 
postal services. 
CONSTITUENCY/REGIONAL MATTERS AND CASEWORK 
Including access to the Commission’s research, library and legal services, 
casework software, translation services, as well as Members’ own support staff. 
POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
Including access to the Commission’s research, library and legal services, access 
to the Policy, Research and Communications fund, party group support (including 
group support staff) funded by the Remuneration Board, national party support, 
access to Electoral Commission Policy Development Grant, external advice from 
lobbyists or campaign groups, and cross-party groups. 
WORKING AWAY FROM HOME 
Including budgets for travel within Wales and extended travel elsewhere in the UK 
or EU, limited provision for international travel, limited provision for partner or 
dependant travel between constituency/region and Cardiff Bay, hotel stays for 
approved business away from Cardiff Bay, residential accommodation allowances 
for some Members, additional allowances for Members with caring responsibilities. 
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05.25. Despite this extensive range of provision, Lord Lisvane warned of the 
dangers of seeing staff support as an alternative to Member capacity: 
 “Better staff support” is a tempting option (to Members, at any rate) 
but it has potentially serious disadvantages. You cannot make up with 
staff for the non-engagement (for whatever reason) of Members, 
because you risk the political process being staff-driven, rather than 
Member-driven. That means in turn that non-elected staff have 
inappropriate political power, and that does not (or should not) play 
well with the public.31 
05.26. Nevertheless, both the Remuneration Board and the Commission have 
taken steps to adjust and improve the support available to Members with a view 
to maximising the capacity of the Assembly. This has included, for example, 
enhancement to Members’ staffing support, changes to Commission staffing 
structures, and the development of tailored services to support Members. 
Our conclusions 
05.27. We have explored a range of ways in which the capacity of the Assembly 
could be enhanced without increasing the number of Members. Such alternatives 
should continue to be explored—like other legislatures, the Assembly must not 
become complacent. Nevertheless, none of these approaches can address the 
underlying limiting factor: the severely limited time available for the 60 elected 
Members to carry out the full range of their responsibilities. This is, necessarily, a 
limiting factor on the capacity of the Assembly to truly be a parliament that works 
for the people of Wales.  
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06. THE ROLES OF ASSEMBLY MEMBERS 
Background 
06.01. The way in which the Assembly structures itself and the procedures it puts in 
place are significant factors in any assessment of the capacity of the institution 
and the way it fulfils its functions. A central part of the role of Assembly Members 
who are not part of the Welsh Government is the scrutiny of policy, spending, 
taxation and legislation. We explore this role in more detail in chapter 07. But, we 
are clear that it is not the only role which Members fulfil. As highlighted by the 
Assembly’s Remuneration Board, there is no job description for an Assembly 
Member32 and so a further factor is the way in which Members individually, or 
within parties, choose to fulfil their roles. 
Office holders 
06.02. Between them, the 60 Assembly Members carry out a range of specialist 
roles and offices, including First Minister, Counsel General, Cabinet Secretaries, 
Ministers, Llywydd, Deputy Presiding Officer, committee chairs, Assembly 
Commissioners, party leaders and business managers. Like any legislature, the 
Assembly relies on these office holders to drive its work. The roles are common to 
any parliamentary body, regardless of size. However, in a small institution like the 
Assembly, while the number of offices is likely to be broadly similar to other 
legislatures, the smaller overall size means that they represent a higher percentage 
of the total membership. For example, Table 3 compares the proportion of 
Members undertaking executive or other office holder roles in the Assembly and 
the Scottish Parliament. In Wales there are 38 additional offices, representing 63 
per cent of the membership. In Scotland there are 58 additional offices, but this 
comprises only 45 per cent of the membership. 
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Table 3 Office holder roles in the National Assembly for Wales and the Scottish Parliament 
National Assembly 
for Wales 
Scottish 
Parliament 
Members 60 129 
Total office holders 38 63% 58 45% 
Comprising: 
Executive roles 14 23% 24 19% 
Llywydd/Deputy 
Presiding Officer 
2 3% 3 2% 
Committee chairs 12 20% 14 11% 
Other office holders 10 17% 17 22% 
Notes: Assumes maximum size of Welsh Government permitted under the Government of Wales Act 
2006. Figures for Wales exclude Business Committee and Scrutiny of the First Minister Committee. 
Figures for Scotland exclude equivalent of Business Committee, and Private Bill committees, the 
Standards Committee and Justice Sub-Committee. ‘Other office holders’ includes Commissioners or 
equivalent, non-government business managers, and non-government party leaders. In Scotland, 
figure includes four Government Whips (in addition to the Chief Whip who is included under 
‘Executive’). 
06.03. A similar comparison in February 2017 with the House of Commons showed 
that there were some 500 MPs who did not hold either executive or office holder 
roles. Of these MPs, 115 were backbench MPs who did not sit on any committee or 
hold any other additional roles.33 
Representing constituents 
06.04. The formal legislative and scrutiny business of the Assembly cannot, and 
should not, be wholly separated from Members’ roles as constituency or regional 
representatives. 
06.05. Members are elected to the Assembly by their constituents, and a key 
element of their role is the representation of those constituents and their interests. 
Working in their constituencies or regions, Members provide support, advice and 
assistance to their constituents, take on casework for individuals or groups, and 
undertake local and national campaigning. They also see how policies and 
legislation operate in practice, which can provide valuable insight for their scrutiny 
and oversight work. In addition, Members are the public face of the Assembly as 
an institution. 
06.06. In 2011 and 2012, research by the Hansard Society showed that, typically, 
Members held approximately four surgeries per month, had seven or eight other 
33 Figures provided by the House of Commons Library in February 2017. 
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local public engagements, and received many hundreds of emails per week.34 
Members are increasingly accessible to their constituents via email, text message 
and social media. This may have contributed to the findings of investigations by 
the Assembly’s independent Remuneration Board, which have highlighted 
increases in the levels of constituency casework Members face, not least because 
of rising expectations from constituents and new technologies.35 Lord Lisvane, a 
former Clerk of the House of Commons, noted that similar trends have been 
observed in Westminster: 
 …over the last thirty years or so, the constituency demands upon 
Members of the House of Commons have increased hugely. This has 
meant that their physical availability for certain types of activity, and 
the time that they are able or prepared to devote, has declined 
markedly.36 
06.07. People in Wales are represented by their local councillors, their Assembly 
Members, their MPs and their MEPs. It is therefore legitimate to consider the ways in 
which these different representative roles intersect in relation to constituency 
representation. Using data from a survey of legislators in eight multi-level 
democracies and six unitary democracies, Andre, Bradbury and Depauw suggest 
that regional legislators, such as Assembly Members, “typically maintain closer 
contacts with constituents” than national legislators such as MPs. They 
demonstrated that: 
 …national legislators [MPs] devote less time to constituency service in 
multi-level than in unitary democracies; and that regional legislators 
[AMs] devote more time than national legislators in multi-level 
democracies.37 
06.08. Their work took account of the distribution of policy issues between regional 
and national legislatures, and particularly where responsibility sat for those issues 
which matter most to constituents’ daily lives. They also suggest that regional 
                                            
34 Hansard Society, Assembly Line? The Experiences and Development of New Assembly Members, 
2013 
35 Ibid 
36 EP03 Lord Lisvane 
37 André, A., Bradbury, J. and Depauw, S. (2014) Constituency Service in Multi-level Democracies, 
Regional & Federal Studies, 24:2, 129-150 
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legislators may have more contact with local authorities and constituents’ action 
groups than their national counterparts, leading to more time focusing on 
constituency or regional casework.38 While there is no specific research on the 
importance to their constituents of elected Members’ representative roles in 
Wales, the findings of research undertaken by Campbell and Lovenduski in relation 
to the House of Commons suggest that voters value such work.39 
06.09. The four Wales MEPs will be removed from the network of elected 
representatives when the UK leaves the European Union. If the review of 
Westminster constituency boundaries expected to be completed in 2018 is 
implemented, the number of MPs elected from Welsh constituencies will reduce 
from 40 to 29 in future UK general elections.40 Both changes are likely to increase 
demand on Assembly Members. 
Political party roles 
06.10. Party is the basis of elective politics in Europe and most democracies, and 
Assembly Members are, for the most part, members and representatives of 
political parties. As such, they have responsibilities which they must fulfil. While 
some of those responsibilities are purely party political—such as campaigning for 
Assembly or other elections or attending party meetings and conferences—they 
still represent calls on Members’ time, and are therefore relevant to our 
consideration of the capacity of the Assembly. Other party roles also play a role in 
the smooth and effective operation of the Assembly: for example party leaders, 
whips and spokespeople. 
  
                                            
38 André, A., Bradbury, J. and Depauw, S., Constituency Service in Multi-level Democracies, 
Regional & Federal Studies, 24:2, 2014, pp. 129-150 
39 Campbell, R. and Lovenduski, J., What should MPs do? Public and parliamentarians’ views 
compared, Parliamentary Affairs, Volume 68, Issue 4, 1 October 2015, pp. 690–708. 
40 The Boundary Commission for Wales published its 2018 Review of Parliamentary Constituencies: 
Revised Proposals Report on 17 October 2017. While the report makes some revisions to the 
boundaries proposed in its initial review in 2016, it still proposes a reduction in the number of MPs 
representing constituencies in Wales from 40 to 29. 
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Media and communications 
06.11. As the public face of the institution, and in order to undertake their 
representative, Assembly business and political roles, Members must communicate 
effectively with their constituents, stakeholder groups, and the media. The impact 
of such activity on Members’ workloads will depend in part on the way they 
choose to fulfil their roles, and any additional roles they hold. For example, a 
Member with responsibilities as an opposition party spokesperson on an issue which 
is the subject of public debate may have additional responsibilities for articulating 
their party’s alternative policy vision in the media or at public events. At the launch 
of a committee report, committee chairs would be expected to be available for 
interview by media outlets. Many Members make active use of social media as a 
channel for communicating with their constituents or promoting campaigns on 
issues of local or national importance. Members of the public engaging with 
Assembly Members on social media are likely to expect a response in a short 
timeframe, regardless of the complexity of their inquiry. 
Cross-party groups 
06.12. Many Members are members of cross-party groups. Such groups are not 
part of the formal business of the Assembly, nor do they have a formal role in 
policy development. Nevertheless, they provide opportunities for Members to work 
on a cross-party basis to consider specific issues in depth, undertake research, 
produce reports making recommendations or articulating alternative policy visions, 
and to network and work closely with stakeholder or campaign groups. 
Employers 
06.13. In addition to their other roles, all Assembly Members are employers. The 
Remuneration Board’s Determination on Members’ Pay and Allowances provides 
that each Member may employ up to three FTE staff to assist them with their role as 
an Assembly Member. Party leaders may employ party group staff to support the 
Assembly group in their Assembly work. Members also establish offices in their 
constituencies and regions in order to engage with their electorate. 
06.14. Assembly Members therefore have significant responsibilities as employers, 
to manage their staff effectively and in line with legislation and good practice, 
and to meet the statutory and other considerations that come with entering 
contracts, leasing property, meeting health, safety and accessibility obligations 
and so on. 
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What Members do 
Priorities and workloads 
06.15. After the election in 2011, the Hansard Society asked the 23 newly-elected 
Members about the time requirements of the role. Particular issues raised included 
the long hours and competing priorities. It found that two months after election 
Members were reporting working an average of 49 hours per week, plus an 
additional nine hours of travel. After a year in office this had increased to 57 hours 
per week on average (plus travel).41 
06.16. Researchers asked the new Members to rank the different elements of their 
roles in order of priority. The results are shown in Table 4. After nearly a year in 
office, Members’ priorities were largely unchanged, with the exception of the 
average ranking for ‘holding the government to account’ increasing from fourth 
to first, and ‘championing constituency in the Assembly’ decreasing from first to 
fourth. 
Table 4 Hansard Society research on Members' priorities42 
How would you rank the following aspects of your job as 
an Assembly Member in order of priority? 
July 2011 
(average 
rankings) 
April 2012 
(average 
rankings) 
Championing constituency in the Assembly 1 4 
Scrutinising legislation 2 2 
Helping individual constituents 3 3 
Holding the government to account 4 1 
Local campaigning 5 5 
Commenting on political or constituency issues in the 
media 
6 6 
Supporting the party 7 7 
National campaigning 8 8 
 
06.17. The Hansard Society asked Members how they spent their time in a typical 
working week. In term time, Members spent on average 65 per cent in Cardiff Bay 
and 35 per cent in the constituency or region. In recess 15 per cent of Members’ 
time was spent in Cardiff Bay and 85 per cent in the constituency or region. New 
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Members reported splitting their time roughly evenly between the Siambr (22 per 
cent), committee (21 per cent) and constituency work (21 per cent).43 
06.18. Members reported that the pressures on their time—for example the need 
to work through the weekend to attend local meetings, undertake research, or 
keep up with reading and paper work—affected the balance between their work 
and personal lives: 
 A number of AMs referred to the lack of reading time and thinking 
time available in their week: “Enormous time pressures, long commute, 
put on weight, little personal time”. 
 
Time problems become even more apparent when asking AMs about 
their balance between work and personal time. Over the course of 
their first year new AMs’ satisfaction with their work-life balance 
decreased considerably, reflecting their reported increase in working 
hours.44 
06.19. In 2014, Bangor University undertook research on the barriers to standing for 
election to the Assembly, and found that respondents: 
 …strongly noted the work-life imbalance as a potential barrier, with 
respondents discussing both the stress of the role itself as well as the 
impact it has on their family and social lives.45 
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campaigning (13 per cent) and national campaigning (7 per cent). 
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Sitting weeks 
06.20. Figure 3 provides illustrative examples of typical sitting weeks for two 
backbench Assembly Members. The examples do not reflect any specific week or 
any particular Member, rather they identify the potential commitments Members 
might have as a result of fulfilling their varied roles. 
06.21. Case study 1 (Figure 3a) reflects a Member who: 
 Is a spokesperson for an opposition party; 
 Represents a constituency in the outer area (as defined by the 
Remuneration Board) meaning that they receive financial support for 
accommodation in Cardiff Bay; 
 Is a member of Committee A, which meets on Tuesdays, and 
Committee B, which meets on alternate Wednesdays and Thursdays; 
 Is an Assembly Commissioner. 
06.22. Case study 2 (Figure 3b) reflects a Member who: 
 Represents a region in the inner area, approximately 45 minutes from 
Cardiff Bay. This means that they do not receive financial support for 
accommodation in Cardiff Bay; 
 Is a member of Committee C, which meets on a Monday, and chair of 
Committee D, which meets on alternate Wednesdays and Thursdays. As 
a chair, they are also a member of the Committee for the Scrutiny of 
the First Minister and the Chair’s Forum.  
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Figure 3a ‘Typical’ sitting week: Member 1 
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office to home
S
a
tu
rd
a
y
S
u
n
d
a
y
Morning Afternoon Evening
Hold interviews for vacancy in 
Cardiff Bay office
13:00-16:00 Assembly Commission meeting, 
including discussion of budget strategy
Read papers for Committee A 
(35 pages) and prepare 
questions for Cabinet Secretary
09:00-11:00 Committee A 
meeting, including evidence 
session with Cabinet Secretary 
and forward work planning
13:30-18:00 Plenary, including questioning Cabinet Secretary on policy statement, speaking in 
Government debate, voting on motions. During Plenary, deal with correspondence, prepare 
ideas for Members' Bill ballot, read Committee B papers, leave Siambr for meetings with 
constituents and campaign groups, prepare press release for a local campaign and update 
social media on the issues raised in Plenary.
Meetings, for example with stakeholders or 
academics, constituents, lobby groups, 
petitioners. In between meetings, deal with 
queries from support staff on complex or 
sensitive casework.
9:15-15:00 Committee B meeting, including proposing, debating and voting on amendments to a Bill, and proposing idea for 
a future inquiry
Travel home from Cardiff Bay. During train journey, deal with correspondence, 
including queries from support staff on casework, questions from the media 
about the Bill Committee B is considering, and social media queries from 
constituents. Request Research Service enquiries on issues for Plenary the next 
week.
Constituency activity, for example including meetings with constituency office staff, advice 
surgeries, casework, visiting local schools, meetings with local authority, attending local 
events, and travelling around constituency
Political party policy 
committee meeting to 
prepare for upcoming 
conference
Constituency activity, for example including meetings with constituency office staff, advice surgeries, meetings with local businesses or 
organisations, attending and speaking at local events, media work, and reviewing and signing casework letters prepared by support staff
Attend local event in 
constituency
Political and constituency activity, for example including canvassing, 
attending local events, visiting local community groups, answering Facebook 
queries
Travel from home to Cardiff Bay. During train journey, read meeting papers 
and background briefings, deal with correspondence, review draft written 
questions prepared by support staff, reviewing cost and location options for 
constituency office move.
13:30-18:30 Plenary, including asking spokesperson questions to Cabinet Secretary, speaking in 
debate on Committee A report, voting on motions. During Plenary, leave Siambr to meet 
Committee B staff to discuss possible amendments to a Bill, to meet a Minister about a 
constituency matter, and to meet other Committee B Members to negotiate support for 
amendments.
Prepare speaking notes and 
questions for Plenary business 
next week
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Figure 3b ‘Typical’ sitting week: Member 2 
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Political canvassing in the region, attending local litter picks or other community events, 
informal discussions with constituents at local farmers' market
Travel from home to mid-
Wales
10:45-12:30 Committee for 
Scrutiny of the First Minister 
meeting
Travel to regional office from 
mid-Wales
Meetings with constituents to 
discuss local concerns and 
casework
Correspondence and 
casework, including dealing 
with support staff queries, 
reviewing draft responses, 
reading briefings etc.
Regional actvity, for example including attending local events, speaking at public meetings, holding advice 
surgeries, dealing with casework, travelling around region, replying to emails, letters and social media 
enquiries, and visiting local hospital
13:30-18:00 Plenary, including questioning Cabinet Secretary, leading and responding to 
debate on Committee D report, and speaking in opposition debate. During Plenary, 
background research on issues in Committee C's portfolio, and prepare proposal for 
committee inquiry, strategic planning for upcoming local authority election campaign. Leave 
Siambr to meet Welsh Government adviser about upcoming regional event.
13:30-19:30 Plenary, including asking supplementary question during FMQs, debating and 
voting on amendments to Bill and voting on motions. During Plenary, prepare for cross-party 
group meeting, and prepare speech for local event. Leave Siambr to meet Cabinet Secretary 
to discuss Committee D recommendations, and to record clips to promote upcoming 
Committee D Plenary debate.
9:00-12:00 Chair Committee D meeting, including oral 
evidence sessions with witnesses and private consideration of 
draft report
Regional activity, for example including meetings with regional office staff, advice surgeries, casework, meetings with constituents or local community groups, 
returning calls, travelling around region, discussing complex casework with staff, answering social media queries
Morning Afternoon Evening
Read papers for Committee C 
meeting (55 pages) and 
background report relating to 
upcoming inquiry (50 pages)
12:00-15:00 Committee C meeting, including 
leading a roundtable discussion with 
stakeholders and receiving a technical briefing 
on a Bill
Read papers for Committee D including 
reviewing and amending draft report 
prepared by committee support staff
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Recess 
06.23. The Assembly sits for around 36 weeks per year. For the remaining 16 weeks, 
the Assembly is in recess. However, recess periods are not holidays for Members. 
The time is important in informing Members’ decision-making and their day-to-day 
deliberations as policy makers, legislators, and constituency or regional 
representatives. Informal discussions with Members from different political parties 
suggest that they generally regard at least 12 recess weeks per year to be 
‘constituency weeks’, during which they undertake a range of different activities, 
for example: 
 Engagement: visits within the constituency or region; attending national 
or local events to support constituents; gauging constituents’ views on 
specific issues for example by conducting surveys or holding public 
meetings; meeting with members of the third sector or local 
campaigning groups; using opportunities such as the summer shows to 
reach out to constituents they would not otherwise reach. 
 Advocacy: holding additional surgeries and meetings with constituents; 
undertaking casework; meeting local authorities, health boards or other 
public service providers to pursue issues raised by constituents. 
 Campaigning: running campaigns on local issues; pursuing issues not 
ordinarily within their party spokesperson portfolio; election 
campaigning;46 attending party conferences and strategic events. 
 Office-related activities: meaningful contact with staff (especially those 
based in constituency or regional offices) and updating them on 
developments in the Assembly; planning for the forthcoming sitting 
weeks; research and meetings to inform their formal Assembly business 
and scrutiny roles in the coming term; taking part in or providing 
personal and professional development activity and training for 
themselves or their staff. 
06.24. Members highlighted the benefits of recess for high quality engagement 
with their constituents. It provides opportunities for Members to strengthen their 
understanding of the pressures facing public service providers and the issues of 
importance to constituents, local businesses, community groups and charities, and 
to take part in community celebrations and events. Such activity can enhance 
Members’ formal Assembly business and scrutiny work, as well as contributing to 
                                            
46 In the past five years, elections or referenda of national importance have been held in Wales in 
May 2012, May 2014, May 2015, May 2016, June 2016, May 2017 and June 2017. In addition, in Ynys 
Môn, local elections were held in in May 2013 and an Assembly by-election in August 2013. 
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their local accountability and the transparency of the Assembly’s work. One 
Member told us: 
 …it’s very easy to exist in a bubble in Cardiff Bay and not understand 
the very real pressures facing people, businesses and services which is 
why the recess period is an important time to engage with our local 
communities.47 
06.25. Another Member, who represents a constituency some distance from the 
Assembly, noted that many of the important community events, for example 
farmers’ markets or community council meetings, take place during the Assembly 
working week. Recess therefore provides an opportunity which is not available in 
term time to attend such events, and engage with the local community. 
06.26. Recess periods also provide Members with opportunities to take holidays, 
spend time with their families, and maintain healthy and happy personal lives. This 
is particularly important for Members living a distance away from the Assembly 
who may be away from home, partners and children three or four nights per week 
during term time. 
Our conclusions 
06.27. While much of our focus has been on the capacity of the Assembly to fulfil 
its scrutiny and oversight functions, Members’ roles are much broader than their 
participation in formal Assembly business. Members have a range of calls on their 
time, including representing their constituents, undertaking constituency or 
regional casework, party political responsibilities, and responsibilities as employers. 
06.28. There is some evidence to suggest that the volume of constituency and 
regional casework has increased, in part because of constituents’ expectations 
and new technologies, and in part because of the proactive approach taken by 
Members and their staff. There is also considerable evidence to suggest that such 
work is important to constituents, as well as to Members themselves. 
06.29. We strongly believe that Members’ representative, casework and political 
roles cannot and should not be separated from their formal Assembly business 
roles—casework and campaigning can provide insight into the operation of policy 
or legislation on the ground which can enhance scrutiny, and help to ensure that 
the voice of citizens is heard in formal Assembly business. Similarly Members’ 
                                            
47 Informal discussions with Members 
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scrutiny and oversight work, and the expertise they build in specific subject areas, 
enhance their constituency and campaigning work. 
06.30. While Members have no defined job description they consistently report 
working long hours to fulfil a wide range of different tasks. On top of their working 
hours, many have lengthy travel times or are away from home for much of the 
week. The resultant impact on Members creates a barrier for some—for example 
those with caring responsibilities—who might otherwise stand for election, with a 
corresponding impact on the diversity of representation in the Assembly.48 
  
                                            
48 We discuss the potential for Members to stand for election on the basis of job sharing in chapter 
12. This flexibility could mitigate against some of the barriers presented by Members’ roles. 
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07. SCRUTINY AND OVERSIGHT 
Parliamentary scrutiny 
07.01. The scrutiny and oversight of government is a core purpose of any 
parliament. This involves the examination and challenge of what the government 
spends, the decisions it takes, the policies and laws it puts in place, how it 
operates, and the opportunities and risks presented by different courses of action. 
Scrutiny and oversight also extends beyond government to a range of public 
bodies. 
07.02. In carrying out their scrutiny functions, Assembly Members can focus on the 
outcomes and impact of government decisions, policies or legislation for the 
people of Wales. Scrutiny provides opportunities to consider what lessons may be 
learned from action that was taken, whether alternative approaches might have 
been more effective, and the processes by which decisions were taken or actions 
carried out. 
07.03. In this way, Members hold the government to account by challenging 
Ministers or officials to explain the courses of action they have pursued or to justify 
their performance. Scrutiny also enables Members to seek out or gather 
information, whether from government, experts, stakeholders or the public. This 
information can then be used to inform questions, to improve public 
understanding of an issue, or as the basis for recommendations on how to 
approach things differently. And, increasingly, parliamentarians look to involve the 
public directly in their work so that the focus of the legislature, and the actions of 
government, are responsive to the reality of the lives of those they serve. 
07.04. The aim of the scrutiny undertaken by the Assembly and its Members should 
be to improve outcomes for the people of Wales, whether by improving decision-
making, processes or delivery. One way to assess the impact of scrutiny is to 
consider whether outcomes would have been better had the scrutiny not taken 
place. Peter Price, a former member of the Richard Commission, suggested that: 
 The people of Wales have much to gain from increased capacity 
leading to a more effective Assembly. A tiny increase in the 
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effectiveness of government in Wales would pay dividends in multiples 
of the cost…49 
07.05. However, it is not always straightforward to assess the impact of scrutiny 
objectively—clearly a change to policy as a result of scrutiny may be an 
improvement from one person’s perspective but not from another’s. The Institute 
for Government has identified a number of ways in which scrutiny can affect 
government.50 These include facilitating new evidence or analysis, greater 
openness, the potential for learning, improved processes, or shifting the context by 
influencing politicians, the media, the public or other stakeholders. 
07.06. To be effective, scrutiny relies on the power of influence. It requires focus, 
resource and a strategic approach. It also requires effective engagement, 
involvement and input of experts, stakeholders, the public and the media. The 
Institute for Government argues that: 
 …sometimes this web of scrutiny can create an environment that has 
a pre-emptive impact on the decisions of those who are scrutinised—
motivating them to behave in ways that anticipate the potential 
impact of scrutiny rather than waiting for those impacts to happen.51 
  
                                            
49 EP33 Peter Price, European Strategy Counsel 
50 Institute for Government, Parliamentary Scrutiny of Government, January 2015 
51 Ibid 
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Assembly scrutiny 
07.07. The procedures and practices of the Assembly provide Members with 
many ways to fulfil their scrutiny roles, for example: 
 Leading or participating in debates, voting on motions put to the 
Assembly for decision, and raising issues of importance to them and 
their constituents in order to raise the profile of issues or influence the 
Government; 
 Asking oral or written questions of the Welsh Government to seek 
information on matters of importance to them and their constituents; 
 Seeking to amend, and voting on, legislation put to the Assembly for 
decision; 
 Voting on taxes and budgets. 
07.08. In addition to their work in the Assembly’s Siambr, as members of Assembly 
committees, Members undertake scrutiny in greater depth. They do so by holding 
inquiries, examining Welsh Government policy and legislation, holding the Welsh 
Government or other public bodies to account, gathering evidence for the 
purpose of analysis and making recommendations, and considering public 
petitions. They also engage the public directly in the work of the Assembly by 
inviting submissions, taking evidence, undertaking outreach work, and holding 
engagement events. 
07.09. Substantive change is rarely purely a direct result of the recommendations 
made by a committee—rather the impact can be subtle and persuasive. For 
example, the impact of committee scrutiny can include giving greater profile or 
attention to a previously overlooked issue, setting the agenda by identifying areas 
in need of government intervention. Alternatively, it can contribute to existing 
sector-led pressure for action by providing a platform for good ideas or the ‘rocket 
fuel’ needed to help stakeholders’ suggestions find traction. These effects may be 
realised well before a committee publishes a formal report or makes 
recommendations. While we acknowledge that there is a lack of formal research 
around the impact of parliamentary scrutiny at the Assembly and elsewhere, 
Figure 4 highlights some examples of the outcomes of Assembly scrutiny. 
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Figure 4 Case studies of the impact of Assembly scrutiny and oversight 
EQUALITY, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNITIES COMMITTEE INQUIRY INTO 
REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS  
On the basis of evidence from stakeholders that the Welsh Government’s Syrian 
Refugee Taskforce and Operations Board perpetuated a perceived ‘two tier’ 
system between refugees arriving as part of the Syrian Vulnerable Person 
Resettlement Programme and refugees arriving spontaneously, the Committee 
pursued the issue with the Cabinet Secretary. The Welsh Government subsequently 
broadened the remit of the Board to cover all refugees. The Committee also 
pursued issues relating to the quality of accommodation for refugees and asylum 
seekers with the Home Office and Clearsprings (which provides accommodation), 
and subsequently heard via stakeholders that there was now positive 
engagement to explore issues relating to quality and complaints procedures. 
PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE INQUIRY INTO HEALTH BOARD FUNDING  
The Committee recommended in 2012 that local health boards would be able to 
improve financial planning in the medium to long term if their funding and 
financial planning took place on a three-year basis, in line with local authorities. 
The Welsh Government subsequently introduced legislation to set out a legal 
framework for three year plans for health boards’ finances, and the NHS Finance 
(Wales) Act 2014 was subsequently scrutinised and passed by the Assembly. 
ENTERPRISE AND BUSINESS COMMITTEE INQUIRIES INTO TRANSPORT PLANNING FOR 
THE RUGBY WORLD CUP AND THE CARDIFF AIRPORT BUS LINK 
Following a one-day inquiry into the experiences of fans who had queued for hours 
to leave Cardiff following games at the 2014 Rugby World Cup, the Committee 
made a series of recommendations for greater coordination and planning for 
future events. Subsequently, events at the Principality Stadium have trialled 
different approaches with a view to improving transport arrangements for large 
events. During an inquiry into ports and airports, the Committee identified that 
current public transport links were not providing attractive or effective access for 
passengers travelling to or from the airport. The Committee recommended an 
improved, dedicated bus service between Cardiff city centre and Cardiff airport. 
The Government subsequently introduced a half-hourly bus service from Cardiff 
Bay/Central Station to the airport. 
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HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE COMMITTEE INQUIRY INTO PREVENTING THROMBOSIS 
AMONG HOSPITAL PATIENTS 
The Committee’s key recommendation, that reduction of hospital-acquired 
thrombosis should become a Tier 1 priority, was initially rejected by the Welsh 
Government. However, as witnesses stressed this particular recommendation was 
key to making improvements, the Chair and members of the Committee pursued 
this further during the Plenary debate, emphasising the evidence the Committee 
had heard during its scrutiny. In her response to the debate, the Minister agreed to 
overturn her original decision, and accepted the recommendation. 
PETITIONS COMMITTEE WORK ON FAMILY HOLIDAYS DURING SCHOOL TERM TIMES 
The Committee considered two broadly similar petitions relating to inconsistencies 
in the way in which schools and local authorities dealt with requests for absence 
from schools during term time. The Committee took oral evidence from the 
Minister, who then wrote to directors of education and regional education 
consortia to seek evidence that the Welsh Government’s policy was being 
implemented fairly, and to headteachers to restate the policy and ensure schools 
were clear on the arrangements. 
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07.10. In addition to contributing to substantive change, scrutiny can also give rise 
to an engagement dividend. Increasingly, innovative outreach and engagement 
activities, whether through digital or more traditional methods, are a mainstream 
element of the work of the Assembly and its committees. Such activity benefits 
Members and committees—providing real world examples of policies and 
legislation in action, bringing technical subject matters to life, and demonstrating 
the impact of issues on individuals, groups and communities—as well as those who 
participate. For example, we heard about work undertaken by the Economy, 
Infrastructure and Skills Committee as part of its inquiry into business rates. The 
Committee involved individuals and businesses by inviting them to feature in a 
video and take part in a business breakfast event with Members. Evaluation of the 
feelings of participants before and after the event showed a stark uplift in the 
number who felt confident about taking part in future social or political action, 
and a rise in the number who felt that ‘people like me’ could have a say in the 
work of the Assembly.52 
Legislative scrutiny 
07.11. Perhaps the most significant change in the Assembly’s work during the 
course of devolution in Wales has been the volume and complexity of legislative 
scrutiny: 
 A total of 28 Assembly Acts became law in the Fourth Assembly, 
including one proposed by the Commission and two proposed by 
individual Members. It is reasonable to expect the level of legislative 
activity at least to remain the same in the Fifth Assembly. For example, 
the Welsh Government’s legislative programme for 2016–17 contained 
six Bills (including two relating to taxes), and the appetite of individual 
Members and committees to introduce legislative proposals is high; 
 The size and complexity of Assembly Bills are comparable to those in 
other UK parliaments and assemblies. In addition, in Wales the entire 
legislative procedure—from introduction, through scrutiny and 
amendment, to final approval—is undertaken bilingually, as Assembly 
Acts have equal legal status in Welsh and English; 
 The volume of subordinate legislation will increase as a result of Brexit-
related statutory instruments; 
                                            
52 National Assembly for Wales Outreach Team, ’Encouraging public participation in the work of the 
Assembly’, January 2017 
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 The policy and constitutional significance of the Legislative Consent 
Memoranda considered by the Assembly has increased, and is likely to 
do so further as Brexit-related legislation unfolds. 
07.12. The Assembly’s legislative scrutiny process generally includes four stages: 
 Stage 1: consideration of the general principles of the Bill by a 
committee, and the agreement of those general principles by the 
Assembly; 
 Stage 2: detailed consideration by a committee of the Bill and any 
amendments tabled to that Bill; 
 Stage 3: detailed consideration by the Assembly of the Bill and any 
amendments tabled to that Bill; 
 Stage 4: a vote by the Assembly to pass the final text of the Bill; 
 There is an optional additional amending stage—Report stage—which 
can take place between Stages 3 and 4, if proposed by the Member in 
Charge of the Bill and agreed by the Assembly. 
07.13. The impact of Assembly scrutiny can be seen at different stages of the 
process. For example, unlike in Westminster, a key part of the Assembly’s legislative 
process is Stage 1. During Stage 1 a policy and legislation committee and the 
Finance and Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committees consider each Bill in 
detail, and usually publish reports making recommendations for the improvement 
of the legislation. The Welsh Government frequently accepts these cross-party 
committee recommendations, whether for the legislation to be amended, 
additional information to be provided, or for complementary non-legislative action 
to be taken. Members can also table amendments to Bills during amending 
stages. These might take the form of probing amendments, intended to ensure 
issues are debated or to secure commitments from Ministers, or amendments 
which seek to change the text of the Bill. In the period January to March 2016, 34 
amendments tabled by non-Government Members were agreed by the Assembly 
in Plenary (of a total of 930 amendments tabled during the period).53 Since the 
beginning of the Fifth Assembly in May 2016, the Assembly has considered four Bills 
in Plenary. In total, 150 amendments were tabled to these Bills at Stage 3, of which 
109 were agreed. Of these ‘successful’ amendments, eight (7 per cent) were 
                                            
53 National Assembly for Wales Commission, Delivery and transition Annual report and accounts 
2015–16, July 2016. Figures exclude any tabled amendments to amendments. 
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tabled by non-government Members. This represents 16 per cent of the 49 
amendments tabled by non-government Members at Stage 3.54 
07.14. The Assembly’s legislative scrutiny work also includes the scrutiny of 
subordinate legislation—primarily through the work of the Constitutional and 
Legislative Affairs Committee and Plenary, although other committees may also 
choose to scrutinise particular statutory instruments—and Legislative Consent 
Memoranda (the mechanism by which the Assembly considers whether to 
consent to Westminster legislation which touches on devolved subject matters or 
the powers of the Assembly). 
07.15. In addition, there is increasingly a determination from Assembly committees 
to undertake more pre-and post-legislative scrutiny. Daniel Greenberg, a former 
Parliamentary Counsel, suggested that: 
 …in many ways post-legislative scrutiny is a more important way of 
holding the Welsh Government to account in relation to legislation 
than is Committee scrutiny at the Bill stage, at which point predictions 
and concerns must largely be guesswork on both sides. Although the 
Assembly does have an emerging tradition of post-legislative scrutiny, 
there is considerable room for greater rigour and regularity, and 
pressure on Committees is one of the reasons why this is developing 
relatively slowly. […] Expanding pre-legislative scrutiny of Bills would 
also be valuable; but this, of course, is in the hands of the Welsh 
Government, as it cannot be conducted unless the Welsh 
Government chooses to publish a draft Bill.55 
  
                                            
54 Figures exclude any tabled amendments to amendments. 
55 EP01(a) Daniel Greenberg 
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07.16. This suggestion from Daniel Greenberg echoes the recommendations 
made by the Fourth Assembly Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee 
during its inquiry into making laws in Wales that: 
 …there should be a presumption in favour of publishing draft Bills. This 
recommendation applies to the Welsh Government and Assembly 
Members given leave to introduce Bills. 
 
[…] 
 
…committees [should] aim to: 
 
(i) incorporate consideration of post-legislative scrutiny into their 
planning of the scrutiny of individual Bills referred to them by the 
Business Committee; 
(ii) re-visit their proposed approach after Stage 4 has been 
completed, taking into account issues raised during scrutiny.56 
07.17. Effective legislative, pre-legislative and post-legislative scrutiny are vital, 
whether of Bills, subordinate legislation or Legislative Consent Memoranda, 
particularly in a unicameral legislature such as the Assembly. Figure 5 provides 
examples of the impact of such scrutiny by Assembly committees. 
  
                                            
56 National Assembly for Wales Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee, Making Laws in 
Wales, October 2015 
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Figure 5 Case studies of the impact of Assembly legislative scrutiny 
CHILDREN, YOUNG PEOPLE AND EDUCATION COMMITTEE SCRUTINY OF THE 
EDUCATION BILL 
On the basis of evidence heard by the Committee during its Stage 1 scrutiny of the 
Bill, Members recommended that a Part of the Bill which made provision for 
additional learning needs should be removed. Opposition Members tabled 
amendments to this effect. Speaking in the debate on the amendments, the 
Minister indicated that he had considered the recommendation, and agreed to 
accept the amendments. The provisions were therefore removed from the 
Education Bill. Following further policy and legislative development work the 
Government subsequently published a draft Additional Learning Needs Bill, on 
which the Committee carried out pre-legislative scrutiny. The Bill has since been 
introduced in the Fifth Assembly, and is being scrutinised by the Committee’s 
successor. 
HEALTH, SOCIAL CARE AND SPORT COMMITTEE SCRUTINY OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH 
(WALES) BILL 
Following Stage 1 scrutiny of the Bill, the Committee recommended the addition of 
‘sexual offences’ to the list of offences which would prevent someone from being 
issued with a licence to undertake special procedures, such as acupuncture, 
tattooing, body piercing and electrolysis. The Minister accepted the 
recommendation, and tabled an amendment to give effect to it. The amendment 
was agreed and the Bill changed accordingly. 
ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABILITY COMMITTEE SCRUTINY OF THE SUPPLEMENTARY 
LEGISLATIVE CONSENT MEMORANDUM ON THE UK GOVERNMENT’S HOUSING AND 
PLANNING BILL 
The Committee considered a Supplementary Legislative Consent Memorandum in 
relation to the inclusion of compulsory purchase provisions in the UK Government’s 
Housing and Planning Bill. It noted that the UK Government had carried out its 
consultation on an England-only basis, whereas the provisions in the Bill would also 
apply to Wales. The lack of time to consult stakeholders in Wales on the 
application of technical provisions led the Committee to recommend that the 
Assembly did not give consent. The Assembly subsequently voted unanimously to 
withhold consent, and the UK Government amended the Bill. 
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CHILDREN, YOUNG PEOPLE AND EDUCATION COMMITTEE PRE-LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY 
OF THE QUALIFICATIONS WALES BILL 
The Welsh Government planned to establish a Qualifications Wales body with 
combined roles as regulator and awarding body. The role was amended to 
undertake only a regulatory role following scrutiny, and criticism, by the 
Committee. 
HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE COMMITTEE SCRUTINY OF THE CARE AND SUPPORT 
(ELIGIBILITY) (WALES) REGULATIONS 2015 
During the Committee’s scrutiny of the then Social Services and Well-being (Wales) 
Bill, it became clear that the Care and Support (Eligibility) (Wales) Regulations and 
accompanying code of practice would be key to the Act’s implementation. The 
Committee scrutinised the draft regulations, gathering views from stakeholders and 
experts, and wrote to the Minister to highlight concerns relating to the code of 
practice. The Minister agreed to make changes to the code, and wrote to the 
Committee to outline the changes made in response to the Committee’s 
concerns. 
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07.18. During its 2014–15 inquiry into the way legislation is made in Wales, the 
Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee took evidence on the capacity of 
the Assembly to undertake its legislative scrutiny functions. Views expressed by 
witnesses included: 
 The Auditor General for Wales: 
 …scrutiny relies on two things: it relies on the information by which you 
scrutinise, and it relies on time to scrutinise… [T]he Assembly really 
could do with more time to scrutinise legislation. That might mean that 
you need to look perhaps at pre-legislative consultation stages a bit 
more in order to ensure that the legislation itself—not just the intent 
behind legislation, but perhaps the draft Bill itself—is exposed to a 
degree of external scrutiny. Because, with the size of legislature that 
the Assembly is, it will be hard-pressed to scrutinise. I make the same 
point that I did when I was a member of the Richard Commission: I 
think that the Assembly needs more Members to do its job properly.57 
 The Hansard Society: 
 [the Assembly lacks] the capacity that leads to a backbench culture 
of a kind that you find in a bigger legislature. That has implications in 
terms of committee work and legislation…But that’s always struck me 
as one of the issues that defines how Members engage with the 
work.58 
 The then Welsh Government Minister for Finance and Government 
Business, now Leader of the House and Chief Whip: 
 [there is] a lot of pressure on a small number of Members, which goes 
back to the bigger question about our capacity and our ability to 
actually handle a lot of legislation as an Assembly.59 
                                            
57 Auditor General for Wales in National Assembly for Wales Constitutional and Legislative Affairs 
Committee, Making Laws in Wales, October 2015 
58 Hansard Society, Ibid 
59 Welsh Government, Ibid 
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Financial scrutiny 
07.19. In addition to its policy and legislative scrutiny, key elements of the 
Assembly’s responsibilities are the scrutiny of government spending and finances 
and, from the Fifth Assembly onwards, taxation. In 2017–18, the total budget 
subject to the scrutiny and approval of the National Assembly is some £15 billion. 
07.20. The Assembly’s Finance Committee has lead responsibility for oversight of 
this huge sum of public expenditure. Other committees also undertake financial 
scrutiny in the course of their inquiries and legislative scrutiny, as well as scrutiny of 
the budgets and in-year spending within their portfolios. The Assembly’s Public 
Accounts Committee is responsible for scrutinising matters which relate to the 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which resources are employed in the 
discharge of public functions in Wales. 
07.21. The Auditor General for Wales highlighted his concerns that the small size of 
the Assembly could limit its capacity to carry out its financial scrutiny work 
effectively, particularly as the powers of the Assembly increase with the devolution 
of tax powers: 
 …it is worrying that resources spent on careful analysis by staff of the 
WAO may essentially come to be wasted by a lack of Members’ 
reading time. I also find the research60 troubling, though not surprising, 
from the point of view of my position as an office-holder affected by 
Assembly legislation. In particular, I think it helps explain why 
problematic provisions contained in the Public Audit (Wales) Act 2013, 
such as the over-complex and counter-productive provisions 
regarding audit fees, were passed by the Assembly. 
 
[…] 
 
While the number of Members will not be the only determinant of 
successful exercise of those further powers, I consider that 60 Members 
is too low a number to ensure that there are sufficient Members with 
the time and interest to apply consistent close scrutiny to Ministers’ 
fiscal proposals. Fiscal proposals are fairly technical in nature, and 
consideration of their likely economic effects is not straightforward. 
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They are therefore likely to be somewhat more challenging for 
Assembly Members to subject to effective scrutiny than legislation in 
general.61 
07.22. Following work led by the Finance Committee, the annual budget process 
has been amended with effect from 2017 to provide more scope, time and 
flexibility for Assembly committees to engage in in-depth scrutiny of the Welsh 
Government budget. While it will continue to be a matter for individual 
committees to decide how to prioritise their work programmes, it is likely that 
committees will seek to undertake more detailed budget scrutiny work, with a 
corresponding impact on committee workloads. 
07.23. The Wales Act 2017 gave the Assembly legislative competence to move 
away from the current budget process—which requires the Assembly to pass an 
annual budget motion—and instead place the process on a legislative footing. For 
example, this might take the form of taxation resolutions accompanied by 
legislation to authorise expenditure, or a Westminster-style model of a 
comprehensive Finance Bill which encompasses taxation and spending. The 
Assembly’s Finance Committee is at an early stage in work to assess whether a 
legislative budget process would be appropriate for Wales once devolved taxes 
including landfill tax, land transaction tax and income tax-variation come on 
stream, and if so, what it might mean for the Assembly’s procedures and workload. 
Our conclusions 
07.24. Effective policy, financial and legislative scrutiny and oversight are 
fundamental elements of the roles of parliamentarians. Such scrutiny can result in 
tangible outcomes for people and communities, whether through direct influence 
on government policy or spending decisions, by the indirect influence it brings to 
bear on government through increasing the profile of particular issues, or because 
cross-party committees can explore issues in detail and in the absence of some of 
the party political heat of the Siambr. 
07.25. For such scrutiny to be effective, the Assembly and its Members must have 
sufficient time, resources and capacity to plan, deliver and follow up on their 
scrutiny work. Implementation of our recommendation to increase the size of the 
Assembly would provide capacity to exercise these scrutiny responsibilities far 
more effectively, with consequent benefits in terms of better law-making and 
government in Wales. 
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08. CAPACITY OF THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM 
Background 
08.01. Much of the responsibility for holding the Welsh Government to account, 
and for the detailed examination and amendment of legislation, falls to the 
Assembly’s committees. We have therefore explored in detail how the current 
system operates, and what indications it provides of the number of Members the 
Assembly needs to fulfil its functions. 
Committee structure 
08.02. The design of the committee structure is largely a matter for the Assembly 
itself.62 Including the Business Committee (the formal channel for the organisation 
of Assembly business and the oversight of procedure) the Fifth Assembly has 14 
permanent committees—two more than the Fourth Assembly. One of the 
additional committees was established to provide capacity for the scrutiny of 
Brexit-related matters and to help meet the overall demands of the Assembly’s 
legislative workload. The greater number of committees has been enabled by 
each committee having fewer members when compared to the previous 
Assembly. For example, the seven policy and legislation committees each have a 
membership of eight (previously ten) and the Finance and Public Accounts 
Committees each have seven members (previously eight). 
08.03. The majority of Welsh Government subject responsibilities are overseen by 
the seven principal policy and legislation committees and the Constitutional and 
Legislative Affairs Committee. The principal committees have dual responsibility for 
policy and legislation i.e. they undertake the work conducted by separate Select 
and Public Bill committees in the House of Commons. The dual responsibility model 
was first established in the Fourth Assembly. The main driver for the establishment of 
dual function committees was to bring to bear the policy expertise of Members on 
the examination of policy and legislation in the round. During the Third Assembly 
there were five dedicated legislation committees and four principal policy 
committees. While this gave the policy committees greater flexibility over their 
work programmes, it did not alleviate the pressure on the number of 
backbenchers required to fill committee positions.  
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08.04. A basic principle of good parliamentary operation is that all aspects of 
government policy, legislation and expenditure are open to scrutiny in committee. 
For the Assembly to fulfil this principle with 60 Members (of whom up to 14 may be 
part of the executive) the remits of its committees are necessarily broad—covering 
more than one Ministerial portfolio—and responsibilities carried by separate 
committees in other parliaments are combined. Given the breadth of the remits 
and the policy areas within which legislation tends to fall, we believe that 
broadening the remits further in order to reduce the overall number of committees 
would have a detrimental impact on committees’ ability to provide effective 
oversight of government policy, spending and legislation. 
08.05. The Assembly’s ‘specialist’ committees—Constitutional and Legislative 
Affairs, Public Accounts, Finance, Scrutiny of the First Minister, Petitions, and 
Standards of Conduct—each fulfil specific and important functions which 
enhance the scrutiny performance of the institution, the engagement with the 
people of Wales, and uphold the high standards which people rightly expect from 
the Assembly. While the committee structure is a matter for the Assembly, it is 
difficult to see how any of these committees could be removed. 
Committee membership 
08.06. We considered whether the Assembly’s overall capacity issues could be 
alleviated by reducing the size of committee memberships, which currently range 
between four and eight depending on the role of the committee. 
08.07. There is no definitive mechanism for determining the optimum size for a 
committee. The Sir Bernard Crick Centre for the Public Understanding of Politics 
argued that: 
 What makes an effective scrutiny committee cannot be reduced 
down to the number of members but it can be related to having 
sufficient members with sufficient time and energy to really commit to 
an area of policy and to forge meaningful relationships with other 
members.63 
08.08. However, difficulties can arise if committees are either too large or too 
small. For example, a small committee may struggle to achieve a quorum 
consistently, particularly if Members serve on a number of different committees. A 
                                            
63 EP09 Sir Bernard Crick Centre for the Public Understanding of Politics, Sheffield University 
A PARLIAMENT THAT WORKS FOR WALES 
76 
large committee may struggle to achieve consensus. Sophie Wilson of the Institute 
for Government noted that: 
 A shared goal also means a committee is more likely to scrutinise issues 
in a sustained manner, reach a consensus and then speak with one 
voice—something that becomes more difficult, the larger the 
committee.64 
08.09. Professor the Lord Norton of Louth (author, academic and Conservative 
peer) suggested to us that the optimum range for the size of a committee is 
between six and sixteen, on the basis that a size within this range will help to avoid 
quorum issues, provide scope to reflect the overall political balance, allow 
Members to build on each other’s scrutiny, and allow for effective exchange of 
ideas.65 
08.10. The Government of Wales Act 2006 contained certain provisions in relation 
to the membership of committees. For example, section 29(2)(a) required that, so 
far as reasonably practicable, the membership of each committee reflected the 
overall political balance of the Assembly. This constraint was repealed by the 
Wales Act 2017, meaning that the Assembly now has greater flexibility over the size 
and composition of committees. We understand that the Assembly’s Business 
Committee is considering what procedural changes may be required to give 
effect to the legislative change. It is good parliamentary practice to have in place 
suitable safeguards to ensure that the committee system is robust in its scrutiny of 
government, and that all parties and independent Members represented in the 
Assembly have appropriate voice and influence. It therefore seems unlikely that 
the Assembly, in line with other legislatures, would move far away from the 
principle that committees should reflect the overall political balance at least at an 
aggregate level, if not for individual committees. 
08.11. Within the current Standing Order provisions, the minimum size of 
committee within which overall political balance is achievable depends on the 
political makeup of the Assembly. With the makeup of the Assembly immediately 
following the 2016 Assembly election, the closest reflection of party balance would 
have been achieved by committees of nine. Marginal changes to the political 
makeup of the Assembly can affect the calculation significantly—for example, in 
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the Fourth Assembly the closest reflection of the political balance would have 
been committees of twelve. 
08.12. The decisions taken by the Assembly in relation to its Fifth Assembly 
committee structure reflect political compromises and a collective willingness to 
deviate from the strict requirement for balance. The Assembly has taken conscious 
decisions in respect of the size of each of its committees to balance their 
responsibilities with the practical realities of the Assembly’s size. The principal policy 
and legislation committees have eight members: sufficient to approximate party 
balance and create the potential for the establishment of subcommittees or 
working groups to maximise the volume of work that committees can undertake. 
Other oversight committees, where voting is less frequent, are smaller. The 
Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee and committees which deal with 
matters which are less party-political are smaller still. The variations in size represent 
negotiations and compromises made by parties willing to accept 
underrepresentation on individual committees in order to make the whole system 
viable. 
Membership and chairing of committees 
08.13. We also looked at how the committee system is populated. Not all the 60 
Members are available to undertake committee work. Most obviously, some 
Members hold executive functions as members of the Welsh Government. A small 
number of other Members, for example the leaders of the larger opposition parties, 
do not currently sit on any committees. Nor does the Llywydd, other than in her 
capacity as chair of the Business Committee. The Deputy Presiding Officer chairs 
the Committee for the Scrutiny of the First Minister, but does not sit on any other 
committees.66 
08.14. Once these Members have been excluded from the total, it leaves just 44 
Members to fill 83 committee places. Table 5 compares the number of Members 
sitting on multiple committees in the Assembly and the Scottish Parliament as at 
July 2017. 
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Table 5 Number of Members sitting on multiple committees (July 2017) 
 Number of 
committees 
Number of 
Members 
Number of Members sitting on: 
One 
committee 
Two 
committees 
Three 
committees 
National Assembly 
for Wales 
12 60 12 (20%) 25 (42%) 7 (12%) 
Scottish Parliament 16 129 51 (40%) 37 (29%) 5 (4%) 
Notes: All figures are from July 2017. Figures for Wales exclude the Business Committee, and the 
Committee for the Scrutiny of the First Minister (which is chaired by the Deputy Presiding Officer and 
of which all committee chairs are members in an ex officio capacity). Figures for Scotland include 
one subcommittee, and exclude its equivalent of the Assembly’s Business Committee and 
committees established to scrutinise Private Bills. 
08.15. Backbench Members from all parties are affected by the requirement to sit 
on more than one committee. Table 6 shows the number of specialist roles to be 
filled by Members of each party represented in the Assembly, and the extent of 
‘doubling up’ which is required. For example, the 17 backbench Welsh Labour 
Members remaining, once the members of the Welsh Government and the Deputy 
Presiding Officer have been excluded, must fill between them a place on the 
Assembly Commission, six committee chairs and 31 committee places. As there 
are four Labour places on each of the policy and legislation committees, the result 
is that more or less all the party’s backbenchers will be in committee on 
Wednesday mornings and all day on Thursday, when four committees may be 
meeting concurrently. 
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Table 6 Roles and offices held by each party (July 2017) 
 Welsh 
Labour 
Welsh 
Conservative 
Group 
Plaid 
Cymru 
UKIP Welsh 
Liberal 
Democrats 
Independent Total 
Welsh 
Government 
11 - - - 1 - 12 
Llywydd - - 1 - - - 1 
Deputy 
Presiding 
Officer 
1 - - - - - 1 
Assembly 
Commission 
1 1 1 1 - - 4 
Party leader - 1 1 1 - - 3 
Business 
manager 
- 1 1 1 - - 3 
Committee 
chair 
6 2 3 1 - - 12 
Committee 
places 
(excluding 
chairs) 
31 14 14 10 - 2 71 
Total roles 50 19 21 14 1 2 107 
Total 
Members 
29 12 11 5 1 2 60 
Notes: Committee chairs and places exclude Business Committee and Committee for the Scrutiny 
of the First Minister. Welsh Labour party leader and business manager roles are fulfilled by the First 
Minister and the Leader of the House and Chief Whip respectively. 
08.16. The workload involved in sitting on even one committee is significant. In 
addition to attending meetings, committee members must undertake a 
considerable volume of reading, research and preparation if they are to perform 
their scrutiny roles effectively. Daniel Greenberg notes: 
 The effectiveness of a Committee‘s work in scrutinising policy or 
legislation, or in conducting an inquiry, depends much more on the 
effectiveness of the work that is done between sessions than it does on 
the formal conduct of the sessions themselves. And the more direct 
involvement Clerks and other Commission staff receive from AMs and 
their offices, the more penetrating and rigorous the result.67 
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08.17. We agree with this. However, anecdotally, we understand from Members 
that time available to them to prepare for meetings is limited to the extent that 
they may be unable to engage with the evidence or issues in sufficient depth. The 
result is that Members may solely rely on the suggested questions prepared for 
them by Commission staff. While this may result in scrutiny that is adequate, it is 
unsatisfactory and inhibits Members’ ability to pose incisive questions from a 
political perspective or to follow up with effective and properly researched 
supplementary questions. 
08.18. The burden on committee chairs is particularly acute. The role of 
committee chair is both critical to the effectiveness of the institution and 
demanding. For example, it entails the provision of strategic direction to the work 
of the committee and its support staff, and speaking for the committee during 
Assembly business, events or in the media. As at July 2017, eight chairs sat on one 
other major committee, and three chairs sat on two others. Only one chair 
specialised solely on their own committee.68 
08.19. The size of the Assembly makes membership of two, sometimes three, 
demanding committees inevitable for most backbench Members. This is 
damaging to the effectiveness of the Assembly. It constrains the time available for 
Members to read, research and prepare and has a corresponding effect on the 
capacity of Members to undertake high quality scrutiny, develop alternative policy 
thinking, and engage effectively with stakeholders and the public. For example, it 
is not uncommon for a committee to be undertaking several different policy 
inquiries and scrutinising one or more pieces of legislation concurrently, and 
therefore considering multiple different policy areas in a single meeting. Illustrating 
this, Figure 6 provides a snapshot of the policy inquiries and legislative scrutiny 
being undertaken by the Assembly’s policy and legislation committees as at 
September 2017. These inquiries will be at various stages of completion, including 
initial research and consultation, evidence gathering, reporting or following up. Bills 
may be at Stage 1 (consideration of general principles) or Stage 2 (consideration 
of amendments). 
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Figure 6 Ongoing policy and legislation committee work as at September 2017 
CHILDREN, YOUNG PEOPLE AND EDUCATION COMMITTEE 
Policy inquiries: Flying Start; The Emotional and Mental Health of Children and 
Young People; Perinatal Mental Health; Teachers’ Professional Learning and 
Education. 
Legislative scrutiny: Additional Learning Needs and Education Tribunal (Wales) Bill; 
Legislative Consent Memorandum on the Financial Guidance and Claims Bill. 
CLIMATE CHANGE, ENVIRONMENT AND RURAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 
Policy inquiries: Future of Agricultural and Rural Development Policies in Wales; 
Management of Marine Protected Areas in Wales; Forestry and Woodland Policy in 
Wales; Rethinking Food in Wales. 
CULTURE, WELSH LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATIONS COMMITTEE 
Policy inquiries: Historic Environment; Non-public Funding of the Arts; News 
Journalism in Wales; Funding for and Access to Music Education. 
ECONOMY, INFRASTRUCTURE AND SKILLS COMMITTEE 
Policy inquiries: Selling Wales to the World; Impacts of Congestion on the Bus 
Industry in Wales; City Deals and the Regional Economies of Wales; 
Apprenticeships in Wales 2017; Rail Franchise and the Metro; Digital Infrastructure in 
Wales. 
EQUALITY, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNITIES COMMITTEE 
Policy inquiries: Human Rights in Wales; Poverty in Wales: Communities First—
Lessons Learnt; Poverty in Wales: Making the Economy Work for People on Low 
Incomes; Poverty in Wales: Asset-based Approaches to Poverty Reduction; Fire 
Safety in High Rise Blocks in Wales. 
Legislative scrutiny: Abolition of the Right to Buy and Associated Rights (Wales) Bill. 
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND ADDITIONAL LEGISLATION COMMITTEE 
Policy inquiries: Implications for Wales of Britain Exiting the European Union; 
Regional Policy—What Next for Wales?; The Great Repeal Bill and its implications 
for Wales; Implications of Brexit for Welsh ports. 
HEALTH, SOCIAL CARE AND SPORT COMMITTEE 
Policy inquiries: Physical Activity of Children and Young People; Use of 
Antipsychotic Medication in Care Homes; Loneliness and Isolation; Primary Care; 
Medical Recruitment; Sustainability of the Health and Social Care Workforce. 
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Towards a more sustainable and effective committee 
system 
08.20. In 2004, the Richard Commission recommended that Members should sit on 
just one major subject committee in order to develop subject expertise and 
facilitate better scrutiny.69 This sensible aim was also raised with us in evidence from 
Lord Lisvane, who suggested that: 
 …being a member of more than one committee dilutes the effort and 
knowledge, and reduces effectiveness.70 
08.21. We discussed the issue with two leading parliamentary experts—Lord 
Norton and Greg Power (a specialist who has worked with parliaments and 
political institutions in more than 30 countries). Both agreed that it would be 
reasonable to apply the following principles to committee membership: 
i. Committee members should generally sit on no more than two 
committees; 
ii. Committee chairs should sit only on their own committee (unless 
harnessing their particular policy expertise, for example, to enhance 
financial scrutiny or the scrutiny of the First Minister).71 
08.22. We endorse this position and suggest that the Assembly and political 
parties should adopt them as principles to be reflected in the design of any future 
committee system. 
08.23. We considered the potential, in an Assembly of 60, for these principles to 
be applied. Table 7 shows the minimum number of Members who could be 
required to sit on multiple committees on the basis of the committee system and 
party balance in the Assembly as at July 2017, assuming that chairs also sit on 
multiple committees. Table 8 is based on these same assumptions, but applies the 
principle that committee chairs should not sit on committees other than the one 
they chair. An additional assumption, in both models, is that the Welsh 
Government comprises the maximum number of members permitted by section 51 
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of the Government of Wales Act 2006. Table 7 shows that on the basis of these 
assumptions, all available Welsh Labour and UKIP Members would be required to 
sit on at least two committees, with around half of the available Welsh Labour 
Members and one UKIP Member required to sit on three. Nearly 90 per cent of 
Plaid Cymru Members would be required to sit on two committees, as would nearly 
half of the Welsh Conservative group. The result is that even if chairs sat on 
committees other than their own, nearly a fifth of available Members would be 
required to sit on three committees. 
Table 7 Members required to sit on multiple committees if chairs sit on more than one committee 
 Committee 
places 
Available 
Members 
Available Members required to sit on: 
Two 
committees 
Three 
committees 
Four 
committees 
Welsh Labour 37 15 15 100% 7 47% - - 
Welsh 
Conservative 
Group 
16 11 5 45% - - - - 
Plaid Cymru 17 9 8 89% - - - - 
UKIP 11 5 5 100% 1 20% - - 
Welsh Liberal 
Democrats 
- - - - - - - - 
Independent 2 2 - - - - - - 
Total 83 42 33 79% 8 19% - - 
Notes: In Table 7 and Table 8 the maximum size of the Welsh Government (14 and assumed for the 
purpose of modelling to be 13 Welsh Labour Members and 1 Welsh Liberal Democrat Member), 
Llywydd and Deputy Presiding Officer (2), and leaders of the two largest opposition parties (2) have 
been excluded to reach a total of 42 ‘available’ Members who can take up committee chairs or 
membership. Business Committee and the Committee for the Scrutiny of the First Minister have 
been excluded from the calculations. 
08.24. Table 8 applies the principle that committee chairs should not sit on 
committees other than the one they chair. Of course, while it would reduce the 
burden on these Members to focus on their roles as chairs, the impact on other 
Members of their party groups would be significant for most parties. For example, 
the nine remaining Welsh Labour Members would all have to sit on at least three 
committees, and four of them would need to sit on four. Similarly, all backbench 
Plaid Cymru and UKIP Members would have to sit on two committees, with two 
Members from each party having to sit on three. Self-evidently in the current 
Assembly, applying our second principle so as to improve the lot of committee 
chairs, would exacerbate the problem for other Members. 
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Table 8 Members required to sit on multiple committees if chairs sit only on their own committee 
 Committee 
places 
(excluding 
chairs) 
Available 
Members 
Available Members required to sit on: 
Two 
committees 
Three 
committees 
Four 
committees 
Welsh Labour 31 9 9 100% 9 100% 4 44% 
Welsh 
Conservative 
Group 
14 9 5 56% - - - - 
Plaid Cymru 14 6 6 100% 2 33% - - 
UKIP 10 4 4 100% 2 50% - - 
Welsh Liberal 
Democrats 
- - - - - - - - 
Independent 2 2 - - - - - - 
Total 71 30 24 80% 13 43% 4 13% 
See notes to Table 7. 
08.25. We therefore considered the extent to which our principles for committee 
membership could be met in Assemblies of different sizes. Table 9 shows a range of 
potential scenarios for Assemblies of 60, 75, 80, 85 and 90 Members. The table 
illustrates the effect of continuing the current committee structure, establishing an 
additional committee, or changing the size of the principal policy and legislation 
committees. 
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Table 9 Members required to sit on two or more committees in Assemblies of up to 90 Members 
 
Places 
(excluding 
chairs)
Places 
(excluding 
chairs)
Places 
(excluding 
chairs)
Places 
(excluding 
chairs)
Welsh Labour 6 9 31 9 100% 35 9 100% 31 9 100% 24 9 100%
Welsh Conservative 
Group
2 9 14 5 56% 15 7 88% 18 9 100% 14 5 56%
Plaid Cymru 3 6 14 6 100% 15 6 100% 17 6 100% 14 6 100%
UKIP 1 4 10 4 100% 11 4 100% 10 4 100% 10 4 100%
Welsh Liberal 
Democrats
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Independent 0 2 2 0 0% 2 0 0% 2 0 0% 2 0 0%
Total 12 30 24 80% 26 90% 28 93% 24 80%
Welsh Labour 6 16 31 15 94% 35 16 100% 31 15 94% 24 8 50%
Welsh Conservative 
Group
2 12 14 2 17% 15 4 36% 18 6 50% 14 2 17%
Plaid Cymru 3 9 14 5 56% 15 6 67% 17 8 89% 14 5 56%
UKIP 1 5 10 5 100% 11 5 100% 10 5 100% 10 5 100%
Welsh Liberal 
Democrats
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Independent 0 3 2 0 0% 2 0 0% 2 0 0% 2 0 0%
Total 12 45 27 60% 31 70% 34 76% 20 44%
Welsh Labour 6 19 31 12 63% 35 16 84% 31 12 63% 24 5 26%
Welsh Conservative 
Group
2 13 14 1 8% 15 3 25% 18 5 38% 14 1 8%
Plaid Cymru 3 10 14 4 40% 15 5 50% 17 7 70% 14 4 40%
UKIP 1 5 10 5 100% 11 5 100% 10 5 100% 10 5 100%
Welsh Liberal 
Democrats
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Independent 0 3 2 0 0% 2 0 0% 2 0 0% 2 0 0%
Total 12 50 22 44% 29 59% 29 58% 15 30%
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Notes: ‘Available Members’ excludes the Welsh Government (assumed to comprise 13 Welsh Labour Members and one Welsh Liberal Democrat 
Member), the Llywydd (Plaid Cymru) and Deputy Presiding Officer (Welsh Labour), and the leaders of the Welsh Conservative group and Plaid 
Cymru. Independent Members are assumed to be allocated two committee spaces. Party balance is assumed to be consistent with Assembly 
as at July 2017. Current structure includes seven policy and legislation committees with eight members (4 Welsh Labour, 1/2 Welsh Conservative 
group/Plaid Cymru and 1 UKIP), two committees with seven members and three with four members. If another policy and legislation committee 
were established, it is assumed it would be chaired by a Welsh Conservative group Member, and the number of available Members has been 
adjusted accordingly in the relevant columns. Policy and legislation committees of nine members assumes 4 Welsh Labour, 2 Welsh Conservative 
group, 2 Plaid Cymru and 1 UKIP. Policy and legislation committees of seven members assumes three Welsh Labour, 1/2 Welsh Conservative 
group/Plaid Cymru and 1 UKIP. 
Places 
(excluding 
chairs)
Places 
(excluding 
chairs)
Places 
(excluding 
chairs)
Places 
(excluding 
chairs)
Welsh Labour 6 21 31 10 48% 35 14 67% 31 10 48% 24 3 14%
Welsh Conservative 
Group
2 14 14 0 0% 15 2 15% 18 4 29% 14 0 0%
Plaid Cymru 3 11 14 3 27% 15 4 36% 17 6 55% 14 3 27%
UKIP 1 6 10 4 67% 11 5 83% 10 4 67% 10 4 67%
Welsh Liberal 
Democrats
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Independent 0 3 2 0 0% 2 0 0% 2 0 0% 2 0 0%
Total 12 55 17 31% 25 46% 24 44% 10 18%
Welsh Labour 6 24 31 7 29% 35 11 46% 31 7 29% 24 0 0%
Welsh Conservative 
Group
2 15 14 0 0% 15 1 7% 18 3 20% 14 0 0%
Plaid Cymru 3 12 14 2 17% 15 4 33% 17 5 42% 14 2 17%
UKIP 1 6 10 4 67% 11 5 83% 10 4 67% 10 4 67%
Welsh Liberal 
Democrats
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Independent 0 3 2 0 0% 2 0 0% 2 0 0% 2 0 0%
Total 12 60 13 22% 20 34% 19 32% 6 10%
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08.26. Our modelling shows that, if our principles of committee membership were 
applied to an Assembly with 75 Members, under the current committee system all 
parties but UKIP would see a reduction in the proportion of Members required to sit 
on two or more committees. As the size of the Assembly increases further, the 
proportion of Members required to sit on two or more committees decreases. At 80 
Members, only 44 per cent of Members are required to sit on more than one 
committee. At 85 Members this falls to 31 per cent, and at 90 Members, to 22 per 
cent. 
08.27. Our modelling is, necessarily, based on a range of assumptions, but 
conclusions can be drawn: 
 A relatively small increase in the overall membership, for example to 75 
or 80 Members, would allow more Members to specialise or to focus 
their time more effectively; 
 However, the effect will be felt differently by parties of different sizes as 
the size of the Assembly increases. With smaller increases in the size of 
the Assembly, the effect will be more significant for the larger opposition 
parties. As the Assembly increases in size, the increases in capacity will 
also begin to benefit larger parties with executive roles, and smaller 
opposition parties. 
08.28. We have focused our attention on the scrutiny capacity of the Assembly, 
and have assumed that the maximum size of the Welsh Government will remain at 
14, as currently prescribed by section 51 of the Government of Wales Act 2006. All 
the evidence we have received has addressed the needs of the institution as a 
scrutiny body and legislature. We have received nothing arguing for an increase in 
the number of Ministers, and we do not believe that there is a compelling case for 
such an increase. 
08.29. Indeed, should the Assembly choose to legislate to increase the limit on the 
number of Ministers in line with any increase in the size of the Assembly, the 
additional scrutiny capacity gained would be significantly affected. If the size of 
the Assembly were to increase from 60 to 80 and our principles of committee 
membership were applied, for example, all else being equal, a proportionate 
increase in the size of the Welsh Government from 14 to 18 or 19 would increase 
the percentage of Members required to sit on two or more committees from 44 per 
cent to 53 or 54 per cent. Clearly, the impact would be felt most directly by the 
backbenchers of any party in government. 
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08.30. Our recommendations on size and capacity therefore reflect an 
assumption that the Assembly will legislate to increase its size whilst maintaining the 
existing limit on the size of the executive. 
08.31. If the size of the Assembly is to be increased, it is, of course, for the 
Assembly to decide how it structures and organises itself in order to make best use 
of its additional capacity. As Daniel Greenberg noted: 
 …there is likely to become pressure to increase the number of 
Committees if the number of AMs is increased, and the creation of 
new Committees would come with a significant increased burden for 
support staff, who are again unlikely to be augmented at the same 
rate as the number of AMs, for entirely proper reasons of public 
economy.72 
08.32. At present, the Assembly’s size means that small differences in the number 
of seats held by each party, or the number and size of committees, can have a 
big impact on demands placed on Members. All parties therefore have an interest 
in working hard to negotiate arrangements that manage these capacity 
constraints. We recognise that in a bigger Assembly this consensus might be harder 
to achieve given the differential impact on different parties. There might also be a 
temptation, at least at first, to imagine that all capacity concerns have been 
removed. 
08.33. We caution the Assembly against this view. Even if our recommendations 
are implemented, the Assembly will remain a small parliament when compared to 
other, similar institutions elsewhere. Those charged with its operational design will 
need to deploy any capacity gains carefully if improvements to scrutiny, oversight 
and legislation are to be realised. 
  
                                            
72 EP01 Daniel Greenberg 
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Our conclusions 
08.34. We believe that the Assembly is too small to carry out its responsibilities 
effectively. An increase in the size of the Assembly would increase the capacity of 
the institution to fulfil its policy, legislative and financial scrutiny roles. Much of this 
capacity gain would be seen in the work of Members on committees, as the need 
for Members to sit on multiple committees would be reduced. However, the extent 
to which this will be realised in practice will depend on how the Assembly deploys 
the additional resource. It is not our role to prescribe how the Assembly should 
structure itself, whether in terms of the committees it establishes or the office 
holders it appoints. We are clear, however, that if the Assembly does not exercise 
restraint—for example in relation to the maximum size of the Welsh Government, 
the number of committees and the size of committees—the additional capacity 
and the subsequent benefits for the quality and quantity of scrutiny may not be 
realised, and the rationale which underpins our recommendations will be 
significantly weakened. 
 
Recommendation 3. The Assembly must exercise restraint in the way it makes use 
of any increase in the size of the institution—for example in relation to the number 
and size of committees, the appointment of office holders, and the maximum 
size of the Welsh Government—in order to ensure that the potential benefits for 
the quality and quantity of scrutiny are realised and additional costs are kept to 
an absolute minimum. 
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09. UK AND INTERNATIONAL 
COMPARATORS 
UK comparators 
09.01. With only 60 elected Members, the Assembly has fewer elected members 
than many local authorities in Wales (Figure 7), and is by far the smallest of the 
devolved UK parliaments (Table 10). Like its fellow devolved legislatures, the 
Assembly is a unicameral institution—its Members therefore have to address every 
aspect of parliamentary responsibility without the safety net of a revising chamber 
to cause them to think again. 
Figure 7 Number of councillors in local authorities in Wales 
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Table 10 Population per Member of UK devolved legislatures 
 Population Number of 
Members 
Population per 
Member 
Northern Ireland (pre-2017) 1,862,100 108 17,242 
Northern Ireland (post-2017) 1,862,100 90 20,690 
Scotland 5,404,700 129 41,897 
Wales 3,113,200 60 51,887 
Notes: population figures sourced from Office for National Statistics, 2016 mid-year population 
estimates, June 2017 
09.02. The asymmetric nature of devolution in the UK means that like for like 
comparison between the devolved institutions is not straightforward. That said, in 
1999, when the devolved institutions were established, the role of Assembly 
Members in Wales was undeniably less demanding than those of their counterparts 
elsewhere. 
09.03. By 2014, when the Assembly’s independent Remuneration Board 
commissioned the Hay Group to undertake a benchmarking exercise to assess the 
roles of Members of the different parliaments, it was clear that the legislative 
responsibilities of Assembly Members were now significant, bearing no comparison 
with those carried by their predecessors in earlier Assemblies.73 
09.04. We believe that the successive changes to the devolution settlement in 
Wales, including the forthcoming income tax-varying powers, mean that, while the 
breadth of devolved policy responsibility varies (with the Assembly most 
conspicuously lacking justice and home affairs powers), the fundamental functions 
fulfilled by Members in Cardiff Bay are now comparable to those of Members in 
Holyrood, Stormont and Westminster. 
  
                                            
73 Hay Group, Job evaluation and remuneration benchmarking for Assembly Members, August 2014 
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International comparators 
09.05. In 2014, the Silk Commission noted that: 
 …the National Assembly is also more stretched than its international 
comparators, especially those where the executive is drawn from the 
members of the legislature.74 
09.06. In its 2013 report, Size Matters, the UK’s Changing Union Project and 
Electoral Reform Society Cymru undertook detailed work on the size of the 
Assembly in an international context.75 The analysis was based on the Regional 
Authority Index (RAI), which examines the relative autonomy of regions in 42 
countries, and awards a score based on: 
 Institutional depth (autonomy of regional government); 
 Policy scope (range of policy responsibility); 
 Fiscal autonomy (ability to independently tax its population); and 
 Representation (extent to which the regional legislature and executive 
are independent). 
09.07. Size Matters compared autonomous regions in Europe, North America and 
Australia. The Index scores were calculated in 2006—the report therefore 
compares pre-2007 Wales in the first instance. The RAI score for the Scottish 
Parliament was 13, broadly in line with regions in Italy, Spain, Germany, Canada 
and the USA (which ranged between 12 and 15). The scores for pre-2007 Wales 
and Northern Ireland were both 8. Size Matters then assessed the development of 
Wales’s autonomy as the devolution settlement has changed, and in respect of 
the anticipated devolution of tax powers and police and justice recommended by 
the Silk Commission. Size Matters acknowledges that there is an international trend 
towards increasing regional authority, making it likely that the scores of the 
comparator regions may also have increased since 2006. Nevertheless, Table 11 
shows that as the Assembly’s powers have increased, Wales’s RAI score is likely to 
be approaching the norm for other European, North American and Australian 
regions. 
                                            
74 Commission on Devolution in Wales, Empowerment and responsibility: legislative powers to 
strengthen Wales, 2014 
75 UK’s Changing Union and Electoral Reform Society Cymru, Size Matters: making the National 
Assembly more effective, 2013 
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Table 11 Regional Authority Index scores for the National Assembly for Wales 
 Institutional 
depth 
Policy 
scope 
Fiscal 
autonomy 
Representation Total 
score 
1999–2006 3 2 0 3 8 
2007–11 3 2 0 4 9 
2011 3 3 0 4 10 
With limited tax base 3 3 2 4 12 
With limited income 
tax-varying powers, 
control of police76 and 
powers over own 
institutional 
arrangements 
3 3 3 4 13 
Notes: Adapted from UK’s Changing Union and Electoral Reform Society Cymru, Size Matters: 
making the National Assembly more effective, 2013 
09.08. Size Matters further assessed the size of European parliaments according to 
number of members and the ratio of members to population. It noted that: 
 It can be seen that the average size of the lower chambers of the 
parliaments in the countries of the EU is 267 members. If we take the 
countries of 10 million or less the average is 166, while those serving 
populations of between 1 and 6 million people is not much less, at 142. 
 
Therefore, even excluding second chambers, it is clear that by 
comparison the National Assembly for Wales is a remarkably small 
institution. When looking at the electoral ratio—that is, how many 
elected representatives per head of population—Wales is again 
shown to be far less well represented than the EU average. 
 
However, if we were to focus on smaller countries with populations 
below 10 million it is clear that the Welsh Assembly is by far the least 
representative in terms of elected representatives per head, with a 
ratio of one member per 51,058 people. The average in the EU as a 
whole on this score is one per 39,100. For countries up to 10 million it is 
                                            
76 The scoring was undertaken on the assumption that control of policing might be devolved. 
However, policing was subsequently included in the Wales Act 2017 as a reserved matter. 
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one per 22,122, and for those in the population range of 1-6 million it is 
one per 23,566.77 
09.09. The research concluded that: 
 Moving to a National Assembly of 80 members would give Wales an 
electoral ratio of around the same level as Scotland, and close to the 
EU average. However, this would still be a low level for a small nation-
state within the EU. To achieve the mean level for this category the 
National Assembly would require around 140 Assembly Members. 
Compared with other devolved institutions, Wales has a relatively small 
number of elected representatives. Even when we include all the 
smaller regions, those with fewer powers, and those that do not have 
executive functions, the average number is 76. When we exclude 
those regions, the average is 104. 
 
This analysis of sub-national legislatures suggest that 80 members 
would be relatively small for a legislature such as the National 
Assembly that represents more than three million people. Indeed, the 
comparison suggests that 100 AMs would be closer to the norm.78 
Our conclusions 
09.10. Direct comparisons between legislatures are not straightforward. Different 
institutions operate in different contexts and exercise different powers. 
Nevertheless, the Assembly is objectively small when compared to other UK or 
international comparators. If the Assembly had the same average number of 
Members per head of population as the 16 devolved institutions in Europe, 
Canada and Australia with populations between 2 and 4 million, it would have a 
membership of 86. If the nine states of the USA with similar populations were also 
included, the number would be 91.79 
 
                                            
77 UK’s Changing Union and Electoral Reform Society Cymru, Size Matters: making the National 
Assembly more effective, 2013 
78 UK’s Changing Union and Electoral Reform Society Cymru, Size Matters: making the National 
Assembly more effective, 2013 
79 Figures sourced from Size Matters, National Conference of State Legislatures, and US Census 
Bureau 
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10. THE ASSEMBLY’S ELECTORAL 
ARRANGEMENTS 
Background 
10.01. The implementation of our recommendation that the size of the Assembly 
should be increased to between 80 and 90 Members will require reform of the 
Assembly’s electoral system. We were tasked with making recommendations for 
the electoral system which should be used to elect the Assembly at the next 
election in 2021. 
A principles-based approach 
10.02. Different electoral systems have strengths and weaknesses, and there is no 
one ideal electoral system. To help us assess which system, or systems, might be 
most suitable for the Assembly’s particular context, we have drawn on our 
expertise and experience, as well as the academic literature and our analysis of 
debates in Wales and elsewhere, to identify principles against which to evaluate 
different electoral systems: 
 Government accountability and effectiveness: the system should 
encourage the return of effective, accountable and stable 
governments, whether majorities or coalitions. 
 Proportionality: the system should be no less proportional than the 
Assembly’s current electoral arrangements, and preferably be more 
proportional. 
 Member accountability: the system should ensure that all Members are 
clearly accountable to voters and able to represent them effectively 
and appropriately in the national interest. 
 Equivalent status: as far as possible, the system should ensure that all 
Members are elected with broadly equivalent mandates which afford 
them equal status. 
 Diversity: the system should encourage and support the election of a 
body of representatives which broadly reflects the population. 
 Voter choice: where appropriate within its design, the system should 
allow voters to select or indicate a preference for individual candidates. 
 Equivalent mandates: the system should reflect the general principle of 
electoral system design that votes should have approximately the same 
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value, with seats apportioned taking electorate numbers and 
geography into account. 
 Boundaries: the system should be based on clearly defined geographic 
areas which are meaningful to people and take into account existing 
communities of interest, and existing electoral and administrative 
boundaries. 
 Simplicity: the system should be designed with simplicity and intelligibility 
for voters in mind. 
 Sustainability and adaptability: the system should be able to be 
implemented in 2021, and subsequently respond and adapt to 
changing political, demographic and legislative trends, needs and 
circumstances without requiring further fundamental change in the 
near future. 
10.03. Clearly, no single electoral system can fully deliver against every one of our 
principles. Nevertheless, taken together they provide a robust framework against 
which to assess different electoral systems and reach impartial, politically neutral 
conclusions and recommendations. 
10.04. In chapter 11 we outline the Assembly’s current electoral arrangements, 
highlight key milestones in electoral reform affecting Wales since 1999, and explore 
the context for electoral reform in Wales. 
10.05. In chapter 12 we consider issues relating to diversity of representation, and 
explore what legislative action could be taken to support and encourage the 
election of a diverse Assembly which reflects the population it represents. We also 
consider the potential of job sharing arrangements as a means of alleviating the 
barriers some people may face in standing for election, for example those with 
disabilities or caring responsibilities. 
10.06. In chapter 13 we discuss electoral systems which we consider adequately 
meet our principles, and which could be used to elect an Assembly of at least 80 
Members—this being the minimum number of Members we believe the Assembly 
requires to fulfil its functions effectively. We explore the strengths and weaknesses 
of each system, and highlight key features, for example boundaries, ballot 
structures and mechanisms for filling casual vacancies.80 We also identify other 
                                            
80 We are aware that there has been some public debate about the circumstances under which a 
seat should become vacant. This is a matter for the Assembly to consider. Our focus, in the design 
of the electoral systems, is to ensure there are appropriate mechanisms for filling casual vacancies 
which arise. 
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electoral systems that we considered, which we believe do not satisfactorily 
deliver against our principles. 
10.07. In chapter 14 we explore the mechanisms and structures which will need to 
be put in place to ensure that the implementation of our recommendations results 
in sustainable electoral arrangements for the Assembly. 
How should the Assembly be elected in 2021? 
Electoral systems 
10.08. We have been tasked with making recommendations which could be 
implemented for the next Assembly election in 2021. While we have identified our 
preferred options, it is ultimately for the Assembly to determine the priorities and 
principles it wishes its electoral system to deliver. 
10.09. We are confident that the three systems we have outlined in detail in 
chapter 13 could be put in place for 2021, and that each would operate 
effectively within the Welsh context. Each could deliver stable and accountable 
governments. Boundary or seat apportionment review mechanisms could be 
designed to enable each of the systems to be sustainable and adaptable. Each 
could be communicated in a way which is intelligible and understandable to the 
electorate. 
10.10. Nevertheless, each system has specific strengths and some limiting factors 
which the Assembly will wish to consider carefully. Our analysis of these strengths 
and weaknesses has led us to conclude that our preferred option, subject to the 
implementation of our recommendations for an integrated gender quota, is a 
Single Transferable Vote (STV) system. Should our recommendations for an 
integrated gender quota not be implemented, a Flexible List proportional 
representation system would be a viable alternative to STV. We also outline a 
Mixed Member Proportional system (MMP), which represents a ‘status quo’ 
option.81 However, we do not favour such a system, because it limits the size of 
Assembly which could be elected in 2021 to 80. 
  
                                            
81 Mixed Member Proportional systems are also known as Additional Member Systems. 
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Single Transferable Vote: our preferred option 
10.11. STV delivers against our principles of proportionality, equivalent status for 
Members and voter choice. It would be sufficiently flexible to elect an Assembly 
towards the higher end of our recommended size bracket, enabling greater 
future-proofing and reducing the potential need for these issues to be revisited in 
the foreseeable future. STV is used in Northern Ireland to elect the Northern Ireland 
Assembly, and in Scotland for the election of local authorities. The Welsh 
Government is also considering STV as an alternative electoral system for local 
authorities in Wales, should individual authorities vote to adopt it. Because of this, 
within the Welsh context, it could also deliver simplicity and familiarity for voters. 
STV would reduce the influence that political parties have over which of their 
candidates are elected. However, as explored in detail in chapter 13, there is a risk 
that the level of Member accountability provided by STV could lead to a 
disproportionate focus on Members’ representative roles, which could come at 
the expense of, for example, their formal Assembly business and scrutiny roles. 
10.12. The Assembly is rightly commended for being one of the first parliamentary 
bodies in the world to achieve gender parity. However, since 2011, the 
percentage of female Members has fallen to 42 per cent. The electoral system is 
important if the achievements made by political parties in Wales in this field are to 
be safeguarded in the longer term. Our recommendations for an integrated 
gender quota, the enabling of job sharing arrangements, and the inclusion in 
Assembly reform legislation of provisions relating to the collation of information 
about candidates, provide mechanisms for this. If these recommendations are 
implemented, an STV system could also deliver against our principle of diversity of 
representation, and could therefore be the most appropriate electoral system for 
Wales. 
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Flexible List: a viable alternative 
10.13. However, if the recommendations for promoting diversity of representation 
we outline in chapter 12 are not implemented—whether through lack of political 
consensus or the limits of the Assembly’s legislative competence—we would be 
concerned about whether STV could be guaranteed to adequately achieve the 
election of an Assembly which fully reflects the population it represents. In these 
circumstances, we believe that a Flexible List system, and the potential 
encouragement it would provide for parties to implement their own arrangements 
to prioritise candidates with different protected characteristics, would be more 
likely to deliver a more representative Assembly. A Flexible List system of the nature 
we have outlined in chapter 13 would deliver flexibility over the size of the 
Assembly and equivalent status for Members. It would deliver a degree of voter 
choice, as candidates receiving sufficient personal votes would move up the party 
list, although the degree of voter choice is less than in an STV system. The extent to 
which a Flexible List system delivered against our principle of proportionality would 
depend on the details of the system. 
Mixed Member Proportional: a ‘status quo’ option 
10.14. If the Assembly does not implement either STV or a Flexible List, it might 
consider adapting the current electoral arrangements to elect an Assembly within 
our recommended size bracket. In chapter 13, we outline how this could be 
achieved. However, this is not our preferred option. It would not be possible to 
elect an Assembly larger than 80 Members without significant boundary review, 
which is not possible before the 2021 election, or the number of regional Members 
being greater than the number of constituency Members. The latter would not be 
desirable, not least because of the impact on the degree of voter choice should 
more than half of Assembly Members be elected on the basis of closed lists. While 
80 is within the size bracket we identified in Part 2 of this report, it is the lowest point 
of that bracket. The capacity gains would not, therefore, provide the same 
degree of future-proofing as a larger increase in size.  
10.15. There is a perception that the First Past the Post element of a Mixed 
Member Proportional (MMP) system would deliver most strongly against our 
principle of Member accountability. This must be offset against the perception that 
the closed list element does not provide for such accountability—a situation which 
would be exacerbated should the proportion of regional Members exceed the 
proportion of constituency Members. An MMP system, under which there are two 
routes to election, would also not deliver fully against our principle that Members 
should have equivalent status—although this can be mitigated to some extent by 
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the continued allowance of dual candidature. The closed list element of an MMP 
system would enable parties to implement arrangements to prioritise particular 
groups of candidates. The system has, perhaps, the advantage that it is the status 
quo option, with which voters will be broadly familiar, and makes use of the 
boundaries and ballot structure which have been in place for five Assembly 
elections since 1999. 
 
Recommendation 4. If our recommendations on legislative interventions to 
support and encourage diversity of representation are implemented, the 
Assembly should be elected by Single Transferable Vote with effect from 2021. If, 
however, these recommendations are not implemented, the Assembly should be 
elected on the basis of a Flexible List electoral system with effect from 2021. 
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Electoral boundaries: STV and Flexible List 
10.16. The Assembly’s current boundaries are broadly co-terminous with 
Westminster parliamentary constituencies. However, the automatic link was 
severed by the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act 2011, and the 
constituency boundaries have already begun to diverge. If the current review of 
Westminster constituency boundaries, or any further boundary review, is 
implemented, then the current coincidence of boundaries, and the corresponding 
benefits of co-terminosity for parties and voters, will be lost. We considered 
whether it would be possible to retain these benefits by adopting the proposed 
Westminster boundaries for Assembly elections. However, in addition to the 
uncertainty about whether or when the boundary review proposals will be 
implemented, we believe that it would be inappropriate for the Assembly’s 
constituency boundaries to be subject to change as a result of factors outside the 
Assembly’s control or influence which may be driven by factors with little direct 
relevance to Wales. We therefore rejected the 29 proposed Westminster 
constituencies as the basis for the Assembly’s electoral system. 
10.17. However, by basing our proposed multimember constituencies on existing 
electoral and administrative areas, we have sought to retain some of the benefits 
of co-terminosity for parties and voters, including familiarity, clarity and simplicity 
for voters, as well as minimising, at least initially, the need for expensive and 
lengthy boundary review work. 
10.18. In chapter 14 we have outlined two potential options for boundaries which 
could be used within an STV or a Flexible List electoral system, and which could be 
implemented for 2021 on the basis of minimal boundary review work—our 
preferred option of 20 constituencies based on pairings of the 40 current Assembly 
constituencies, and a viable alternative of 17 constituencies based on the existing 
local authority areas in Wales. Like all electoral boundary maps, each has its 
strengths and weaknesses. 
10.19. The size of the Assembly to be elected under any new electoral system 
should be prescribed in primary legislation. In Part 2 of this report, we outline the 
case for the size of the Assembly to be increased to at least 80 Members and 
ideally closer to 90 to provide greater and more sustainable capacity gains. Both 
multimember constituency options offer some flexibility for the Assembly to 
determine precisely the number of Members for which it legislates. Consideration 
of where within our recommended bracket of 80 to 90 Members the size of the 
Assembly should be set should be based not only on the capacity gains at each 
size, but also on the district magnitudes of the multimember constituencies for 
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which Members would be returned.82 Higher district magnitudes create greater 
potential for proportionality. However, if constituencies become too big, it can 
result in hyperproportionality. As the Wales Governance Centre and the Electoral 
Reform Society Cymru highlighted in Reshaping the Senedd: 
 While a strong democracy requires the inclusion of a diversity of 
voices, there are also potential negative consequences for a political 
system when elected representation ‘fractionalises’ into a large 
number of small parties. Among these consequences can be that 
extremist parties, with limited public support, gain the legitimacy of an 
elected platform; that such parties may sometimes be in a strong 
bargaining position to influence government formation and policy; 
and that effective governments become more difficult to form and 
sustain across the multitude of parties.83 
10.20. Conversely, if district magnitudes are too low, the outcome may not be 
sufficiently proportional. In addition, it is widely accepted that district magnitudes 
of higher than three are more likely to support the return of a more diverse 
legislature. 
10.21. Taking account of these factors, in our view, Assembly constituencies 
should return at least four Members. Ideally they should return no more than six 
Members, although a small number of seven seat constituencies may be tolerable. 
On the basis of our indicative modelling, this would suggest that the optimal size of 
the Assembly on the basis of district magnitudes should be: 
 83 or 84 Members on the basis of our 17 proposed constituencies 
formed by combining or splitting local authority areas; 
 89 or 90 Members on the basis of our 20 proposed constituencies 
formed by pairing Assembly constituencies.84 
                                            
82 District magnitude is the number of Members returned to represent an electoral area. 
83 Wales Governance Centre and Electoral Reform Society Cymru, Reshaping the Senedd: how to 
elect a more effective Assembly, November 2016 
84 Our modelling is based on electorate data from December 2016. Legislation to reform the 
electoral system would need to specify the electorate data upon which the apportionment of 
seats to constituencies would be based. This might result in some variation over where within our 
bracket of 80 to 90 Members lay the optimal size range for the Assembly on the basis of district 
magnitudes. Similar variation could result from changes to the Assembly franchise, for example a 
reduction in the minimum voting age. 
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20 paired existing Assembly constituencies: our preferred option 
10.22. We conclude in chapter 03 that the capacity benefits resulting from 
additional Members increase as the size of the Assembly rises within our 
recommended size bracket. Our preference, therefore, is for the size of the 
Assembly to be at the upper end of our recommended bracket. This should be 
reflected in decisions taken by the Assembly about the boundaries upon which it is 
elected. Our modelling indicates that, of our two proposed multimember 
constituency models, this could better be achieved on the basis of 20 pairings of 
the current 40 Assembly constituencies. 
10.23. In addition, the relative similarity in the size of the electorates in each of the 
20 newly-formed constituencies would result in a relatively low variance in district 
magnitude between constituencies. Our modelling suggests that, if used to elect 
an Assembly of either 89 or 90 Members, all constituencies would return either four 
or five Members. Such low variation in district magnitude makes it more likely that 
the proportionality of the electoral outcomes across constituencies will be broadly 
similar, as well as delivering on our principle of equivalent mandates. A post-2021 
boundary review could be used to equalise constituency sizes further, if that were 
to be considered desirable. 
10.24. The existing 40 Assembly constituency boundaries have been used for 
Assembly elections since 1999, and therefore their use, albeit in combination, 
provides a degree of familiarity for voters. However, the sustainability of 
constituencies based on pairings of the current Assembly constituencies would 
require separate boundary review mechanisms to be put in place, with a new or 
existing boundary review body being charged to undertake periodic reviews of 
the boundaries. 
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17 local authority-based constituencies: a viable alternative 
10.25. A set of boundaries based on local authority areas would use the existing 
electoral and administrative boundaries which are most likely to be familiar and 
relevant to the people of Wales. It would also provide political parties with some of 
the benefits of co-terminosity for internal party organisation, as parties should 
already have structures or arrangements in place to support organisation at a 
local authority level. In addition, the requirements for future boundary reviews 
would be minimised—there are already arrangements in place for the review of 
local authority boundaries, which generally focus on ward boundaries within local 
authority areas rather than external boundaries. There would need, instead, to be 
periodic recalculation of the seat apportionments to each Assembly constituency 
in order to respond to demographic or population changes. Were there to be 
significant changes to the organisation of local government in Wales, this would 
be within the control of the Assembly, which would be able to decide how and if 
Assembly constituencies should be adjusted. 
10.26. However, the variance in the number of Members returned by each 
constituency in 2021 would be significantly broader than our preferred option of 20 
constituencies based on pairs of current Assembly constituencies. Our modelling 
indicates that the differences in the electorate size of local authorities across Wales 
would lead to variances in district magnitude of between three and six Members in 
an Assembly of 80 or 81 Members, three and seven in an Assembly of 82 Members, 
and four and seven in an Assembly of 83 to 90 Members. This would have 
implications for the achievement of consistently proportional outcomes and the 
perceived equivalence of Members’ mandates. 
 
Recommendation 5. We recommend that the multimember Assembly 
constituencies upon which a Single Transferable Vote or Flexible List system are 
based should return no fewer than four and ideally no more than six Members. 
Recommendation 6. Should the Assembly implement either a Single Transferable 
Vote or Flexible List electoral system in 2021, we recommend that an Assembly of 
89 or 90 Members should be elected on the basis of 20 Assembly constituencies 
formed by pairing the current 40 Assembly constituencies. A multimember 
constituency model based on combining or splitting local authority areas could 
be a viable alternative for the election of an Assembly of 83 or 84 Members on 
the basis of either STV or Flexible List, should the Assembly decide that variations 
in district magnitude were acceptable. 
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Equivalent mandates 
10.27. One of our principles is that votes should have approximately the same 
value, with seats apportioned taking electorate numbers and geography into 
account. Under the Assembly’s current arrangements, North Wales is marginally 
overrepresented, reflecting, for example, its distance from Cardiff Bay and the 
extra time many Members need to travel within their constituencies. When 
reforming its electoral arrangements, the Assembly will need to consider whether it 
wishes this slight overrepresentation to continue. Our modelling is based on 
application of the Sainte-Laguë method purely on the basis of electorate 
numbers; alternatively, a weighted formula could be applied. 
 
Recommendation 7. The Assembly should consider whether, in the 
apportionment of seats to constituencies or regions, additional weighting should 
be applied to voters in specific parts of Wales, for example on the basis of the 
distance from Cardiff Bay, rurality or deprivation of the area in which they are 
registered to vote. 
 
Public awareness and information 
10.28. Whichever electoral system or electoral boundaries are put in place, 
appropriate and effective communication, publicity, voter education and public 
awareness-raising activity will be vital to ensure that people in Wales understand 
how to cast their vote, and how their vote influences the Assembly which serves 
them. It will be important for the Assembly to work with the Electoral Commission 
and other relevant stakeholders to achieve this. 
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11. CURRENT ELECTORAL 
ARRANGEMENTS 
The current Mixed Member Proportional system 
(Additional Member System) 
Background 
11.01. From the Assembly’s establishment in 1999, the 60 Assembly Members have 
been elected by a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system, also 
known as an Additional Member System. MMP is classified as a form of 
proportional representation. However the degree of proportionality which results 
depends on a range of factors, including the balance between the number of 
constituency and regional seats, the district magnitude of the region (i.e. the 
number of Members returned by each region), and the electoral formula which is 
used to allocate regional seats to political parties. 
11.02. MMP systems are hybrids, providing two routes to election for Members. In 
Wales, this means that the Assembly comprises: 
 40 constituency Members elected by First Past the Post to represent 
individual constituencies. Until 2011, when the Parliamentary Voting 
System and Constituencies Act 2011 severed the link, the constituency 
boundaries were co-terminous with Westminster parliamentary 
boundaries. 
 20 regional Members elected via closed lists to represent five regions. 
The regional boundaries were originally established between 1979 and 
1994 for the election of Wales’s MEPs.85 
  
                                            
85 Since 1999, Wales’s MEPs have been elected on an all-Wales basis. 
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Ballot structure 
11.03. Voters each have two votes, one for their preferred constituency 
candidate and a regional vote for their preferred political party.86 Voters can cast 
both votes for the same political party, or can vote for different political parties on 
their constituency and regional ballots as they choose. In Wales, there are 
separate ballot papers for the constituency and the regional list. Voters do not 
have to complete both ballots for their votes to be valid i.e. a voter could choose 
to vote for a constituency candidate but not for a political party on the regional 
ballot, or vice versa. 
Counting methodology 
11.04. The votes for constituencies are counted first—the winner of each 
constituency is the candidate who receives the most votes. The regional votes are 
then counted, and an electoral formula applied to allocate the regional seats to 
political parties. There are a number of different electoral formulae which can be 
used for this purpose; in Wales, the Government of Wales Act 2006 specifies the 
D’Hondt electoral formula: 
Number of votes won by a party
(Number of seats won so far + 1)
 
11.05. Each region in Wales returns four Members to the Assembly. Therefore, the 
allocation of seats comprises four stages. During each stage, the winner of the 
seat is decided through the application of the D’Hondt formula to the number of 
regional votes won by each party and the number of seats the party has won so 
far. This total includes the number of constituency seats won by the party in the 
region plus any regional seats it won in previous stages. Table 12 shows an 
example from the 2016 Assembly election. 
  
                                            
86 Or independent regional candidate. 
A PARLIAMENT THAT WORKS FOR WALES 
110 
Table 12 Allocation of seats in North Wales region in 2016 
Party Constituency 
seats won 
Regional 
votes 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 
Welsh Labour 5 57,528 
57,528
(5+1)
 
=9,588 
57,528
(5+1)
 
=9,588 
57,528
(5+1)
 
=9,588 
57,528
(5+1)
 
=9,588 
Welsh 
Conservatives 
2 45,468 
45,468
(2+1)
 
=15,156 
45,468
(2+1)
 
=15,156 
45,468
(2+1)
 
=15,156 
45,468
(3+1)
 
=11,367 
Plaid Cymru 2 47,701 
47,701
(2+1)
 
=15,900 
47,701
(2+1)
 
=15,900 
47,701
(3+1)
 
=11,925 
47,701
(3+1)
 
=11,925 
Welsh Liberal 
Democrats 
0 9,345 
9,345
(0+1)
 
=9,345 
9,345
(0+1)
 
=9,345 
9,345
(0+1)
 
=9,345 
9,345
(0+1)
 
=9,345 
UKIP 0 25,518 
25,518
(0+1)
 
=25,518 
21,518
(1+1)
 
=12,759 
21,518
(1+1)
 
=12,759 
21,518
(1+1)
 
=12,759 
Notes: coloured cells indicate the party which won the seat in each round of calculations. Table 
only shows votes won by parties represented in the Assembly. 
11.06. Unlike in some other countries which use MMP, for example New Zealand 
and Germany, the system used in Wales does not include any formal electoral 
thresholds, for example minimum numbers of constituency seats or a minimum 
vote share a party must win to be eligible to win a regional seat. 
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Mechanism for filling vacancies 
11.07. Assembly elections take place every five years. Should any casual 
vacancies arise between elections—for example as the result of the resignation or 
death of a Member—the method by which the seats are filled depends on the 
route by which the outgoing Member was originally elected: 
 Constituency vacancies are filled through by-elections. The date of the 
by-election, which is determined by the Llywydd, must be within three 
months of the vacancy occurring unless the vacancy occurs within six 
months of the next scheduled Assembly election. In such circumstances, 
the seat remains vacant until the scheduled Assembly election.87 
 Regional vacancies are filled by the next eligible person on the list of 
candidates stood by the relevant political party for that region at the 
last Assembly election. Individuals are eligible if they are willing to serve 
as an Assembly Member, are still a member of the relevant political 
party, and the relevant political party confirms they are eligible. If there 
is no eligible individual, for example if the outgoing Member stood as an 
independent or all the candidates on the party’s list have either been 
elected or are otherwise no longer eligible to fill the vacancy, the seat 
remains vacant until the next Assembly election.88 
  
                                            
87 Section 10 of the Government of Wales Act 2006 
88 Section 11 of the Government of Wales Act 2006 
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Election results since 1999 
11.08. Table 13 shows the results of Assembly elections in Wales since 1999, and 
the proportionality of the result as calculated according to the Gallagher Index of 
disproportionality (the internationally accepted measure of proportionality).89 
Table 13 Assembly election results from 1999 to 2016 
 
Notes: election results sourced from National Assembly for Wales Research Service (2007 to 2016) 
and House of Commons Library (1999 to 2003). Where parties won Assembly seats, vote shares are 
shown by party. Where parties did not win seats, their vote shares are included under ‘other’. UKIP 
did not stand candidates in the Assembly election in 1999. Gallagher Index Figures were calculated 
by Cardiff University’s Wales Governance Centre.  
  
                                            
89 The Gallagher index of disproportionality measures the disproportionality of an electoral 
outcome; that is, the difference between the percentage of votes received and the percentage 
of seats a party gets in the resulting legislature. The lower the Gallagher figure, the more 
proportional the outcome. 
Welsh Labour
Welsh 
Conservatives
Plaid Cymru
Welsh Liberal 
Democrats
UKIP Other
Gallagher 
Index Figures
Vote share 37% 16% 30% 13% n/a 5%
Constituency seats 27 9 1 3 0 0
Regional seats 1 8 8 3 0 0
Total seats 28 17 9 6 0 0
Vote share 38% 20% 21% 13% 3% 5%
Constituency seats 30 5 1 3 0 1
Regional seats 0 7 10 3 0 0
Total seats 30 12 11 6 0 1
Vote share 31% 22% 22% 13% 3% 9%
Constituency seats 24 5 7 3 0 1
Regional seats 2 7 8 3 0 0
Total seats 26 12 15 6 0 1
Vote share 40% 24% 19% 9% 2% 7%
Constituency seats 28 6 5 1 0 0
Regional seats 2 8 6 4 0 0
Total seats 30 14 11 5 0 0
Vote share 33% 21% 20% 7% 13% 5%
Constituency seats 27 6 6 1 0 0
Regional seats 2 5 6 0 7 0
Total seats 29 11 12 1 7 0
2
0
1
1
10.4
2
0
1
6
13.0
1
9
9
9
8.6
2
0
0
3
10.3
2
0
0
7
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Electoral reform in Wales since 1999 
11.09. Figure 8 outlines key milestones in the development and reform of electoral 
arrangements in Wales since 1999. 
Figure 8 National Assembly for Wales electoral reform since 1999 
 
Assembly elected on the basis of 40 constituencies linked to Westminster 
parliamentary constituencies and five regions based on the European Parliament 
constituencies which had been used between 1979 and 1999.90 
 
Richard Commission recommended an increase in the size of the Assembly, and 
highlighted the need for any increase to be accompanied by electoral reform. 
 
Government of Wales Act 2006 introduced a prohibition on dual candidature—
individuals standing as both a constituency candidate and on the relevant regional 
list. 
 
Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act 2011 severed the automatic 
link between Westminster parliamentary constituencies and Assembly 
constituencies. 
 
UK Government published a Green Paper on future electoral arrangements for the 
National Assembly for Wales.91 The decision not to pursue the proposals meant that 
the Assembly’s constituency boundaries became ossified as those provided for by 
the Parliamentary Constituencies and Assembly Electoral Regions (Wales) Order 
2006 as modified by the Parliamentary Constituencies and Assembly Electoral 
Regions (Wales) (Amendment) Order 2008. 
 
Wales Act 2014 overturned the prohibition on dual candidature. 
 
Wales Act 2017 devolved competence over electoral arrangements in Wales to the 
Assembly. 
 
  
                                            
90 From 1999 onwards MEPs were elected on an all-Wales basis. 
91 Wales Office, Green paper on future electoral arrangements for the National Assembly for Wales, 
2012 
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11.10. With effect from a Principal Appointed Day, to be specified in regulations 
by the Secretary of State for Wales—expected to be 1 April 2018—the Assembly 
will have competence over elections confined to Wales, including Assembly 
elections and local government elections. It is with a view to exercising such 
powers in relation to Assembly elections that the Llywydd and Assembly 
Commission have tasked us with reviewing the Assembly’s size and electoral 
arrangements. 
11.11. The Welsh Government is also exploring how these new areas of 
competence might be exercised in relation to local government in Wales. Its 
consultation on local government electoral reform includes proposals not only for 
practical arrangements relating to electoral registration, and the administration 
and conduct of elections, but also for an extension of the franchise to include 16- 
and 17-year-olds, and for local authorities in Wales to be able to resolve to adopt 
the Single Transferable Vote system for their elections.92 
11.12. We are aware of the Welsh Government’s proposals, and grateful to the 
Cabinet Secretary for Finance and Local Government and his officials for the 
constructive and positive way in which they have engaged with our work. Our task 
is to make recommendations for the appropriate electoral system which should be 
used to elect the Assembly from 2021. Accordingly, we have developed our 
principles and undertaken our work with a focus on recommending electoral 
systems which are appropriate for the Assembly as the national legislature of 
Wales. Nevertheless, there is clear overlap between our work, and that of the 
Cabinet Secretary. 
 
Recommendation 8. The Welsh Government, in developing its proposals for local 
government electoral reform, should have regard to our recommendations and 
report, particularly in relation to the design and operation of the Single 
Transferable Vote electoral system. 
 
  
                                            
92 Welsh Government, Electoral reform in local government in Wales, July 2017 
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12. DIVERSITY OF REPRESENTATION 
Legislative interventions to encourage diversity 
Background 
12.01. Diversity of representation is one of our principles. It has also been one of 
the hallmarks of the Assembly since its establishment, particularly in terms of 
gender balance. There are different ways in which diversity of representation can 
be encouraged and supported, for example: 
 Features of some electoral systems, by their nature, support or 
encourage diversity, for example larger district magnitudes or greater 
proportionality; 
 Positive interventions or features can be proactively integrated into 
electoral systems with the intention of encouraging diversity; 
 Complementary measures or interventions can be put in place by 
political parties within their own candidate selection processes. 
12.02. Parties in Wales have been particularly active in seeking to achieve gender 
balance among their candidates, as well as diversity in a broader sense, for 
example in relation to ethnicity or disability. Such measures, which we would wish 
to see continue, might take the form of candidate (or potential candidate) 
training, mentoring or financial support. 
12.03. During our work, we have therefore focused on how our proposals for 
electoral systems could, by their nature or through proactive interventions, support 
and encourage the election of a diverse Assembly which reflects the people and 
communities it serves. 
Candidate information 
12.04. One of the challenges inherent in operationalising measures to support 
diversity is the difficulty in identifying and categorising those who embody different 
protected characteristics. Section 106 of the Equality Act 2010 would, if 
commenced, improve the availability of information about candidate diversity. 
The UK Government has resisted calls for the section’s commencement, most 
recently in a response to a House of Commons Women and Equality Committee 
report, in which it stated: 
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 The proposal for publication of parliamentary candidate diversity data 
originated in the Speaker’s Conference on Parliamentary 
Representation. The Conference report recommended that political 
parties report on their candidate selections every six months, covering 
up to thirteen different fields. Both the Labour and Coalition 
governments expressed concerns about the potential regulatory 
burden which this would impose, particularly on smaller parties, and 
have worked with the political parties to encourage voluntary 
collection of diversity data on candidates. 
 
[...] 
 
The Government proposes to continue the process of engaging with 
the parties to ensure greater transparency on selected parliamentary 
candidates ahead of the next General Election, rather than imposing 
legislative requirements through section 106 of the Equality Act.93 
12.05. We acknowledge the UK Government’s concerns about the regulatory 
burdens on political parties, but believe that voluntary collection and publication 
of candidate diversity data is insufficient. During the course of our work we sought 
data on Assembly election candidates to inform our thinking on electoral systems; 
such information is not readily available. The lack of such information presents a 
barrier for parties and for campaigners who seek to encourage and support the 
selection and election of diverse candidates and representatives. 
12.06. The power to commence section 106 resides with the Secretary of State. 
We believe that the Secretary of State should be asked to commence the 
provision in relation to Assembly elections, or to transfer the power to do so to the 
Welsh Ministers. Otherwise, the Assembly should, as part of legislation to reform the 
electoral system, introduce a provision in respect of Assembly elections that would 
secure the availability of information regarding diversity. 
  
                                            
93 UK Government, Government Response to the Women and Equalities Committee Report on 
Women in the House of Commons, September 2017 
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Recommendation 9. The Assembly should request that the Secretary of State 
commences section 106 of the Equality Act 2010 in relation to Assembly 
elections, or transfers the power to do so to the Welsh Ministers. Otherwise, 
legislation to reform the Assembly’s electoral arrangements should include 
provision that would secure the availability of information regarding diversity. 
 
Gender representation and quotas 
12.07. We strongly believe that the selection and election of a more diverse 
Assembly across the full range of protected characteristics94 would enhance the 
operation of the Assembly, and the way it works for and represents the people of 
Wales. However, in addition to the challenges outlined above in relation to 
identifying and categorising people who embody some of the characteristics, we 
believe there is a distinction which can be drawn between gender and some 
other protected characteristics. For example, a specific ethnic group might be 
marginalised on the basis that they form a very small minority of the population 
within their constituency or within Wales. Their representation is important though, 
and barriers to their selection and election should be addressed, for example 
through parties’ candidate selection processes. Nevertheless, women constitute 52 
per cent of the adult population, and are, therefore, an underrepresented 
majority. 
12.08. We acknowledge the intersectionality of individuals’ identities—people’s 
identities are multidimensional, and it may sometimes be problematic to consider 
the different characteristics they embody in isolation. However, for the reasons 
outlined above, we have focused primarily on ways to support and encourage 
balanced gender representation.95 
12.09. The National Assembly for Wales has a well-established international 
reputation for promoting gender equality. However, as Table 14 shows, since 2011 
there has been a decline in the level of women’s representation. Having once 
                                            
94 Section 4 of the Equality Act 2010 provides for the following protected characteristics: Age; 
Disability; Gender reassignment; Marriage and civil partnership; Pregnancy and maternity; Race; 
Religion or belief; Sex; Sexual orientation. 
95 For the purpose of our work on the representation of women and men, we include transgender 
men and women on the basis of the gender with which they identify. We acknowledge that the 
increasing recognition of non-binary gender identities presents additional challenges to 
operationalising measures in relation to gender. 
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achieved a parity Assembly in 2003, women currently constitute 42 per cent of 
Members. While the Assembly is still relatively well-positioned in terms of women’s 
representation—the international average is 23 per cent—reform of the electoral 
system provides an opportunity to safeguard and protect the Assembly’s 
achievements, and those of political parties in Wales, in relation to gender 
representation. 
Table 14 Gender representation in the Assembly since 199996 
 Female Assembly Members Male Assembly Members 
1999–2003 24 40% 36 60% 
2003–2005 30 50% 30 50% 
2006–2007 
(following a by-
election) 
31 52% 29 48% 
2007–2011 28 47% 32 53% 
2011–2016 25 42% 35 58% 
2016–2021 25 42% 35 58% 
 
12.10. International evidence suggests that the use of gender quotas in 
parliaments across the world is increasing, and over half of the world’s nations use 
some form of electoral quota.97 Research by Norris and Krook in 2011 found that: 
 Among the twenty OSCE countries registering the sharpest growth in 
the proportion of women in parliament during the last decade...half 
had introduced legal quotas. By contrast, among the twenty OSCE 
countries lagging behind in growth...none had implemented legal 
quotas.98 
12.11. There is international backing for gender quotas. Various international 
institutions, including the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination (CEDAW), the Beijing Platform for Action, the EU and the Council of 
Europe support their use. The international standard for ‘good’ parliaments 
according to the Inter-Parliamentary Union is a legislature that is: 
                                            
96 Adapted from Electoral Reform Society, Women in the National Assembly, April 2016 
97 Dalerup, D. for the Quota Project, About Quotas, 2009 
98 Norris, P. and Krook, M. for OSCE, Gender equality in elected office: a six-step action plan, 2011 
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 …truly representative, transparent, accessible, accountable and 
effective in its many functions.99 
12.12. Different types of gender quota are deployed in different countries, 
depending on the electoral system and local circumstances, for example: 
 Candidate quotas which introduce a ‘floor’ for the proportion of male 
or female candidates a party stands for election. These could be 
applied in the form of constituency twinning for FPTP seats. They could 
also be applied to multimember systems such as STV or Flexible List at a 
constituency or a national level. Ireland has recently put in place a 
quota of this nature, requiring that at least 30 per cent of the 
candidates each party stands nationally are female (rising to 40 per 
cent after seven years). The percentage of women candidates 
increased 90 per cent at the 2016 election compared to the 2011 
election, with a corresponding 40 per cent increase in the number of 
women elected—35 in 2016 compared with 25 in 2011.100 Parties in 
Scandinavia, Spain and Austria have voluntarily adopted similar quotas, 
ranging from 33 per cent to 50 per cent. 
 Requirements for the ordering of candidates on any list element of the 
system. Voluntary quotas of this nature have been used by parties in 
Wales in Assembly elections, for example zipping of regional candidate 
lists.101 
 ‘Reserved seats’ to which only female candidates could be elected. 
This type of quota is widely used in South Asia, the Arab region and sub-
Saharan Africa. 
12.13. Gender quotas have been used voluntarily by parties in Wales since 1999, 
and made a significant contribution to the achievement of gender parity in 2003. 
In the run up to the first elections in 1999, the Labour Party in Wales used a form of 
quota known as twinning—when two constituencies are informally linked together, 
with one selecting a male candidate and the other a female candidate. Plaid 
Cymru adopted a ‘gender template’ for the regions where it expected to win 
seats, using zipping to place women first and third on the party’s lists. For the 2003 
                                            
99 IPU, Parliament and democracy in the twenty-first century: a guide to good practice, 2006 
[original emphasis] 
100 Brennan, M. and Buckley, F. ‘The Irish legislative gender quota: the first election’, Administration, 
vol 65(2), May 2017 
101 Zipping involves listing candidates alternately according to their gender; i.e. if the first candidate 
is a woman, the second must be a man, the third a woman, and so on. 
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election, the Labour Party used All Women Shortlists in six constituency seats,102 and 
Plaid Cymru placed women within the first two spaces on each of its regional lists. 
Ahead of the 2016 Assembly election, Plaid Cymru updated its Standing Orders to 
provide that if a male candidate were selected at the top of the list, a female 
candidate would be selected in second place, and if a female candidate were 
selected first, either a male or female candidate could be selected in second 
place. 
Table 15 Gender representation by party in the Assembly since 1999 
 
Notes: gender representation as at the relevant election. Does not take account of subsequent 
changes in group membership, by-elections or the filling of regional vacancies. In 2011 the South 
Wales Central seat won by the Welsh Liberal Democrats would have been taken by a man, but he 
was disqualified from membership of the Assembly. The second placed candidate on the regional 
list was a woman, who took up the seat and is therefore reflected in the table. 
                                            
102 The use of All Women Shortlists led to dispute in one of the six constituencies, Blaenau Gwent, 
which led to the former Labour Member standing as an independent candidate and defeating the 
Labour candidate. However, this is was an unusual exception. 
Total
Number % Number %
Welsh Labour 16 57% 12 43% 28
Welsh Conservatives 0 0% 9 100% 9
Plaid Cymru 6 35% 11 65% 17
Welsh Liberal Democrats 3 50% 3 50% 6
Welsh Labour 19 63% 11 37% 30
Welsh Conservatives 2 18% 9 82% 11
Plaid Cymru 6 50% 6 50% 12
Welsh Liberal Democrats 3 50% 3 50% 6
Independent 0 0% 1 100% 1
Welsh Labour 16 62% 10 38% 26
Welsh Conservatives 1 8% 11 92% 12
Plaid Cymru 7 47% 8 53% 15
Welsh Liberal Democrats 3 50% 3 50% 6
Independent 1 100% 0 0% 1
Welsh Labour 15 50% 15 50% 30
Welsh Conservatives 4 29% 10 71% 14
Plaid Cymru 4 36% 7 64% 11
Welsh Liberal Democrats 2 40% 3 60% 5
Welsh Labour 15 52% 14 48% 29
Welsh Conservatives 3 27% 8 73% 11
Plaid Cymru 4 33% 8 67% 12
Welsh Liberal Democrats 1 100% 0 0% 1
UKIP 2 29% 5 71% 7
2
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12.14. Reform of the Assembly’s electoral system provides an opportunity to 
embed equality into the future political life of Wales and its national institutions. The 
decline in women’s representation suggests that the Assembly’s reputation for 
gender equality is vulnerable. Writing before the Assembly election in 2016, 
McAllister noted that: 
 In both of the last two devolved elections, the number of women AMs 
elected has fallen, as women elected for the ﬁrst time in 1999 retired 
and many were replaced by men. Early positive action by Labour and 
Plaid Cymru created an ‘incumbency overhang’: women ﬁrst elected 
in 1999 or 2003 stood more of a chance of re-selection and re-election 
in subsequent elections, thus boosting the overall number of women in 
the Assembly. But as Labour and Plaid Cymru shied away from positive 
measures like twinning constituencies and reserved places at the top 
of regional lists, men began to replace women. Furthermore, at the 
2011 election, some women from the 1999 and 2003 intakes retired 
and were often replaced by men. This creates a new incumbency 
overhang which works in favour of men, and challenges further drives 
towards gender equality.103 
12.15. Table 16 shows the gender imbalance in candidates standing at the 2016 
Assembly election. Of the 524 candidates who stood, only 34 per cent were 
women. 
                                            
103 McAllister, L. in Electoral Reform Society Cymru, Women in the National Assembly, 2016 
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Table 16 Gender balance of candidates at the 2016 Assembly election 
 
Notes: adapted from data provided by Cardiff University’s Wales Governance Centre. Breakdown 
by party shown for parties represented in the Assembly. The 524 total candidates also includes 
independent candidates, and candidates standing for eleven other parties. 
  
Number % Number % Number %
Female 78 31% 98 36% 176 34%
Male 170 69% 178 64% 348 66%
Total 248 276 524
Female 17 43% 11 50% 28 45%
Male 23 58% 11 50% 34 55%
Total 40 22 62
Female 9 23% 8 29% 17 25%
Male 31 78% 20 71% 51 75%
Total 40 28 68
Female 10 25% 16 43% 26 34%
Male 30 75% 21 57% 51 66%
Total 40 37 77
Female 13 33% 16 46% 29 39%
Male 27 68% 19 54% 46 61%
Total 40 35 75
Female 9 24% 6 30% 15 26%
Male 29 76% 14 70% 43 74%
Total 38 20 58
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12.16. To seek to ensure that the reformed electoral system safeguards parties’ 
achievements in gender representation in Wales, we recommend that gender 
quotas are integrated into the Assembly’s electoral system. Such quotas should: 
 Be prescriptive rather than permissive, i.e. introduce requirements to 
increase gender-balanced representation rather than introduce 
enabling measures; 
 As far as possible, include targets with penalties at the selected level 
and incentives at the elected level, i.e. a party failing to treat men and 
women equally by selecting candidates in accordance with the quota 
(whether in terms of proportions of male and female candidates or 
zipped lists, for example) would be subject to penalties, whereas a party 
which succeeded in achieving gender balance in terms of women and 
men actually elected would receive incentives. 
12.17. Such quotas can be set at different levels, and differ in their effects, 
depending on the way in which they are designed and the electoral system into 
which they are integrated. Ultimately, the success of a quota may depend on the 
way in which parties respond to them, i.e. the degree to which parties are free to 
make choices about where and how many candidates to stand, and whether 
parties (or factions within them) seek to subvert the quota. 
12.18. We outline details of the quotas which we recommend integrating into the 
electoral systems we are proposing in chapter 13. In developing our proposals, we 
have considered the extent of the Assembly’s legislative competence under the 
Wales Act 2017, as well as the extent to which different quota arrangements could 
be expected to be effective in supporting and encouraging the election of a 
gender-balanced parliament for Wales. 
12.19. With effect from the commencement of the reserved powers model of 
devolution established by the Wales Act 2017, the Assembly will have general 
competence in relation to its own elections. We are aware that this general 
competence will be subject to the application of relevant reservations such as 
funding of political parties, and equal opportunities (and exceptions to those 
reservations). However, in our view, it would be anomalous if such reservations 
meant that the Assembly did not have competence to determine its own electoral 
arrangements, including gender quotas.  
12.20. Such arrangements would need to include mechanisms for the 
enforcement of the quotas. This could be achieved, for example, by the rejection 
by local Returning Officers of slates of candidates as invalid if they did not meet 
certain criteria (for example requirements for candidate lists to be zipped, or be 
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gender-balanced). We have also considered whether incentives could be put in 
place to encourage compliance with a gender quota. Such mechanisms might 
include provision for additional payments by the Remuneration Board to support 
party groups in their Assembly work to be made to political parties which had 
selected a gender-balanced slate of candidates. Similar approaches are taken in: 
 Croatia: where for each MP representing an underrepresented gender, 
political parties receive an additional 10 per cent of the amount 
envisaged per individual MP; 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina: where 10 per cent of the funding provided to 
political parties is distributed to parties in proportion to the number of 
seats held by MPs of the gender which is less represented in the 
legislature.104 
12.21. Similarly, should the Assembly wish to incentivise gender balance among 
parties’ candidates through the payment of electoral deposits—for example, two 
for the price of one deposits for two candidates of different genders—this would 
appear to us to be proportionate in the context of seeking to ensure that the 
gender balance in the Assembly reflects the gender balance in the communities it 
serves. 
12.22. The intention of our proposals for gender quotas is to ensure that the 
Assembly is as representative as possible of the people of Wales. Diversity of 
representation is one of the principles against which we have evaluated different 
electoral systems, and is a factor which contributes to our rejection of some 
systems (see chapter 13). Similarly, in our consideration of electoral boundaries 
(see chapter 14), we reflect the general consensus in the academic literature that 
district magnitudes of at least three are required to support diversity of 
representation. We believe that the Assembly has some scope to legislate in a way 
which encourages gender-balanced representation, although we acknowledge 
there are significant constraints on its competence. While we recognise that the 
question of the Assembly’s legislative competence is not one that falls to us to 
resolve, we urge the Assembly to explore the limits of its authority in order to find 
innovative ways of encouraging gender balanced-representation. 
  
                                            
104 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Handbook on promoting women’s 
participation in political parties, 2014 
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Recommendation 10. In order to safeguard the achievements of the Assembly 
and political parties in Wales in relation to gender-balanced representation, we 
recommend that a gender quota is integrated within the electoral system put in 
place for 2021. If this does not happen—whether through lack of political 
consensus or the limits of the Assembly’s legislative competence—we propose 
that political parties be expected to take steps to ensure their candidate 
selection processes support and encourage the election of a gender-balanced 
parliament for Wales. This should include voluntary adoption by parties of the 
quotas we have outlined. 
 
Job sharing 
12.23. One of the principles integral to the Assembly’s ethos is that, as far as 
possible, family friendly working should be embedded in its culture and 
procedures.105 The Assembly has taken steps to develop its timetable and working 
practices in accordance with this principle, and Members do have considerable 
flexibility in how they approach some elements of their roles. Nevertheless, in 
common with other legislatures, the formal business elements of Members’ roles 
offer limited flexibility, which could represent a disproportionate barrier for some 
potential candidates. The Assembly’s independent Remuneration Board has 
commissioned Cardiff University’s Wales Governance Centre to conduct research 
into the barriers against and incentives for standing for election to the Assembly. 
We would encourage the Assembly, political parties, the Remuneration Board and 
the Assembly Commission to consider the findings of this research carefully. 
12.24. In a pamphlet published by the Fawcett Society in September 2017, 
academics, politicians and experts have explored the potential for candidates to 
be selected and stand for election on the basis of job sharing arrangements (as a 
recent High Court case determined, this is not currently permitted under electoral 
law).106 In her foreword to the pamphlet, Dr Sarah Wollaston MP stated: 
 It should be possible for two people to combine their candidacies and 
stand as the job-share MPs for a constituency. I job-shared as a GP 
                                            
105 See chapters 05 and 06 for further discussion on family friendly working and the Assembly. 
106 Fawcett Society, Open House? Reflections on the possibility and practice of MPs job-sharing, 
September 2017 
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before entering Westminster—providing there is good communication 
the arrangement can work well and broaden the skills and experience 
brought to the role, including for jobs involving complex decision-
making. People have fair questions about how it would work—and 
candidates would need to lay out their process for making decisions 
and resolving conflicts to the public, and then, as ever, the electorate 
would have the final say. Permitting MP job-sharing would be a 
proportionate step towards making it possible for more people to 
consider standing and to diversifying Parliamentary representation.107 
12.25. While the pamphlet focuses on Westminster, many of the issues raised are 
equally relevant to Assembly Members. For example, Campbell and Childs 
highlight that job sharing arrangements could make it more accessible for people 
with disabilities or caring responsibilities to put themselves forward for election. They 
argue it could also: 
 …counter the (much lamented) rise of the professional politician by 
allowing, for example, doctors, teachers, nurses or […] scientists to 
become MPs whilst continuing to maintain their professional skills. 
Furthermore, there are risks and costs involved in standing in marginal 
seats, and allowing MPs to continue to pursue a career part time 
outside of politics might allow more people to consider standing for 
election. In an aging society, it would also permit the older MP to 
better balance work and retirement by enabling them to effectively 
work part-time in their later years. Or it might enable a sitting MP to 
stand for one Parliament as a job-share so they can take on a caring 
role for an elderly relative before returning full-time at a later 
election.108 
12.26. Enabling candidates standing for the same party or as independents to 
stand for election on the basis of job sharing arrangements could lead to an 
increase in the diversity of representation within the Assembly. The flexibility to 
stand on the basis of job sharing could be particularly beneficial for older 
candidates, those with disabilities, or those with caring responsibilities. Of course, 
                                            
107 Fawcett Society, Open House? Reflections on the possibility and practice of MPs job-sharing, 
September 2017 
108 Fawcett Society, Open House? Reflections on the possibility and practice of MPs job-sharing, 
September 2017 
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whether it did so would be a matter for electors, who would be able to decide 
whether or not to vote for candidates standing as a job share. It would be 
important for any candidates wishing to stand for election on this basis to clearly 
set out for the electorate how the arrangement would operate, for example in 
relation to constituency work. The Assembly’s Standing Orders would need to 
make provision about matters such as voting or participation in formal business. 
Assembly procedures and electoral law would need to clearly specify what would 
happen if one job share partner were to resign or die, or there were a difference in 
opinion between the partners about whether to leave or join a political party. The 
central guiding principle for this is that job share partners should be treated as if 
they are one person. This means, for example, that should one partner resign their 
seat, the other would automatically be deemed to have resigned as an Assembly 
Member. There would also need to be clarity and transparency around the 
remuneration and financial support for such a job share arrangement. While it 
would be for the Remuneration Board to determine, our expectation is that job 
sharing should give rise to no additional costs beyond those of a single Assembly 
Member: the job share partners would share a single salary, be entitled to a single 
Member’s office costs, staffing and accommodation allowances, and count as a 
single Member for the purposes of calculating financial support for political parties. 
 
Recommendation 11. Electoral law, Assembly procedures and the 
Remuneration Board’s Determination on Members’ Pay and Allowances should 
be changed to enable candidates to stand for election on the basis of 
transparent job sharing arrangements. The guiding principles of such 
arrangements should be that candidates clearly articulate the basis of their job 
sharing agreement to voters, that job sharing partners are treated as if they are 
one person, and that job sharing Members should give rise to no additional costs 
beyond those of a single Assembly Member. 
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13. ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 
Background and rejected systems 
13.01. A wide variety of electoral systems are in use across the world. Different 
systems have different strengths and weaknesses, and deliver different outcomes. 
To determine which systems we would focus on, we first assessed a range of 
systems against our principles. This allowed us to narrow our focus by rejecting 
those systems which we were not confident could adequately deliver against our 
principles. Table 17 provides a brief overview of some of the systems we rejected, 
focusing on those which are widely used and/or have been advocated in Wales. 
Table 17 Rejected electoral systems 
System Strengths Weaknesses 
First Past The Post Perception of strong Member 
and government 
accountability. Equivalent 
status for all Members. Simple 
and intelligible for voters. 
Less proportional than current 
electoral system. Unlikely to 
adequately encourage 
diversity of representation. 
Multimember First Past 
The Post (for example 
one man and one 
woman per 
constituency) 
Perception of strong Member 
and government 
accountability. Equivalent 
status for all Members. Simple 
and intelligible for voters. 
Reserved seats would 
mandate a gender-balanced 
Assembly. 
Less proportional than current 
electoral system. Reserved 
seats limit voter choice of 
candidates. 
Single national list Single route to election for all 
Members. Could maximise 
proportionality and voter 
choice. 
Loss of local link between 
Members and those they 
represent. 
Closed List 
proportional 
representation 
Single route to election for all 
Members. Could secure high 
proportionality. Could 
facilitate strong, cohesive 
political parties. 
No choice for voters between 
individual candidates. No 
accountability for individual 
Members directly to voters. 
 
Alternative Vote or 
Two-Round System 
Greater voter choice than First 
Past the Post. 
Potential to be less 
proportional than current 
system. Unlikely to adequately 
encourage diversity of 
representation. If a two-round 
system, additional expense. 
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System Strengths Weaknesses 
Mixed Member 
Majoritarian 
Similar in many respects to 
Mixed Member Proportional 
(Additional Member System) 
and therefore familiar in Wales. 
Less proportional than current 
system. Two routes to election 
for Members. No voter choice 
among individual candidates 
in the list element. 
Dual-Member Mixed 
Proportional 
Single ballot paper for voters 
to complete. 
Less proportional than current 
system. Unlikely to adequately 
encourage diversity of 
representation. 
 
13.02. Through this process, we narrowed our focus to three electoral systems 
which we believe could operate effectively in Wales with effect from 2021:109 
 Mixed Member Proportional; 
 Single Transferable Vote; 
 Flexible List. 
13.03. In this chapter, we consider the design and operation of each of these 
systems. 
  
                                            
109 An Open List proportional system might also have met our principles. However Open List systems 
are very close to STV in their effects. On the basis that STV is already used within the UK, we decided 
to focus our attention on STV rather than Open List proportional representation. 
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Mixed Member Proportional system 
Background 
13.04. Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) systems are used to elect legislatures in 
a number of different countries, for example New Zealand, Germany and 
Scotland. The Assembly is currently elected via an MMP system.110 We therefore 
explored how the current electoral arrangements could be adjusted to 
accommodate the election of an Assembly within our recommended size bracket 
of 80 to 90 Members. 
Size of the Assembly 
13.05. In an MMP system, the total area represented by the legislature is divided 
into regions, each of which is then divided into constituencies. One Member is 
returned for each constituency on the basis of First Past The Post. A number of 
Members are returned for each region on the basis of a list. The list element of the 
electoral system, which can be open, flexible or closed,111 ‘compensates’ parties 
for the disproportionality of the First Past The Post element by applying an electoral 
formula on the basis of the number of votes received by each party and the 
number of constituency seats won within the region. In this way, the total number 
of seats won by each party is more closely aligned to the proportion of the votes 
each receives. 
13.06. It would be highly unusual for the ‘compensatory’ or ‘top-up’ list seats to 
outnumber the First Past the Post constituency seats. Indeed, in no other MMP 
system does this arise. For this reason, and because voter choice would be 
unacceptably curtailed if more than 50 per cent of Members were elected by 
closed lists, we believe that it would not be desirable for this to be the case in 
Wales either. Should the Assembly retain an MMP system, therefore, the maximum 
size of Assembly which could be elected without substantial boundary review work 
to increase the number of constituency seats would be 80, comprising 40 
constituency Members and 40 regional Members. Such substantial boundary 
review work could not be undertaken before 2021. 
13.07. In principle it would be possible for an Assembly of 80 to be elected in 2021, 
before a further enlargement to 90 in 2026 on the basis of a post-2021 boundary 
review. To elect an Assembly of 90, such a review would have to increase the 
number of Assembly constituencies to a minimum of 45, and create corresponding 
                                            
110 See chapter 11 for an overview of the current arrangements. 
111 Lithuania is the only country to use an open list within a Mixed Member Proportional system. 
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regions which would return between them 45 regional seats. In order to meet our 
principle that the electoral system should be at least as proportional as the current 
arrangements, and preferably more proportional, without exceeding the general 
rule that regional seats should not outnumber constituency seats, regional seats 
should comprise between 33 and 50 per cent of the total number of seats. 
13.08. While a two-step increase of this nature is possible, it is not an approach we 
would recommend. It would be likely to attract criticism, not least because of the 
potential confusion and additional costs which could arise. 
Electoral formula 
13.09. A key factor in determining the outcomes of an MMP system is the electoral 
formula which is used to translate the votes parties receive into the number of 
regional seats won. Under the Assembly’s current electoral arrangements, the 
D’Hondt formula is used for this purpose. While the D’Hondt formula generally 
produces less proportional outcomes than some other electoral formulae, on the 
basis that MMP would provide a ‘least change’ option, our view is that D’Hondt 
should continue to be used. 
Dual candidature 
13.10. There has been an ongoing debate in Wales about whether individuals 
should be able to stand as candidates for both a constituency seat and on the list 
for the relevant region. Dual candidature was permitted when the Assembly was 
first established in 1999, but was subsequently prohibited by the Government of 
Wales Act 2006. This prohibition was overturned by the Wales Act 2014, with the 
effect that dual candidature was permitted with effect from the 2016 Assembly 
election. Dual candidature is the norm in MMP systems (Wales used to be the only 
exception to this), and our view is that dual candidature should continue to be 
permitted in Wales. Without dual candidature, the field of candidates in an MMP 
system can be weakened, and there can be intra-party competition as regional 
candidates’ chances of being elected are negatively affected by the success of 
their party’s constituency candidates. 
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Electoral thresholds 
13.11. To date, the size of Assembly regions (each of which returns four Members), 
is such that the effective electoral threshold is sufficient to avoid 
hyperproportionality112 without the application of a legislative threshold. As set out 
in detail in chapter 14, the MMP system we outline would return 40 regional 
Members. Each region would return between seven and nine regional Members, 
and between seven and nine constituency Members. 
13.12. We considered whether district magnitudes of this level could risk 
hyperproportional outcomes, in which parties which do not have a substantial 
level of support could win seats in the Assembly. Our indicative modelling suggests 
that the impact of electoral thresholds on the outcome of Assembly elections 
would be minimal. On this basis, and on the basis that MMP is the status quo 
option, we would not propose that an electoral threshold be applied. 
Diversity of representation 
13.13. As set out in chapter 12, our view is that an integrated gender quota should 
be included within the design of the Assembly’s electoral system to support and 
encourage the election of a diverse legislature. 
13.14. To this end, parties standing lists of regional candidates should be required 
to ensure that 50 per cent of their candidates in each region are female and 50 
per cent are male.113 Parties should also be required to zip their lists, alternating 
female and male candidates. We believe strongly that these should be legislative 
requirements. However, if these provisions are not specified in legislation, then 
parties standing in elections in Wales should seek to fulfil these requirements 
voluntarily. 
13.15. In addition, we would expect parties standing candidates in more than 
one region to seek to ensure that there is broad balance in how many of their lists 
have a woman at the top, and how many have a man at the top. While no formal 
legislative quota would apply to constituency seats, we would also expect parties 
to seek to ensure that 50 per cent of their candidates across Wales are female and 
50 per cent are male. In selecting their candidates, parties should also have 
regard to broader issues of diversity across all the protected characteristics, to help 
                                            
112 See paragraph 10.19 for discussion of hyperproportionality. 
113 If a party stands an odd number of candidates, this would be interpreted as 50 per cent of the 
total candidates plus or minus one. 
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support and encourage the election of an Assembly which truly reflects the 
communities it serves. 
Mechanism for filling casual vacancies 
13.16. Currently, vacancies which arise between elections, for example as a result 
of the death or resignation of a Member, are filled via by-elections or by the next 
eligible candidate on the list, depending on how the outgoing Member was 
elected. The current arrangements have been utilised in relation to constituency 
and regional Members.114 These arrangements have operated effectively, and 
should continue if the Assembly continues to be elected via a Mixed Member 
Proportional system. 
Assessment against our principles 
13.17. Table 18 provides an assessment of the Mixed Member Proportional system 
outlined above against our principles. 
Table 18 Assessment of a Mixed Member Proportional system against our principles 
Principle Assessment 
Government 
accountability and 
effectiveness 
Modelling indicates broad proportionality, which suggests 
expectation would be relatively stable coalition governments. 
Proportionality Modelling on the basis of D’Hondt, 40 constituencies returning one 
Member and five electoral regions returning seven to nine Members 
suggests the results would be at least as proportional as the current 
system. 
Member 
accountability 
First Past The Post Members retain direct link between single local 
representative and a constituency. Closed lists for regional Members 
can result in confusion about whether individual Members are 
accountable to voters or party. 
Equivalent status Two different routes for election can result in tension between 
Members and confusion for voters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
114 By-elections to replace outgoing constituency Members took place in Swansea East in 2001, 
Blaenau Gwent in 2006, and Ynys Môn in 2013. Outgoing regional Members were replaced by the 
relevant list candidates in Mid and West Wales in 2000, North Wales in 2002 and 2015, South Wales 
East in 2010, and South Wales West in 2015. 
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Principle Assessment 
Diversity Measures to support and encourage diversity of representation 
could be integrated into the system, for example candidate quotas 
or list zipping. 
Voter choice Voters can separately vote for a candidate for their constituency 
and a party for their region. Closed regional lists limits voter choice of 
regional candidates. 
Equivalent 
mandates 
Regional Members each represent a larger electorate than 
constituency Members. Apportionment of seats to regions could be 
on the basis of electorate numbers, or take account of local political 
geography. 
Boundaries Current constituency and regional boundaries are familiar. Separate 
boundary review arrangements would need to be established. 
Simplicity System has been used since 1999 in Wales, and is familiar to voters. 
Translation of votes into constituency seats is simple and intelligible 
for voters; translation of votes into regional seats is more complex. 
Complexity also arises from the use of regional seats to compensate 
parties for the disproportionality of the First Past The Post constituency 
seats, and from the differing mandates of constituency and regional 
Members. 
Sustainability and 
adaptability 
Full boundary review would be required before 2026. Without either 
substantial boundary review work or the number of regional 
Members exceeding the number of constituency Members, the 
maximum size of the Assembly is limited to 80. 
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Single Transferable Vote 
Background 
13.18. In a Single Transferable Vote (STV) system, voters express preferences for 
individual candidates to represent multimember constituencies. Each voter has a 
single vote, which can be transferred from the voter’s first preference to their 
second, and so on, if their preferred candidate has either been eliminated or has 
sufficient votes already to be elected. Voters express their preferences for 
individual candidates; therefore votes can be transferred across parties. In order to 
be elected, candidates must achieve a quota based on the number of seats and 
the number of valid votes cast—the Droop quota. 
13.19. STV is used in Ireland, Northern Ireland, Malta, the Australian Senate, and 
many state parliaments in Australia. It is also used to elect local authorities in 
Scotland. The Welsh Government is consulting on whether local authorities in Wales 
should have the option to adopt STV for their elections. 
Casting a vote 
13.20. In some STV systems, for example in Australia, voters are required to rank a 
minimum number of candidates in order for their ballots to be considered valid. In 
other systems, for example in Ireland, candidates are only required to mark a single 
preference, although they may also express as many preferences as they wish. 
Should STV be adopted in Wales, we believe the minimum number of preferences 
for a valid ballot should be one. 
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Translation of votes into seats 
13.21. The Droop electoral quota (the minimum number of votes required for a 
candidate to be elected) is based on the number of valid votes cast and the 
number of seats to be filled: 
Valid votes
Seats+1
+1=Droop quota 
13.22. Candidates who reach the quota on the basis of first preferences are 
elected automatically. If, following the tallying of the first preference votes, there 
are seats which have not been filled, a two-step process follows and is repeated 
until all seats are filled: 
 First, preferences received by the elected candidates over and above 
the quota (surplus votes) are transferred to the unelected candidates 
ranked next on those votes. Candidates who then reach the quota are 
elected; 
 Second, if there are still seats to fill and there are no surplus votes 
available, the lowest polling candidate is eliminated, and their votes 
are transferred to the candidates ranked next on those votes. 
13.23. Table 19 provides a worked example of a hypothetical STV count for a 
constituency with a district magnitude of three, in which 1,500 valid votes are cast. 
Table 19 Worked example of a hypothetical STV count 
Candidate First count Second count Third count Fourth count 
Transfer of D’s 
votes (elected) 
Transfer of A’s 
votes (eliminated) 
Transfer of C’s 
votes (elected) 
A 225 1 226 -226 0 0 0 
B 290 5 295 47 342 12 354 
C 262 25 287 150 437 -61 376 
D 415 -39 376 0 376 0 376 
E 308 8 316 29 345 49 394 
Total valid 
votes 
1,500  1,500  1,500  1,500 
Notes: there are 1,500 valid votes and 3 seats. The resulting Droop quota is therefore 376. Elected 
candidates are shaded in green. Eliminated candidates are shaded in red. 
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13.24. An important design feature of STV is the methodology by which surplus 
votes are transferred between candidates. The most thorough approach is known 
as the ‘Weighted Inclusive Gregory’ method. Alternative approaches, which are 
simpler to administer but can yield anomalies, are ‘Basic Gregory’ and ‘Inclusive 
Gregory’. Further details of these methodologies are set out in Annex G. 
13.25. Which vote transfer methodology is selected will influence whether or not 
electronic counting is ‘necessary’ in order to avoid overly lengthy or complicated 
counts. Such complexity need not matter from a voter perspective, but does have 
administrative consequences. We are aware that electronic counting is one of the 
issues on which the Welsh Government is consulting in relation to its programme of 
local government electoral reform.115 While all the methods can be counted 
manually, the level of complexity potentially involved in the counting process 
leads us to conclude that: 
 If electronic counting were to be adopted for use with STV in Wales, the 
most viable surplus transfer method is Weighted Inclusive Gregory (as 
used in local government elections in Scotland); 
 If electronic counting were not an option, the most viable transfer 
methodology would be Basic Gregory (as used in elections to the 
Northern Ireland Assembly). 
Diversity of representation 
13.26. If the Assembly adopts STV, then parties should be required to ensure that 
at least 50 per cent of the candidates they stand in each constituency are female 
and 50 per cent are male.116 
13.27. These should be legislative requirements. However, if the requirements are 
not provided for in legislation, parties standing in elections in Wales should seek to 
fulfil these requirements voluntarily. 
13.28. When they are selecting their candidates, we would also expect political 
parties to have due regard to the gender balance of their candidates across 
Wales, and to the representation of other protected characteristics, to help ensure 
that Wales’s parliament properly reflects the people it serves. 
                                            
115 Welsh Government, Electoral reform in local government in Wales, July 2017 
116 If a party stands an odd number of candidates, this would be interpreted as 50 per cent of the 
total candidates plus or minus one. 
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Mechanism for filling casual vacancies 
13.29. Casual vacancies arising between elections in legislatures elected by STV 
can be filled in a number of ways: 
 By-election (used in Ireland and in Scottish local government elections) 
On the basis that voters should have the opportunity to choose who 
takes up the seat, by-elections are run on the basis of Single Member 
STV. The result is a mathematical increase in the electoral quota to 50 
per cent of the vote plus one vote. In a four seat constituency, the 
vacated seat may have been won on the basis of 20 per cent of the 
vote plus one vote—a successful by-election candidate will therefore 
need considerably higher levels of support. 
 Countback (used in Western Australia, Tasmania and Malta) 
On the basis of the argument that the voters decided at the most 
recent election who should hold the seat, the original ballot papers are 
recounted, excluding the outgoing Member, and the seat is awarded 
to the next best-placed eligible candidate. This may not be the ‘runner-
up’ from the original election. A by-product of this method is an 
increase in voter choice at general elections, as parties are likely to 
stand more candidates in each constituency in order to ensure they 
have ‘spare’ candidates who would be eligible to take up seats arising 
from casual vacancies. In Australia and Malta, there is generally a high 
degree of intra-party solidarity in transfer patterns. The result is that the 
candidate elected on countback is likely to come from the same party 
as the outgoing Member. But high degrees of intra-party transfer 
solidarity cannot be guaranteed: for instance, in Ireland it is much lower. 
An alternative, therefore would be for countback to operate on the 
basis of the next best-placed eligible candidate representing the same 
party as the outgoing Member.117  
 Party appointment (used in New South Wales, Victoria and Northern 
Ireland) 
On the basis of the argument that the seat belongs to a party, the party 
represented by the outgoing Member at the point at which they were 
elected appoints an individual to take up the seat. 
13.30. We believe that casual vacancies arising within a legislature elected by STV 
should be filled via countback. This mechanism allows the views of the voters at 
the time of the original election to be respected and reflected in the filling of the 
casual vacancy. It also encourages parties to stand more candidates, enabling 
                                            
117 The party represented by the outgoing Member at the point at which they were elected. 
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greater voter choice. However, we also understand that political parties may feel 
that the views of the voters at the time of the original election as to which party 
should hold the seat should continue to be reflected in the filling of the casual 
vacancy. To this end, we propose that casual vacancies should be filled as follows: 
 Countback of the original election, taking account only of candidates 
standing for the party represented by the outgoing Member at the time 
of the original election; 
 If there are no remaining candidates for the party who are eligible or 
willing to serve, or if the outgoing Member originally stood as an 
independent, a by-election should be held. 
13.31. The use of countback within a political party’s candidates combined with 
the accompanying risk of a by-election if they do not have sufficient candidates 
to fill any casual vacancies which might arise will encourage parties to stand more 
candidates than they expect to win seats. This will have a positive impact on the 
degree of choice available to voters at elections. While by-elections can be 
costly, casual vacancies arise rarely at the Assembly—only eight times since its 
establishment in 1999. Provided, therefore, that parties stand sufficient candidates 
at elections, by-elections are likely to be extremely rare. 
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Assessment against our principles 
13.32. Table 20 provides an assessment of STV against our principles. 
Table 20 Assessment of a Single Transferable Vote system against our principles 
Principle Assessment 
Government 
accountability 
and effectiveness 
Modelling indicates broad proportionality, which suggests 
expectation would be relatively stable coalition governments. 
Proportionality Modelling suggests that the outcomes in Wales, given the 
parameters we have set for district magnitudes, would be more 
proportional than the current system. Factors affecting the 
proportionality at national and constituency level include the 
number of constituencies, the district magnitudes, and the variance 
in district magnitudes. 
Member 
accountability 
Maximises power of voters to express nuanced preferences for 
individual candidates (including independent candidates) rather 
than parties. It can be argued that this can lead to an imbalance in 
Members’ focus on constituency matters to the detriment of other 
elements of their roles. Degree of power voters have in practice 
depends on how many candidates stand in each constituency for 
each party. Members returned for each constituency would have a 
direct constituency link with their electorate. 
Equivalent status All Members are elected by the same route and have the same 
mandate. 
Diversity Measures to support and encourage diversity of representation could 
be integrated into the system, for example candidate quotas. District 
magnitudes of three or more are generally agreed to be more 
conducive to the election of a more diverse legislature. 
Voter choice Maximises voter choice, enabling voters to express as many or as few 
nuanced preferences as they wish. Increased proportionality at a 
constituency level increases the potential for voters to be 
represented by a local representative of their choice. 
Equivalent 
mandates 
Seats can be apportioned using the Sainte-Laguë method based on 
electorate numbers, or taking account of specific local geopolitical 
factors. 
Boundaries Multimember constituencies based on either local authorities or 
current Assembly constituencies would provide a degree of 
familiarity and local identity for voters. Further discussion of 
boundaries, including potential boundary review arrangements, is set 
out in chapter 14. 
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Principle Assessment 
Simplicity Voting by ranking preferences is unfamiliar in Wales, although this 
could be offset by a minimum requirement of a single preference. 
Method of translating votes into seats could be perceived as 
complex, although an outcome by which parties win broadly the 
same proportion of votes and seats could equally be seen to be 
simple. STV is also being considered by the Welsh Government for 
local government in Wales. 
Sustainability and 
adaptability 
Multimember constituencies provide flexibility about where in our 
recommended size bracket of 80 to 90 Members the size of the 
Assembly should be set, thus providing greater assurance about the 
future-proofing of any reform. The nature of any boundary or seat 
apportionment review arrangements would depend on the building 
blocks used as the basis for multimember constituencies. This issue is 
explored further in chapter 14. 
 
Flexible List 
Background 
13.33. List Proportional Representation electoral systems are among the most 
commonly used electoral systems across the world, and are used in many 
European countries, including Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark and 
Sweden. While there are many different types of List PR systems, each of which 
operates in a different way, the common feature is that parties present lists of 
candidates to the electorate in multimember constituencies. Independent 
candidates are treated as a list of one. Voters commonly have one vote (although 
in some variants they may have more than one vote). Whether voters may cast 
their vote for a party or for an individual candidate depends on whether the list 
system is open, closed or flexible. In all cases, votes are aggregated across parties 
to determine the number of seats each party receives. Which candidates take up 
those seats depends on the degree to which parties control who appears on the 
ballot and the final ranking order of candidates. In Closed List systems, the order in 
which candidates will take up any seats won is determined by the party (usually on 
the ballot paper). In Flexible or Open List systems, the order is influenced to a lesser 
or greater extent by the voters. 
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Casting a vote 
13.34. There are various different ways in which Flexible List systems can operate. 
In the variant we are proposing, voters would have a single vote. They could 
choose whether to cast the vote for a party118—which would be interpreted as a 
vote for the party’s preferred candidate order—or for an individual candidate 
within a party’s list. Votes cast for individual list candidates would first be counted 
as part of the aggregate total for the party to determine how many seats it won, 
and then separately to determine whether any candidate had received sufficient 
personal votes to move to the top of the party list. This is similar to the system used 
in Sweden. 
13.35. We acknowledge that some voters, wishing to emphasise their support for a 
particular party and candidate, might mark on their ballot paper that they 
supported a particular candidate and the party for which they were standing. In 
keeping with the longstanding principle that votes are valid if the intention is clear, 
and that Returning Officers must use their judgement in such cases, our view is that 
such votes would be counted as valid votes for the party and personal votes for 
the relevant candidate.119 
Translation of votes into seats 
13.36. For all list systems, counting involves a number of different stages. First, if 
there is an electoral threshold in place i.e. parties must achieve a minimum 
percentage of the vote share in order to be eligible to be allocated seats, this is 
applied to the total vote shares received in the constituency or on a national level 
(depending on the nature of the threshold). 
13.37. Second, an electoral formula is then applied to the vote shares of the 
eligible parties to determine which parties are allocated seats. Different electoral 
formulae may be used for this purpose; for example in Belgium the D’Hondt 
formula is used. In our modelling we have used both the D’Hondt and Sainte-
Laguë formulae. Table 21a and Table 21b show worked examples of a 
hypothetical Flexible List count using the D’Hondt and Sainte-Laguë formulae, 
demonstrating that the same votes can lead to different outcomes.  
                                            
118 Or for an independent candidate standing as a list of one. 
119 Ballot papers with marks against an individual candidate standing for one party and against a 
different party would, necessarily, be considered invalid as the intention would be ambiguous. 
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Table 21a Worked example of hypothetical Flexible List count using D’Hondt divisors120 
Party Votes Total 
seats 
Votes
1
 
Votes
2
 
Votes
3
 
A 350 2 350 1st seat 175 3rd seat 117 
B 310 2 310 2nd seat 155 4th seat 103 
C 150 1 150 5th seat 75  50 
D 120 0 120  60  40 
E 70 0 70  35  23 
Notes: there are 1,000 valid votes and 5 seats. Elected candidates are shaded in green. 
Table 21b Worked example of hypothetical Flexible List count using Sainte-Laguë divisors 
Party Votes Total 
seats 
Votes
1
 
Votes
3
 
Votes
5
 
A 350 2 350 1st seat 117 5th seat 70 
B 310 1 310 2nd seat 103  62 
C 150 1 150 3rd seat 50  30 
D 120 1 120 4th seat 40  24 
E 70 0 70  23  14 
Notes: there are 1,000 valid votes and 5 seats. Elected candidates are shaded in green. 
13.38. The Sainte-Laguë formula is generally accepted to produce more 
proportional outcomes than the D’Hondt formula. The indicative outcome 
modelling that we commissioned from Cardiff University’s Wales Governance 
Centre suggested that D’Hondt could produce less proportional outcomes than 
the current system. We therefore propose that the Sainte-Laguë formula should be 
used if the Assembly adopts a Flexible List electoral system. 
  
                                            
120 Farrell, D. (2011) Electoral systems: a comparative introduction, Palgrave Macmillan/London 
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Flexibility of the list 
13.39. Once it has been determined which parties have been allocated seats, 
the next stage is to determine which candidates are deemed elected. This 
depends on the flexibility of the list. 
13.40. Flexible List systems balance party influence and voter choice over which 
candidates take up the seats won by a party. They come in many forms, which 
vary along two key dimensions: how flexible the lists are; and what mechanisms 
they use to determine the final ordering of candidates. 
13.41. In terms of the first dimension, Flexible List systems can range from those in 
which lists are almost closed (so that party influence predominates) to those in 
which lists are almost open (so that voter influence dominates).121 In order to 
clearly differentiate the electoral systems that we consider from each other, we 
have sought to develop a Flexible List option that is substantially different in its 
effects from STV (where voter influence dominates) while also satisfying our 
criterion that voters should have meaningful choice among, and ability to 
influence the fortunes of, individual candidates. That is, we have sought to work up 
a system in which it is likely that a substantial number of Members would be 
elected through personal votes, but a substantial number would also be elected 
as a result of their position on their party’s list. 
13.42. In terms of the second dimension, Flexible List systems use a wide variety of 
mechanisms.122 The system we have developed uses flexible lists of the ‘threshold’ 
form. Under this system, parties determine the order in which candidates’ names 
appear on the ballot paper. If no candidate receives sufficient personal votes to 
meet a specified candidate threshold, the party’s preferred order is the order in 
which candidates take up any seats won by the party. If a candidate’s personal 
votes pass the threshold, she or he moves to the top of the list. If several 
candidates pass the threshold, they are ordered by the number of votes they have 
each received. For example, in Sweden, candidates receiving 5 per cent or more 
of the votes received by the party list move to the top of the list. We have opted 
for this system because it is simple and therefore readily understood by parties, 
candidates and voters. While other forms of flexible list have certain advantages, 
we do not think these outweigh the value in the context of Assembly elections of 
the threshold system’s simplicity. 
                                            
121 Renwick, A. and Pilet, J. (2016) Faces on the Ballot: The Personalization of Electoral Systems in 
Europe, Oxford University Press/Oxford, p. 20 
122 Ibid, pp. 27-8 
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13.43. The degree of flexibility of the lists in a threshold system is determined by the 
specific features of the electoral system and by how voters choose to cast their 
votes. The key features of the electoral system are: 
 The level at which the candidate threshold is set: flexibility decreases as 
the level of the threshold increases. 
 The number of candidates for whom voters are allowed to vote: flexibility 
decreases as the number of votes each voter may cast decreases. 
 The district magnitude: flexibility decreases as the district magnitude 
increases (as the number of candidates over whom votes are likely to 
be spread increases). 
13.44. As noted above, we propose that voters should be able to vote for one 
candidate. This is simple, and clearly differentiates the system from STV. 
13.45. Table 22 illustrates the potential effects of different candidate thresholds on 
the order in which candidates take up seats won by a party. 
Table 22 Worked example of allocation of seats to candidates in a hypothetical Flexible List system 
Candidates Personal 
votes 
Order of election: 
Party list 
order 
3 per cent 
threshold 
5 per cent 
threshold 
8 per cent 
threshold 
10 per 
cent 
threshold 
Threshold 
level 
 n/a 270 450 720 900 
Candidate A 0 1 5 4 3 2 
Candidate B 500 2 3 3 4 3 
Candidate C 770 3 2 2 2 4 
Candidate D 1,000 4 1 1 1 1 
Candidate E 280 5 4 5 5 5 
Notes: the party received 9,000 votes (aggregate of 2,550 personal votes for individual candidates 
and 6,450 votes for the party list) and has won three seats. With a 3 per cent threshold, a candidate 
would need to receive 270 personal votes to move to the top of the list. They would need 450 
personal votes with a 5 per cent threshold, 720 with an 8 per cent threshold and 900 with a 10 per 
cent threshold. Where more than one candidate achieves the relevant threshold, they move to the 
top of the list in accordance with the order of the number of personal votes they received. Elected 
candidates are shaded in green. 
13.46. Determination of the appropriate threshold must inevitably involve some 
guesswork, as it is difficult to predict how voters might choose to use their votes. 
Evidence from European democracies that use list systems suggests that the 
proportion of voters casting a candidate vote varies significantly between 
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countries, and within countries over time—from below 1 per cent in Austria before 
the 1980s to over 50 per cent in recent elections in Belgium.123 The most useful 
source of evidence for selecting a candidate threshold is Sweden. A Flexible List 
system was introduced for elections to the Swedish parliament (the Riksdag) in 
1998. It initially applied an 8 per cent candidate threshold. A review was always 
planned, however, because of the uncertainty over whether this threshold would 
produce the intended results. In 2014 the threshold was reduced to 5 per cent, as 
the number of candidates elected by personal votes was low: only 8 of the 349 
members of the Riksdag were elected because of candidates’ personal votes in 
2010.124 
13.47. We expect that, because voters in Wales are used to voting for individual 
candidates, they would likely continue to do so in large numbers under a Flexible 
List electoral system. This contrasts with Sweden, where lists were effectively closed 
before 1998 (and where, since 1998, around a quarter of voters have opted to 
cast a candidate vote). The district magnitudes that we propose (4 to 6; see 
chapter 14) are significantly lower than those in Sweden (on average around 15), 
with the result that any given threshold under our system would be easier to reach. 
13.48. We are aiming for a level of list flexibility that is higher than was achieved 
by the 8 per cent threshold in Sweden. Given the considerations above, we think 
that a candidate threshold of around 10 per cent might achieve this. We 
emphasise, however, that this is only a rough estimate, as the proportion of voters 
who would in fact vote for individual candidates is very uncertain. If the Assembly 
decides to introduce a Flexible List system, it should review the candidate threshold 
after the first election. 
  
                                            
123 Renwick, A. and Pilet, J. (2016) Faces on the Ballot: The Personalization of Electoral Systems in 
Europe, Oxford University Press/Oxford, pp. 218-26 
124 Ibid, pp. 145-7 
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Diversity of representation 
13.49. If the Assembly adopts a Flexible List system, we believe that parties should 
be required to ensure that 50 per cent of their candidates in each constituency 
are female and 50 per cent are male, and that their lists are zipped.125 We strongly 
believe that these requirements should be placed on a legislative footing. 
However, if that does not happen, parties should adopt these criteria as principles 
for candidate selection. 
13.50. We would also expect parties to ensure, if they stand candidates in more 
than one constituency, that they seek to balance the number of lists headed by 
women and the number headed by men. In addition, we would expect parties to 
seek to ensure that the candidates they stand across Wales are representative of 
the diverse communities they serve, in terms of all the protected characteristics, as 
well as being gender-balanced. 
Mechanism for filling casual vacancies 
13.51. Should casual vacancies arise during the course of an Assembly term, the 
appropriate mechanism for replacing the outgoing Member would be for the 
vacancy to be filled by the next eligible candidate on the relevant party’s list. 
13.52. Determination of who the next eligible candidate was would include 
consideration of the personal votes received by candidates i.e. the list would be 
considered in the order that candidates would have taken up seats at the 
election, taking account of any changes to the party’s preferred order which had 
resulted from the receipt of personal votes. 
  
                                            
125 If a party stands an odd number of candidates, this would be interpreted as 50 per cent of the 
total candidates plus or minus one. 
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Assessment against our principles 
13.53. Table 23 provides an assessment of the Flexible List system outlined above 
against our principles. 
Table 23 Assessment of a Flexible List system against our principles 
Principle Assessment 
Government 
accountability 
and effectiveness 
Modelling indicates broad proportionality, which suggests 
expectation would be relatively stable coalition governments. 
Proportionality The proportionality depends on the electoral formula utilised. Our 
modelling suggests the Sainte-Laguë formula would produce more 
proportional outcomes than the current system. The D’Hondt 
electoral formula generally produces outcomes which are less 
proportional than the Sainte-Laguë formula, and sometimes less 
proportional than the current system. Factors affecting the 
proportionality at national and constituency level include the 
number of constituencies, the district magnitudes, and the variance 
in district magnitudes. 
Member 
accountability 
Members returned for each constituency would have a direct 
constituency link with their electorate. Degree of influence voters 
have over which candidates take up seats won by the party (and 
therefore the direct accountability of individual candidates (rather 
than parties) to voters) is influenced by the level at which the 
candidate threshold is set. 
Equivalent status All Members are elected by the same route and have the same 
mandate. 
Diversity Measures to support and encourage diversity of representation could 
be integrated into the system, for example candidate quotas or 
requirements for lists to be zipped. The effectiveness of zipping a list 
would be affected by the level at which the threshold for 
candidates’ personal votes was set. District magnitudes of three or 
more are generally agreed to be more conducive to the election of 
a more diverse legislature. 
Voter choice Voters have flexibility to choose either a party or an individual 
candidate, providing a balance between voter choice and party 
influence. Where the balance is struck is influenced by the level at 
which the threshold for candidates’ personal votes is set and the 
campaign strategies adopted by parties. 
Equivalent 
mandates 
Seats can be apportioned using the Sainte-Laguë method based on 
electorate numbers, or taking account of specific local geopolitical 
factors. 
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Principle Assessment 
Boundaries Multimember constituencies based on either local authorities or 
current Assembly constituencies would provide a degree of 
familiarity and local identity for voters. Further discussion of 
boundaries, including potential boundary review arrangements, is set 
out in chapter 14. 
Simplicity Unfamiliar system in relation to Assembly elections, although similar to 
that used to elect Welsh MEPs. Voters would cast only one vote, but 
the choice between voting for a party or for a candidate could 
potentially cause confusion. Method of translating votes into seats 
won by a party, and which candidates take up those seats, could be 
perceived as complex, although an outcome by which parties win 
broadly the same proportion of votes and seats could equally be 
seen to be simple. 
Sustainability and 
adaptability 
Multimember constituencies provide flexibility about where in our 
recommended size bracket of 80 to 90 Members the size of the 
Assembly should be set, thus providing greater assurance about the 
future-proofing of any reform. The nature of any boundary or seat 
apportionment review arrangements would depend on the building 
blocks used as the basis for multimember constituencies. This issue is 
explored further in chapter 14. 
 
Ballot paper design 
13.54. We have reviewed sample ballot papers for each of our proposed 
electoral systems. Under the Wales Act 2017, the design of the ballot papers for use 
at Assembly elections will be a matter for the Welsh Ministers and the Electoral 
Commission.126 When preparing for the Assembly election in 2021, we suggest that 
particular consideration is given to the following: 
 MMP: continuing the current use of separate bilingual ballot papers for 
constituency and regional votes, and continuing the current practice of 
listing regional candidates’ names under the relevant party on the 
regional ballot paper. 
                                            
126 Section 5 of the Wales Act 2017 substitutes a new section 13 into the Government of Wales Act 
2006, which gives the Welsh Ministers an order-making power to make provision about the conduct 
of Assembly elections, the questioning of such elections and the return of an Assembly Member 
otherwise than at an election. Any changes to the design of the ballot paper would be achieved 
through an order made by the Welsh Ministers under this section, and would require prior 
consultation with the Electoral Commission, pursuant to section 7(1) of the Political Parties, Elections 
and Referendums Act 2000. 
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 STV: grouping candidates by the political party for which they are 
standing,127 the determination of the ordering of parties by lot,128 and 
the clarity of the instructions on the ballot paper to ensure voters 
understand they may rank as many or as few candidates as they wish, 
and that they may do so across different parties. 
 Flexible List: the clarity of the instructions on the ballot paper to ensure 
voters understand that they should mark only one cross, against either 
the party or the candidate for which they wish to vote. 
13.55. The issues outlined above will need to be considered by the Welsh Ministers 
when making the relevant order before the election in 2021. If a new system is to 
be adopted, the Welsh Ministers should work closely with the Electoral Commission 
on the design of the ballot paper, to ensure it is appropriate for Wales. 
 
Recommendation 12. Before making any order prescribing the design of ballot 
papers for use in Assembly elections, in addition to the consultation with the 
Electoral Commission required by section 7(1) of the Political Parties, Elections 
and Referendums Act 2000, the Welsh Ministers should also undertake such other 
consultation as may be appropriate, to ensure that the information included and 
the layout of the ballot paper is appropriate for the electoral system and for 
Wales. 
 
  
                                            
127 This is the basis on which STV ballot papers in Malta are arranged. 
128 The order of parties should be consistent across all constituencies for each election. 
RECOMMENDATION 
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14. ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES AND 
SUSTAINABILITY 
Background 
14.01. In addition to the ballot structure of the electoral system by which Members 
could be elected with effect from 2021, we have also considered the electoral 
boundaries upon which the systems could be based. 
Methodology 
14.02. Our terms of reference require us to make recommendations which can be 
implemented for the 2021 Assembly election. Our first consideration, therefore, was 
the extent to which there was scope for substantial boundary review work to be 
undertaken before then. 
14.03. We are grateful to the secretariats of the Boundary Commission for Wales 
and Local Democracy and Boundary Commission for Wales for the constructive 
way in which they have engaged with our work. Our discussions with them clearly 
indicated that there is insufficient time or capacity to carry out a full boundary 
review prior to 2021. We therefore ruled out the possibility of designing new, 
independent electoral areas for 2021. There remains, of course, potential for a full 
boundary review to be undertaken before 2026, to refine and adjust any electoral 
areas used for the purposes of the 2021 election. 
14.04. We next considered the potential for existing or anticipated electoral or 
administrative areas in Wales to serve as building blocks for new Assembly 
constituencies. In addition to minimising the boundary review work required to 
combine or split some areas, this approach fulfils our principle that the Assembly’s 
electoral system should be based on clearly defined geographic areas which are 
meaningful to people and take into account existing communities of interest, and 
existing electoral and administrative boundaries. 
14.05. We considered whether this approach could be subject to legal challenge, 
if implemented by the Assembly. Legal advice given to us suggests that any such 
challenge would be unlikely, and even less likely to succeed, because of our 
independence, our use of existing electoral areas as building blocks, our 
accompanying proposals for full scale boundary review before 2026, the potential 
for the minimal boundary review work required to be undertaken by an 
independent boundary commission, the lack of existing mechanisms for Assembly 
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boundary review, and the fact that any legislation brought forward to implement 
our proposals will be subject to public consultation. 
14.06. On this basis, we considered a range of different electoral and 
administrative subdivisions of Wales, including the current 40 Assembly 
constituencies, the 29 Westminster constituencies set out in the Boundary 
Commission’s revised proposals,129 the 22 local authority areas (also known as 
principal council areas), the seven local health board areas, the five Assembly 
electoral regions, the four regional education consortia regions, and the four 
Police and Crime Commissioner regions. We narrowed these options to three 
which merited more detailed consideration, and considered their strengths and 
weaknesses (see Table 24). 
Table 24 Assessment of potential boundary building blocks 
Boundaries Strengths Weaknesses 
40 existing 
Assembly 
constituencies 
Broadly similar electorate size 
leading to narrow distribution of 
district magnitudes. Familiarity for 
use in Assembly elections. 
Separate boundary review 
mechanisms would be required 
after 2021. If Westminster 
parliamentary boundaries change, 
Assembly constituencies may 
appear disjointed. 
29 proposed 
Westminster 
constituencies 
Similar electorate size. Simplicity for 
voters, electoral administrators and 
political parties resulting from co-
terminosity. Restoring the 
automatic link would negate the 
need for separate boundary review 
arrangements. 
Subject to future changes as a 
result of factors not necessarily 
relevant to Wales. Uncertainty 
about the timing and likelihood of 
the proposals’ implementation. 
Limited flexibility to set district 
magnitudes at levels which would 
encourage proportionality or 
diversity of representation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                            
129 Boundary Commission for Wales, 2018 Review of Parliamentary Constituencies: Revised Proposals 
Report, 17 October 2017 
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Boundaries Strengths Weaknesses 
22 local 
authority 
areas 
Familiar and meaningful 
boundaries with which voters 
identify. Simplicity for voters, 
electoral administrators and 
political parties resulting from co-
terminosity between local 
authorities and Assembly 
constituencies. Not expected to 
change significantly in the medium 
term, and any change is within the 
control of the Assembly. Existing 
local authority boundary review 
arrangements could be utilised. 
Vary significantly in size and 
population leading to wide 
distribution of district magnitudes. 
 
14.07. On the basis of our assessment, and the ongoing uncertainty about the 
timing and likelihood of the implementation of the current boundary review, we 
ruled out basing our proposals on the 29 proposed Westminster constituencies. We 
recognise the advantages of co-terminosity between Assembly and Westminster 
constituencies for the public, electoral administrators and political parties. 
However, these advantages are outweighed by the lack of flexibility the 29 
proposed constituencies provide for the size of the Assembly and for the electoral 
system which could be put in place. It would also not be desirable for Assembly 
constituencies to be sensitive to demographic or other changes elsewhere in the 
UK, rather than factors directly relevant to Wales. 
14.08. We then considered how the remaining building blocks—the 40 existing 
Assembly constituencies and the 22 local authority areas—could be used to 
design boundaries to underpin the three electoral systems outlined in chapter 13. 
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Mixed Member Proportional system: boundaries 
14.09. As outlined in chapter 13, our proposals for a Mixed Member Proportional 
(MMP) system are for the election of 40 constituency and 40 regional Members. In 
such a system, the 40 existing Assembly constituencies would each return a single 
constituency Member. We considered two options for Assembly regions: retaining 
the existing five regions, or splitting each in two to create ten new regions.  
14.10. We considered the merits of splitting the existing regions. Doing so could 
preserve the use of four-Member regions, and a decrease in the geographic size 
of the larger regions could strengthen the link between regional Members and 
their electorates. On balance, however, we took the view that retaining the 
current Assembly regional boundaries has the advantages of simplicity, familiarity 
for voters, and no requirement for boundary review work to be undertaken before 
2021. 
14.11. On the basis of our principle that the system should reflect the general 
principle of electoral system design that votes should have approximately the 
same value, we used the Sainte-Laguë method to apportion 40 regional seats to 
the five electoral regions (see Table 25). To minimise the variation in the ratio of 
Members to electorate, the apportionment took account of the Assembly 
electorate and the number of constituency seats within each region. 
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Table 25 Seat apportionment on the basis of 40 constituencies and five electoral regions (based solely on electorate) 
 
  
Members
Total electors plus 
attainers
Variance Members
Total electors plus 
attainers
Electorate per 
Member (taking 
constituency and 
regional Members 
into account)
Variance (taking 
constituency and 
regional Members 
into account)
Brecon and Radnorshire 1 55,726                      -2%
Ceredigion 1 52,599                      -7%
Dwyfor Meirionnydd 1 43,543                      -23%
Montgomeryshire 1 50,480                      -11%
Carmarthen East and Dinefwr 1 56,020                      -1%
Carmarthen West and South Pembrokeshire 1 56,821                      0%
Llanelli 1 60,244                      6%
Preseli Pembrokeshire 1 56,348                      -1%
Aberconwy 1 44,490                      -22%
Arfon 1 39,456                      -30%
Clwyd West 1 56,821                      0%
Vale of Clwyd 1 56,456                      -1%
Ynys Môn 1 50,855                      -10%
Alyn and Deeside 1 61,944                      9%
Clwyd South 1 55,693                      -2%
Delyn 1 53,067                      -7%
Wrexham 1 53,800                      -5%
Cardiff Central 1 57,238                      1%
Cardiff North 1 66,610                      17%
Cardiff South and Penarth 1 77,114                      36%
Cardiff West 1 66,587                      17%
Cynon Valley 1 50,160                      -12%
Pontypridd 1 59,360                      5%
Rhondda 1 49,393                      -13%
Vale of Glamorgan 1 72,306                      27%
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7 431,781                    28,785                      1%
8 472,582                    27,799                      -2%
3%29,339                      498,768                    9
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Notes: Figures are based on December 2016 Assembly electorate plus attainers data provided by the Boundary Commission for Wales and Local 
Democracy and Boundary Commission for Wales on 28 June 2017. Attainers are persons who attain the age of 18 during the currency of the 
register for the date shown, and are entitled to vote at a National Assembly for Wales election on or after their eighteenth birthday. Source: 
StatsWales. 
Members
Total electors plus 
attainers
Variance Members
Total electors plus 
attainers
Electorate per 
Member (taking 
constituency and 
regional Members 
into account)
Variance (taking 
constituency and 
regional Members 
into account)
Monmouth 1 64,403                      13%
Newport East 1 57,183                      1%
Newport West 1 64,380                      13%
Torfaen 1 60,613                      7%
Blaenau Gwent 1 50,466                      -11%
Caerphilly 1 63,266                      11%
Islwyn 1 55,348                      -2%
Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney 1 55,731                      -2%
Gower 1 60,965                      7%
Swansea East 1 57,930                      2%
Swansea West 1 54,405                      -4%
Aberavon 1 49,724                      -12%
Bridgend 1 61,185                      8%
Neath 1 55,908                      -2%
Ogmore 1 55,803                      -2%
Total 40 2,270,441                 40 2,270,441                 
56,761                      454,088                    28,381                      
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Constituency Regional
Average electors per constituency/ region
0%28,280                      395,920                    7
9 471,390                    27,729                      -2%
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Figure 9 Existing Assembly regions130 
 
Key Name 
1 North Wales 
2 Mid and West Wales 
3 South Wales West 
4 South Wales East 
5 South Wales Central  
                                            
130 Produced by the National Assembly for Wales Research Service 
Contains Ordnance Survey data © Crown copyright and database rights 2017.  
Ordnance Survey licence number 100047295. 
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14.12. The Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters131 
suggests that both electorate numbers and geography may be taken into 
account when apportioning seats to electoral areas. Our methodology of 
modelling equal mandates fits this. An alternative approach that also fits the 
principles would be to follow the current model, in which all Assembly regions 
return the same number of regional Members. This would mean that all regions 
would return eight Members. The result, as shown in Table 26 would be a slight 
underrepresentation of South Wales Central and South Wales East (a reduction 
from nine to eight regional Members each), and a slight overrepresentation of Mid 
and West Wales and South Wales West (an increase from seven to eight regional 
Members each). 
 
                                            
131 The Council of Europe’s European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice 
Commission), Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters: guidelines and explanatory report, 2002 
A PARLIAMENT THAT WORKS FOR WALES 
159 
Table 26 Seat apportionment on the basis of 40 constituencies and five electoral regions (on the basis of eight Members per region)  
  
Members
Total electors plus 
attainers
Variance Members
Total electors plus 
attainers
Electorate per 
Member (taking 
constituency and 
regional Members 
into account)
Variance (taking 
constituency and 
regional Members 
into account)
Brecon and Radnorshire 1 55,726                      -2%
Ceredigion 1 52,599                      -7%
Dwyfor Meirionnydd 1 43,543                      -23%
Montgomeryshire 1 50,480                      -11%
Carmarthen East and Dinefwr 1 56,020                      -1%
Carmarthen West and South Pembrokeshire 1 56,821                      0%
Llanelli 1 60,244                      6%
Preseli Pembrokeshire 1 56,348                      -1%
Aberconwy 1 44,490                      -22%
Arfon 1 39,456                      -30%
Clwyd West 1 56,821                      0%
Vale of Clwyd 1 56,456                      -1%
Ynys Môn 1 50,855                      -10%
Alyn and Deeside 1 61,944                      9%
Clwyd South 1 55,693                      -2%
Delyn 1 53,067                      -7%
Wrexham 1 53,800                      -5%
Cardiff Central 1 57,238                      1%
Cardiff North 1 66,610                      17%
Cardiff South and Penarth 1 77,114                      36%
Cardiff West 1 66,587                      17%
Cynon Valley 1 50,160                      -12%
Pontypridd 1 59,360                      5%
Rhondda 1 49,393                      -13%
Vale of Glamorgan 1 72,306                      27%
Region Constituencies
Constituency Regional
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8 472,582                    27,799                      -2%
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Notes: Figures are based on December 2016 Assembly electorate plus attainers data provided by the Boundary Commission for Wales and Local 
Democracy and Boundary Commission for Wales on 28 June 2017. Attainers are persons who attain the age of 18 during the currency of the 
register for the date shown, and are entitled to vote at a National Assembly for Wales election on or after their eighteenth birthday. Source: 
StatsWales. 
Members
Total electors plus 
attainers
Variance Members
Total electors plus 
attainers
Electorate per 
Member (taking 
constituency and 
regional Members 
into account)
Variance (taking 
constituency and 
regional Members 
into account)
Monmouth 1 64,403                      13%
Newport East 1 57,183                      1%
Newport West 1 64,380                      13%
Torfaen 1 60,613                      7%
Blaenau Gwent 1 50,466                      -11%
Caerphilly 1 63,266                      11%
Islwyn 1 55,348                      -2%
Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney 1 55,731                      -2%
Gower 1 60,965                      7%
Swansea East 1 57,930                      2%
Swansea West 1 54,405                      -4%
Aberavon 1 49,724                      -12%
Bridgend 1 61,185                      8%
Neath 1 55,908                      -2%
Ogmore 1 55,803                      -2%
Total 40 2,270,441                 40 2,270,441                 
56,761                      454,088                    28,381                      
Region Constituencies
Constituency Regional
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Multimember constituencies: STV and Flexible List 
Approach 
14.13. We considered how our building blocks—the 40 existing Assembly 
constituencies and the 22 local authority areas—could be used to create 
constituencies which would provide an appropriate basis for the election of 
Members via either STV or Flexible List. Drivers for this stage of our work included the 
need to balance minimal boundary review work, the apportionment of seats on 
the basis of electorate numbers, and the fulfilment of our principles of 
proportionality, diversity of representation and equivalent mandates. 
Option 1: using current Assembly constituencies 
14.14. On the basis of our recommended size bracket for the Assembly of 
between 80 and 90 Members, we considered how the existing 40 Assembly 
constituencies could be utilised in accordance with the aims set out above. There 
is general agreement in the academic literature that three is the minimum district 
magnitude which can deliver proportionality and support diversity of 
representation. We therefore decided to pair the 40 current Assembly 
constituencies to create 20 new Assembly constituencies. 
14.15. To achieve this, we started with Ynys Môn, which has only one 
geographical neighbour. Working on the basis of neighbouring constituencies, 
electorate numbers, and, as far as possible, local geographic circumstances, we 
created 20 pairs of constituencies with broadly equal representation (Figure 10). 
14.16. Table 27 outlines the seat apportionments for each of our 20 proposed 
constituencies for Assemblies of between 80 and 90 Members. Seats have been 
apportioned using the Sainte-Laguë method. 
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Figure 10 20 multimember constituencies based on pairings of existing Assembly constituencies132 
 
Key Name  Key Name 
1 Arfon and Ynys Môn  11 Aberavon and Neath 
2 Dwyfor Meirionnydd and Aberconwy   12 Bridgend and Vale of Glamorgan 
3 Clwyd West and Vale of Clwyd  13 Ogmore and Rhondda 
4 Delyn and Alyn and Deeside  14 Cynon Valley and Pontypridd 
5 Clwyd South and Wrexham   15 
Caerphilly and Merthyr Tydfil and 
Rhymney 
6 
Brecon and Radnorshire and 
Montgomeryshire 
 16 Blaenau Gwent and Islwyn 
7 
Carmarthen East and Dinefwr and 
Ceredigion 
 17 Monmouth and Torfaen 
8 
Carmarthen West and South 
Pembrokeshire and Preseli 
Pembrokeshire 
 18 Newport East and Newport West 
9 Gower and  Llanelli   19 
Cardiff Central and Cardiff South and 
Penarth 
10 Swansea East and Swansea West  20 Cardiff North and Cardiff West 
                                            
132 Produced by the National Assembly for Wales Research Service 
Contains Ordnance Survey data © Crown copyright and database rights 2017.  
Ordnance Survey licence number 100047295. 
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Table 27 Seat apportionment on the basis of 20 pairings of existing Assembly constituencies 
 
  
Aberavon & Neath
Aberconwy & Dwyfor 
Meirionnydd
Arfon & Ynys Môn Blaenau Gwent & Islwyn
Bridgend & Vale of 
Glamorgan
Caerphilly & Merthyr Tydfil
Cardiff Central & Cardiff 
South and Penarth
Cardiff West & Cardiff North
Preseli Pembs & Carmarthen 
West and South Pembs
Ceredigion & Carmarthen 
East and Dinefwr
Straight average
Total electors 
plus attainers
                                      105,632                                         88,033                                         90,311                                       105,814                                       133,491                                       118,997                                       134,352                                       133,197                                       113,169                                       108,619                                       113,522 
Seats                                                  4                                                  3                                                  3                                                  4                                                  5                                                  4                                                  5                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4 
Electors per 
Member
                                        26,408                                         29,344                                         30,104                                         26,454                                         26,698                                         29,749                                         26,870                                         33,299                                         28,292                                         27,155                                         28,454 
Seats                                                  4                                                  3                                                  3                                                  4                                                  5                                                  4                                                  5                                                  5                                                  4                                                  4 
Electors per 
Member
                                        26,408                                         29,344                                         30,104                                         26,454                                         26,698                                         29,749                                         26,870                                         26,639                                         28,292                                         27,155                                         28,121 
Seats                                                  4                                                  3                                                  3                                                  4                                                  5                                                  4                                                  5                                                  5                                                  4                                                  4 
Electors per 
Member
                                        26,408                                         29,344                                         30,104                                         26,454                                         26,698                                         29,749                                         26,870                                         26,639                                         28,292                                         27,155                                         27,808 
Seats                                                  4                                                  3                                                  3                                                  4                                                  5                                                  4                                                  5                                                  5                                                  4                                                  4 
Electors per 
Member
                                        26,408                                         29,344                                         30,104                                         26,454                                         26,698                                         29,749                                         26,870                                         26,639                                         28,292                                         27,155                                         27,505 
Seats                                                  4                                                  3                                                  3                                                  4                                                  5                                                  4                                                  5                                                  5                                                  4                                                  4 
Electors per 
Member
                                        26,408                                         29,344                                         30,104                                         26,454                                         26,698                                         29,749                                         26,870                                         26,639                                         28,292                                         27,155                                         27,202 
Seats                                                  4                                                  3                                                  3                                                  4                                                  5                                                  5                                                  5                                                  5                                                  4                                                  4 
Electors per 
Member
                                        26,408                                         29,344                                         30,104                                         26,454                                         26,698                                         23,799                                         26,870                                         26,639                                         28,292                                         27,155                                         26,904 
Seats                                                  4                                                  3                                                  4                                                  4                                                  5                                                  5                                                  5                                                  5                                                  4                                                  4 
Electors per 
Member
                                        26,408                                         29,344                                         22,578                                         26,454                                         26,698                                         23,799                                         26,870                                         26,639                                         28,292                                         27,155                                         26,528 
Seats                                                  4                                                  3                                                  4                                                  4                                                  5                                                  5                                                  5                                                  5                                                  4                                                  4 
Electors per 
Member
                                        26,408                                         29,344                                         22,578                                         26,454                                         26,698                                         23,799                                         26,870                                         26,639                                         28,292                                         27,155                                         26,240 
Seats                                                  4                                                  3                                                  4                                                  4                                                  5                                                  5                                                  5                                                  5                                                  4                                                  4 
Electors per 
Member
                                        26,408                                         29,344                                         22,578                                         26,454                                         26,698                                         23,799                                         26,870                                         26,639                                         28,292                                         27,155                                         25,957 
Seats                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  5                                                  5                                                  5                                                  5                                                  4                                                  4 
Electors per 
Member
                                        26,408                                         22,008                                         22,578                                         26,454                                         26,698                                         23,799                                         26,870                                         26,639                                         28,292                                         27,155                                         25,590 
Seats                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  5                                                  5                                                  5                                                  5                                                  5                                                  4 
Electors per 
Member
                                        26,408                                         22,008                                         22,578                                         26,454                                         26,698                                         23,799                                         26,870                                         26,639                                         22,634                                         27,155                                         25,307 
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Notes: figures based on December 2016 Assembly electorate plus attainers data provided by the Boundary Commission for Wales on 28 June 2017. Attainers are 
persons who attain the age of 18 during the currency of the register for the date shown, and are entitled to vote at a National Assembly for Wales election on or after 
their eighteenth birthday. Source: StatsWales. The Sainte-Laguë formula has been applied by initially allocating three Members to each constituency to reach a total of 
60 Members. The electorate figure for each constituency is then divided by the divisor which for 60 Members (20×3) is seven ((2×3)+1=7). This produces a new quotient 
for each constituency and the next seat is allocated to the constituency with the highest quotient. This procedure is repeated to allocate each additional seat. The 
additional seat apportioned for each size of the Assembly is shaded in green. 
Cynon Valley & Pontypridd Alyn and Deeside & Delyn Llanelli & Gower Monmouth & Torfaen
Newport East & Newport 
West
Ogmore & Rhondda
Montgomeryshire & Brecon 
and Radnorshire
Swansea East & Swansea 
West
Clwyd West & Vale of Clwyd Clwyd South & Wrexham Straight average
Total electors 
plus attainers
                                      109,520                                       115,011                                       121,209                                       125,016                                       121,563                                       105,196                                       106,206                                       112,335                                       113,277                                       109,493                                       113,522 
Seats                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4 
Electors per 
Member
                                        27,380                                         28,753                                         30,302                                         31,254                                         30,391                                         26,299                                         26,552                                         28,084                                         28,319                                         27,373                                         28,454 
Seats                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4 
Electors per 
Member
                                        27,380                                         28,753                                         30,302                                         31,254                                         30,391                                         26,299                                         26,552                                         28,084                                         28,319                                         27,373                                         28,121 
Seats                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  5                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4 
Electors per 
Member
                                        27,380                                         28,753                                         30,302                                         25,003                                         30,391                                         26,299                                         26,552                                         28,084                                         28,319                                         27,373                                         27,808 
Seats                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  5                                                  5                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4 
Electors per 
Member
                                        27,380                                         28,753                                         30,302                                         25,003                                         24,313                                         26,299                                         26,552                                         28,084                                         28,319                                         27,373                                         27,505 
Seats                                                  4                                                  4                                                  5                                                  5                                                  5                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4 
Electors per 
Member
                                        27,380                                         28,753                                         24,242                                         25,003                                         24,313                                         26,299                                         26,552                                         28,084                                         28,319                                         27,373                                         27,202 
Seats                                                  4                                                  4                                                  5                                                  5                                                  5                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4 
Electors per 
Member
                                        27,380                                         28,753                                         24,242                                         25,003                                         24,313                                         26,299                                         26,552                                         28,084                                         28,319                                         27,373                                         26,904 
Seats                                                  4                                                  4                                                  5                                                  5                                                  5                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4 
Electors per 
Member
                                        27,380                                         28,753                                         24,242                                         25,003                                         24,313                                         26,299                                         26,552                                         28,084                                         28,319                                         27,373                                         26,528 
Seats                                                  4                                                  5                                                  5                                                  5                                                  5                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4 
Electors per 
Member
                                        27,380                                         23,002                                         24,242                                         25,003                                         24,313                                         26,299                                         26,552                                         28,084                                         28,319                                         27,373                                         26,240 
Seats                                                  4                                                  5                                                  5                                                  5                                                  5                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  5                                                  4 
Electors per 
Member
                                        27,380                                         23,002                                         24,242                                         25,003                                         24,313                                         26,299                                         26,552                                         28,084                                         22,655                                         27,373                                         25,957 
Seats                                                  4                                                  5                                                  5                                                  5                                                  5                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  5                                                  4 
Electors per 
Member
                                        27,380                                         23,002                                         24,242                                         25,003                                         24,313                                         26,299                                         26,552                                         28,084                                         22,655                                         27,373                                         25,590 
Seats                                                  4                                                  5                                                  5                                                  5                                                  5                                                  4                                                  4                                                  4                                                  5                                                  4 
Electors per 
Member
                                        27,380                                         23,002                                         24,242                                         25,003                                         24,313                                         26,299                                         26,552                                         28,084                                         22,655                                         27,373                                         25,307 
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14.17. A key factor for consideration in determining the optimum size of Assembly 
within our bracket to be returned on the basis of 20 multimember constituencies is 
the distribution of district magnitudes at different sizes. Table 28 outlines the 
number of constituencies of each district magnitude as the size of the Assembly 
increases from 80 to 90. The variance in district magnitudes is relatively low, with 
the majority of constituencies returning either four or five Members. 
Table 28 Distribution of district magnitudes for Assemblies of between 80 and 90 Members based on 20 
constituencies 
 3 seats 4 seats 5 seats 
80 2 16 2 
81 2 15 3 
82 2 14 4 
83 2 13 5 
84 2 12 6 
85 2 11 7 
86 1 12 7 
87 1 11 8 
88 1 10 9 
89 0 11 9 
90 0 10 10 
 
14.18. Three is generally accepted in the academic literature on electoral systems 
to be the absolute minimum constituency size. However, to fulfil our principles of 
proportionality and diversity of representation, and future-proof our proposals 
against demographic change, we believe that four should be the minimum district 
magnitude for any of our proposed multimember constituencies. This criterion, 
combined with our earlier conclusion that a size of Assembly towards the top of 
our recommended bracket would provide more meaningful and sustainable 
increases in the Assembly’s capacity, leads us to conclude that if our proposed 20 
multimember constituencies based on current Assembly constituencies are 
implemented, they should be used to elect an Assembly of 89 or 90 Members.133 
                                            
133 Our modelling is based on electorate data from December 2016. Legislation to reform the 
electoral system would need to specify the electorate data upon which the apportionment of 
seats to constituencies would be based. This might result in some variation over where within our 
bracket of 80 to 90 Members lay the optimal size range for the Assembly on the basis of district 
magnitudes. Similar variation could result from changes to the Assembly franchise, for example a 
reduction in the minimum voting age. 
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Option 2: using local authority areas 
14.19. We undertook a similar exercise on the basis of the 22 local authority areas 
in Wales (also known as principal council areas). The exercise was slightly more 
complex than for the existing Assembly constituencies, as there are considerable 
differences in the electorate size of each local authority area. We considered how 
local authority areas of different sizes could be combined to create meaningful 
new constituencies.134 
14.20. Again, we started with the Isle of Anglesey, on the basis that it has only one 
geographical neighbour. Working on the basis of neighbouring local authorities, 
electorate numbers, and, as far as possible, local geographic circumstances, we 
paired smaller and medium local authorities, while leaving the larger authorities 
unpaired, to create 15 new constituencies. This does not fit Cardiff, which is by far 
the largest local authority in terms of electorate size. Taking account of the current 
divisions of Cardiff into North, South, West and Central for the purposes of Assembly 
constituencies, we used the component electoral wards to split the Cardiff local 
authority area into two new constituencies.135 The 17 proposed constituencies are 
shown in Figure 11. 
14.21. Table 29 outlines the seat apportionments for each of our 17 proposed 
constituencies for Assemblies of between 80 and 90 Members. Seats have been 
apportioned using the Sainte-Laguë method. 
 
                                            
134 This is similar to an approach proposed by Dr John Cox in his evidence submission. 
135 The current Assembly constituencies are Cardiff Central, Cardiff North, Cardiff West, and Cardiff 
South and Penarth. Our proposed constituency of Cardiff South and Cardiff Central includes those 
electoral wards in Cardiff South and Penarth which fall within the Cardiff local authority area. Those 
wards which fall within the Vale of Glamorgan local authority area are included in our proposed 
Vale of Glamorgan constituency. 
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Figure 11 17 multimember constituencies based on local authority areas136 
 
Key Name  Key Name 
1 Isle of Anglesey and Gwynedd  10 Bridgend  
2 Denbighshire and Conwy  11 Rhondda Cynon Taf 
3 Flintshire  12 Merthyr Tydfil and Caerphilly  
4 Wrexham  13 Blaenau Gwent and Torfaen  
5 Powys  14 The Vale of Glamorgan  
6 Ceredigion and Pembrokeshire   15 Cardiff North and West 
7 Carmarthenshire  16 Cardiff South and Central 
8 Swansea  17 Monmouthshire and Newport 
9 Neath Port Talbot     
 
                                            
136 Produced by the National Assembly for Wales Research Service 
Contains Ordnance Survey data © Crown copyright and database rights 2017.  
Ordnance Survey licence number 100047295. 
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Table 29 Seat apportionment on the basis of 17 constituencies based on local authority areas 
  
Blaenau Gwent & 
Torfaen
Bridgend
Caerphilly & Merthyr 
Tydfil
Cardiff North & West
Cardiff South & 
Central
Carmarthenshire
Ceredigion & 
Pembrokeshire
Straight average
Total electors plus attainers                       118,995                       104,936                       174,345                       133,277                       112,220                       139,733                       142,299                       133,555 
Seats                                 4                                 4                                 6                                 5                                 4                                 5                                 5 
Electors per Member                         29,749                         26,234                         29,058                         26,655                         28,055                         27,947                         28,460                         28,525 
Seats                                 4                                 4                                 6                                 5                                 4                                 5                                 5 
Electors per Member                         29,749                         26,234                         29,058                         26,655                         28,055                         27,947                         28,460                         28,018 
Seats                                 4                                 4                                 6                                 5                                 4                                 5                                 5 
Electors per Member                         29,749                         26,234                         29,058                         26,655                         28,055                         27,947                         28,460                         27,769 
Seats                                 4                                 4                                 6                                 5                                 4                                 5                                 5 
Electors per Member                         29,749                         26,234                         29,058                         26,655                         28,055                         27,947                         28,460                         27,306 
Seats                                 4                                 4                                 7                                 5                                 4                                 5                                 5 
Electors per Member                         29,749                         26,234                         24,906                         26,655                         28,055                         27,947                         28,460                         27,062 
Seats                                 4                                 4                                 7                                 5                                 4                                 5                                 5 
Electors per Member                         29,749                         26,234                         24,906                         26,655                         28,055                         27,947                         28,460                         26,819 
Seats                                 5                                 4                                 7                                 5                                 4                                 5                                 5 
Electors per Member                         23,799                         26,234                         24,906                         26,655                         28,055                         27,947                         28,460                         26,469 
Seats                                 5                                 4                                 7                                 5                                 4                                 5                                 5 
Electors per Member                         23,799                         26,234                         24,906                         26,655                         28,055                         27,947                         28,460                         26,230 
Seats                                 5                                 4                                 7                                 5                                 4                                 5                                 6 
Electors per Member                         23,799                         26,234                         24,906                         26,655                         28,055                         27,947                         23,717                         25,951 
Seats                                 5                                 4                                 7                                 5                                 4                                 5                                 6 
Electors per Member                         23,799                         26,234                         24,906                         26,655                         28,055                         27,947                         23,717                         25,612 
Seats                                 5                                 4                                 7                                 5                                 4                                 6                                 6 
Electors per Member                         23,799                         26,234                         24,906                         26,655                         28,055                         23,289                         23,717                         25,338 
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Notes: figures are based on December 2016 Assembly electorate plus attainers data provided by the Boundary Commission for Wales on 28 June 2017. Attainers are 
persons who attain the age of 18 during the currency of the register for the date shown, and are entitled to vote at a National Assembly for Wales election on or after 
their eighteenth birthday. Source: StatsWales. The Sainte-Laguë formula has been applied by initially allocating three Members to each constituency to reach a total of 
51 Members. The electorate figure for each constituency is then divided by the divisor which for 51 Members (17 × 3) is seven ((2 × 3) + 1 = 7). This produces a new 
quotient for each constituency and the next seat is allocated to the constituency with the highest quotient. This procedure is repeated to allocate each additional 
seat. The additional seat apportioned for each size of Assembly is shaded in green. 
Flintshire
Gwynedd & 
Isle of Anglesey
Monmouthshire & 
Newport
Neath Port Talbot Powys
Rhondda 
Cynon Taf
Swansea
The Vale of 
Glamorgan
Wrexham Straight average
Total electors plus attainers                       115,011                       133,854                       178,050                       105,632                       106,206                       170,965                       173,300                         94,358                       103,378                       133,555 
Seats                                 4                                 5                                 6                                 4                                 4                                 6                                 6                                 3                                 3 
Electors per Member                         28,753                         26,771                         29,675                         26,408                         26,552                         28,494                         28,883                         31,453                         34,459                         28,525 
Seats                                 4                                 5                                 6                                 4                                 4                                 6                                 6                                 3                                 4 
Electors per Member                         28,753                         26,771                         29,675                         26,408                         26,552                         28,494                         28,883                         31,453                         25,845                         28,018 
Seats                                 4                                 5                                 7                                 4                                 4                                 6                                 6                                 3                                 4 
Electors per Member                         28,753                         26,771                         25,436                         26,408                         26,552                         28,494                         28,883                         31,453                         25,845                         27,769 
Seats                                 4                                 5                                 7                                 4                                 4                                 6                                 6                                 4                                 4 
Electors per Member                         28,753                         26,771                         25,436                         26,408                         26,552                         28,494                         28,883                         23,590                         25,845                         27,306 
Seats                                 4                                 5                                 7                                 4                                 4                                 6                                 6                                 4                                 4 
Electors per Member                         28,753                         26,771                         25,436                         26,408                         26,552                         28,494                         28,883                         23,590                         25,845                         27,062 
Seats                                 4                                 5                                 7                                 4                                 4                                 6                                 7                                 4                                 4 
Electors per Member                         28,753                         26,771                         25,436                         26,408                         26,552                         28,494                         24,757                         23,590                         25,845                         26,819 
Seats                                 4                                 5                                 7                                 4                                 4                                 6                                 7                                 4                                 4 
Electors per Member                         28,753                         26,771                         25,436                         26,408                         26,552                         28,494                         24,757                         23,590                         25,845                         26,469 
Seats                                 4                                 5                                 7                                 4                                 4                                 7                                 7                                 4                                 4 
Electors per Member                         28,753                         26,771                         25,436                         26,408                         26,552                         24,424                         24,757                         23,590                         25,845                         26,230 
Seats                                 4                                 5                                 7                                 4                                 4                                 7                                 7                                 4                                 4 
Electors per Member                         28,753                         26,771                         25,436                         26,408                         26,552                         24,424                         24,757                         23,590                         25,845                         25,951 
Seats                                 5                                 5                                 7                                 4                                 4                                 7                                 7                                 4                                 4 
Electors per Member                         23,002                         26,771                         25,436                         26,408                         26,552                         24,424                         24,757                         23,590                         25,845                         25,612 
Seats                                 5                                 5                                 7                                 4                                 4                                 7                                 7                                 4                                 4 
Electors per Member                         23,002                         26,771                         25,436                         26,408                         26,552                         24,424                         24,757                         23,590                         25,845                         25,338 
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14.22. The variance in district magnitudes between our proposed local authority-
based constituencies is more marked than for those based on Assembly 
constituencies, as shown in Table 30. This could lead to a perception of greater 
representation for particular areas in Wales, or greater likelihood of proportional 
outcomes or diversity of representation in some constituencies compared to 
others. 
Table 30 Distribution of district magnitudes for Assemblies of between 80 and 90 Members based on 17 
constituencies 
 3 seats 4 seats 5 seats 6 seats 7 seats 
80 2 6 4 5 0 
81 1 7 4 5 0 
82 1 7 4 4 1 
83 0 8 4 4 1 
84 0 8 4 3 2 
85 0 8 4 2 3 
86 0 7 5 2 3 
87 0 7 5 1 4 
88 0 7 4 2 4 
89 0 6 5 2 4 
90 0 6 4 3 4 
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14.23. We also considered whether the emergence from the modelling of seats 
with district magnitudes of seven could result in hyperproportional outcomes in 
those constituencies. Our modelling suggests that there is no strong argument that 
this would be the case. We therefore do not propose that legislative electoral 
thresholds are required. Nevertheless, our preference is that seven seat 
constituencies should be the exception and not the norm. 
14.24. As with the 20 paired Assembly constituency model, in reaching our 
conclusions on the optimum size of Assembly to be elected via either STV or 
Flexible List, we have taken into account not only the greater benefits for capacity 
and sustainability of a number nearer the top of our recommended bracket, but 
also our view that district magnitudes of between four and six are to be preferred. 
On these bases, our indicative modelling suggests that if our proposed 17 
multimember constituencies based on local authority areas are implemented, they 
should be used to elect an Assembly of 83 to 84 Members.137 
  
                                            
137 Our modelling is based on electorate data from December 2016. Legislation to reform the 
electoral system would need to specify the electorate data upon which the apportionment of 
seats to constituencies would be based. This might result in some variation over where within our 
bracket of 80 to 90 Members lay the optimal size range for the Assembly on the basis of district 
magnitudes. Similar variation could result from changes to the Assembly franchise, for example a 
reduction in the minimum voting age. 
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Sustainability and review 
14.25. We recognise that the way in which we have combined or split existing 
Assembly constituencies or local authority areas to reach our proposals will be of 
interest to the public, parties and stakeholders, and that some combinations or 
splits will attract greater consensus than others. Nevertheless, we are confident 
that our proposals could be implemented for 2021, if the Assembly decided to 
proceed on the basis of multimember constituencies. If it did so, we recommend 
that before the 2021 election, a boundary commission is tasked with calculating 
the Members to be returned for each of our proposed new constituencies, using 
the Sainte-Laguë method of apportionment. Our apportionments have been 
carried out on the basis of electorate numbers alone. If the Assembly wished to 
compensate for rurality or distance from Cardiff Bay an alternative would be to 
introduce weighting into the Sainte-Laguë formula. 
14.26. The Venice Commission suggests that such weightings, which might be on 
the basis of geographical, administrative or historical factors, should not generally 
permit variation from the norm of more than 10 per cent of the electorate, 
although up to 15 per cent may be permissible in special circumstances, which it 
suggests might include “protection of a concentrated minority” or a “sparsely 
populated administrative entity”.138 
14.27. Regardless of which system the Assembly implements—MMP on the basis of 
40 constituencies and five electoral regions, or either STV or a Flexible List on the 
basis of 17 or 20 multimember constituencies—any legislation reforming the 
Assembly’s electoral system must put in place arrangements for boundary or seat 
apportionment review before 2026, and at suitable intervals thereafter. The Venice 
Commission suggests intervals of no more than ten years between reviews of the 
distribution of seats or the definition of electoral boundaries.139 
14.28. Boundaries which are independent of other electoral or administrative 
areas, i.e. the 40 constituencies and five electoral regions used for MMP, or the 20 
proposed constituencies based on existing Assembly constituencies, will require 
independent review mechanisms. Conversely, review of constituencies based on 
existing local authority areas could be undertaken as part of existing local 
authority boundary review mechanisms. Such review generally involves the 
adjustment of internal ward boundaries rather than external local authority 
                                            
138 The Council of Europe’s European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice 
Commission), Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters: guidelines and explanatory report, 2002 
139 Ibid 
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borders, and the Assembly constituency review work would therefore largely 
consist of reviewing the apportionment of seats to constituencies to respond to 
changes in the electorate. 
14.29. There are two boundary commissions active in Wales: 
 The Boundary Commission for Wales (BCW) is responsible for the review 
of Westminster parliamentary constituencies. Until 2011 the BCW was 
also responsible for Assembly constituencies, as a result of the 
automatic link between Westminster and Assembly constituencies. The 
BCW is a reserved authority under the Wales Act 2017, meaning that the 
Assembly would require the UK Government’s consent before 
conferring any functions on it. 
 The Local Democracy and Boundary Commission for Wales (LDBCW) is 
responsible for reviewing the boundaries of local authorities and their 
constituent electoral divisions, and identifying the appropriate number 
of councillors to represent each. The Assembly already has full 
legislative competence over the LDBCW in relation to local 
government, and under the Wales Act 2017 will have legislative 
competence to confer functions on it in relation to Assembly elections 
with effect from the Principal Appointed Day (expected to be 1 April 
2018). 
14.30. However, there are no statutory provisions allowing for either of these 
bodies to review Assembly boundaries. This has been the case since 2011, when 
the automatic link between Westminster parliamentary constituencies and 
Assembly constituencies was severed by the Parliamentary Voting System and 
Constituencies Act 2011. In 2012, the UK Government published a Green Paper on 
future electoral arrangements for the National Assembly for Wales.140 However, the 
decision not to pursue the proposals meant that the Assembly’s constituency 
boundaries are now ossified as those provided for by the Parliamentary 
Constituencies and Assembly Electoral Regions (Wales) Order 2006 as modified by 
the Parliamentary Constituencies and Assembly Electoral Regions (Wales) 
(Amendment) Order 2008. 
14.31. The Assembly is anomalous in this regard, and it is not appropriate that such 
ossification of the boundaries should continue. Our proposals for electoral systems 
therefore include mechanisms to ensure their sustainability. In each case, we 
recommend a full review is undertaken after the next election. Our view is that this 
                                            
140 Wales Office, Green paper on future electoral arrangements for the National Assembly for Wales, 
2012 
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boundary review should be undertaken by an independent boundary commission 
wholly within the legislative competence of the Assembly. However, even if our 
proposals are not implemented, legislative action must be taken to put in place 
mechanisms to review the current boundaries before the 2026 election. 
14.32. Our work on electoral boundaries is based on Assembly electorate data as 
at December 2016. However, if our recommendation on the extension of the 
franchise to 16- and 17-year-olds is implemented, or indeed any other changes to 
the franchise are made, there will be significant changes to the electorate.141 Any 
boundary or seat apportionment review undertaken before 2026 must therefore 
be on the basis of the extended Assembly franchise. 
 
Recommendation 13. Legislative action must be taken to put in place boundary 
or seat apportionment review mechanisms which provide for a full review before 
the 2026 election, whether or not our proposals for reform are implemented. Such 
mechanisms must take account of any changes to the Assembly franchise, as 
well as other demographic or population changes. 
 
  
                                            
141 StatsWales 2016 mid-year population estimates by age indicate that there are 70,827 people 
aged 16 or 17 in Wales. This represents 2.8 per cent of the population of Wales who are aged 16 or 
over.  
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15. THE MINIMUM VOTING AGE 
Background and methodology 
15.01. With effect from a Principal Appointed Day to be specified by the 
Secretary of State for Wales—expected to be 1 April 2018—the Wales Act 2017 will 
give the Assembly legislative competence over the franchise for Assembly and 
local government elections. 
15.02. We were tasked with considering and making a recommendation as to 
what should be the minimum voting age for Assembly elections. Our approach has 
been to: 
 Review the existing evidence, research and literature, and add to this 
where necessary by seeking additional evidence and views from 
experts and key stakeholders about what the minimum voting age 
should be; 
 Consider the current Assembly franchise, and the wider context in 
Wales, the UK and elsewhere; 
 Consider the risks and opportunities which might be presented by any 
change, including any practical issues which might arise and 
complementary actions which would need to be taken.  
UK and international context 
15.03. In England, Northern Ireland and Wales the minimum voting age for all 
elections and referenda is 18, although the Wales Act 2014 included provision that, 
should a referendum be held on the devolution of income tax-varying powers, the 
Assembly would be able to determine whether the minimum voting age for the 
referendum would be 16 or 18.142 
15.04. In Scotland, the franchise has been extended to 16 and 17-year-olds for 
Scottish Parliament and Scottish local elections. The franchise was first extended to 
16- and 17-year-olds for the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence by the 
Scottish Independence Referendum (Franchise) Act 2013. This legislation put in 
place the required arrangements to ensure that 16- and 17-year-olds were able to 
vote, including appropriate safeguards to ensure that their personal data was 
treated sensitively and responsibly. The reduction in the voting age was 
                                            
142 Section 13(2) of the Wales Act 2014. The requirement for such a referendum to be held has since 
been removed by the Wales Act 2017. 
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accompanied by significant education and public awareness work by the 
Electoral Commission and schools in Scotland. 
15.05. The Scottish Parliament subsequently passed the Scottish Elections 
(Reduction of Voting Age) Act 2015, and 16- and 17-year-olds voted for the first 
time in the Scottish Parliament election in 2016 and the Scottish local elections in 
2017. 
15.06. The Welsh Government published a White Paper consultation, Reforming 
Local Government: Resilient and Renewed, in January 2017.143 The White Paper 
included proposals to reduce the minimum voting age for local elections in Wales 
to 16. These proposals were reiterated in the Welsh Government’s consultation on 
local government electoral reform, published in July 2017.144 
15.07. At present, the franchise for Assembly elections is tied to the franchise for 
local government elections in Wales, by virtue of section 12 of the Government of 
Wales Act 2006. Consequently, an individual who is 18 by or on the day of the 
election is able to vote in an Assembly election. If the local government franchise 
were to be extended to 16- and 17-year-olds, all else being equal, the Assembly 
franchise would also be extended. We understand, however, that any legislation 
brought forward by the Welsh Government in relation to the local election 
franchise is likely to sever the automatic link with the Assembly franchise, leaving 
the minimum voting age for Assembly elections at 18. In any case, as a matter of 
principle, the Assembly should determine its own franchise in legislation with that 
overt purpose. 
15.08. Elsewhere in the UK, calls to reduce the voting age to 16 have increased 
since the early 2000s (see Figure 12 for an overview of key moments in the debate 
about the minimum voting age in the UK). Most recently, two Private Members’ Bills 
have been introduced in the House of Commons, and one in the House of Lords, 
with the objective of reducing the minimum voting age for UK elections.145 
15.09. Similarly, during the passage of the EU Referendum Bill, attempts were 
made to extend the franchise for the referendum to 16- and 17-year-olds. An 
amendment was tabled in the House of Lords by Baroness Morgan of Ely (now a 
                                            
143 Welsh Government, Reforming Local Government: Resilient and Renewed, January 2017 
144 Welsh Government, Electoral reform in local government in Wales, July 2017 
145 Second Reading of Jim McMahon MP’s Representation of the People (Young People's 
Enfranchisement and Education) Bill 2017-19 is scheduled for November 2017. Second Reading of 
Peter Kyle MP’s Representation of the People (Young People's Enfranchisement) Bill 2017-19 is 
scheduled for May 2018. The date for Second Reading of Lord Adonis’ Voting Age (Reduction) Bill 
[HL] 2017-19 is yet to be announced. 
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Welsh Labour AM), who argued that the referendum was a once in a generation 
opportunity for 16- and 17-year-olds to vote on this significant issue, and 
highlighted the mixed messages for 16- and 17-year-olds in Scotland who had 
been able to vote in the Scottish independence referendum. The amendment was 
agreed in the Lords by 293 votes to 211, but was later overturned in the Commons. 
Figure 12 Overview of calls for reduction in the voting age 
 
Unsuccessful attempt in the House of Commons to amend Representation of 
the People Bill to lower the voting age. Amendment was rejected by 434 votes 
to 36. 
 
Voting Age (Reduction to 16) Bill [HL] 2002-03 introduced by Conservative Peer, 
Lord Lucas. The Bill passed the House of Lords, but no time was found for it in the 
House of Commons. 
UK Government’s Children and Young People’s Unit reported on falling voter 
turnout among young people, acknowledging calls for a reduction in the 
voting age, but stated this was not government policy. 
 
Electoral Reform Society organised a coalition of political parties, pressure 
groups and charities, and launched Votes at 16 campaign. 
 
House of Commons Welsh Affairs Committee reported support in principle for 
voting age to be reduced. 
Electoral Commission recommended the voting age remained at 18. Most of 
the public consultation responses supported reducing the voting age, but 
general opinion polling showed support for the status quo. 
 
Representation of the People (Reduction of Voting Age) Bill 2005-06 introduced 
by then Liberal Democrat MP Stephen Williams. The Bill did not receive a 
Second Reading. 
 
Power Commission reported on British democracy and people’s 
disengagement from politics. The final report recommended reducing the 
minimum voting age. 
 
Voting Age Reduction Bill 2007-08 introduced by then Labour MP (now AM) 
Julie Morgan. The Bill received a Second Reading, but did not progress any 
further. 
 
Youth Citizenship Commission reported, noting that there was not sufficient 
evidence on which it could base a recommendation for reduction in the voting 
age. 
 
Unsuccessful attempt to amend the Parliamentary Voting System and 
Constituencies Bill 2010-11 to reduce the voting age for the referendum on the 
electoral system. 
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Voting Age (Comprehensive Reduction) Bill [HL] 2012-13 introduced by the 
Liberal Democrat Peer Lord Tyler. The Bill did not progress beyond First Reading. 
 
House of Commons Backbench Business debate on the reduction of the voting 
age for all elections and referendums in the UK. The motion was agreed by 119 
to 46. 
Voting Age (Comprehensive Reduction) Bill [HL] 2012-13 introduced by the 
Liberal Democrat Peer Lord Tyler. The Coalition Government resisted the Bill.  
Scottish Parliament passed the Scottish Independence Referendum (Franchise) 
Act 2013, enabling 16- and 17-year-olds to vote in the 2014 referendum on 
Scottish independence. 
 
House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee report 
called on the UK Government to lead a national discussion on reducing the 
voting age, and allow the House of Commons a free vote on the issue.  
The Scottish independence referendum marked the first time in the UK that 16- 
and 17-year-olds were entitled to vote. 
 
Unsuccessful attempts to amend the Cities and Devolution Bill and EU 
Referendum Bill to extend the franchise. Amendments were agreed in the 
House of Lords, but later overturned in the House of Commons.  
Scottish Parliament passed the Scottish Elections (Reduction of Voting Age) Act 
2015, enabling 16- and 17-year-olds to vote in the Scottish Parliament election in 
2016 and the Scottish local elections in 2017. 
 
Ten Minute Rule Bill introduced by the Green MP Caroline Lucas to introduce 
proportional representation for UK general elections and reduce the voting age 
to 16. The motion to introduce the Bill was defeated by 81 votes to 74.  
For the first time, 16- and 17-year-olds were entitled to vote in the Scottish 
Parliament election. 
 
House of Lords Citizenship and Civic Engagement Committee established to 
consider citizenship and civic engagement in the 21st century, including 
engagement among young people.  
For the first time, 16- and 17-year-olds were entitled to vote in the Scottish local 
elections. 
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15.10. The voting age in most EU countries is 18, although there are some 
exceptions. For example in: 
 Austria, the Isle of Man, Jersey and Guernsey: the minimum voting age 
is 16; 
 Slovenia: 16-year-olds may vote if they are in employment; 
 Hungary: 16-year-olds may vote if they are married; 
 Norway: 16-year-olds may vote in local elections in some municipalities; 
 Malta: the minimum voting age for local elections is 16; 
 Italy: only those over the age of 25 may vote in elections to the Senate. 
15.11. Elsewhere in the world, minimum voting ages also vary: 
Table 31 Minimum voting ages: international comparators 
Minimum voting age Country 
16 Argentina; Brazil; Cuba; Ecuador; Nicaragua  
17 Indonesia; Timor-Leste 
19 Republic of Korea 
20 Bahrain; Cameroon; Nauru 
21 Cote D’Ivoire; Gabon; Kuwait; Lebanon; Malaysia; Oman; 
Pakistan; Samoa; Singapore; Tonga 
Notes: sourced from PARLINE database on national parliaments. In some countries (for example the 
Dominican Republic and Niger) voters may vote at ages lower than 18 if they are married. There 
are also variations in how age thresholds are applied, for example date of registration, date of the 
poll, or the year the election takes place. Voting in Brazil is optional from 16- and aged 70+ and 
mandatory from 18-70. 
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Age thresholds 
15.12. Much of the public discussion around the minimum voting age focuses on 
whether a lower age threshold would fit better or worse with the ages at which 
other rights and responsibilities arise. Children in Wales noted that the young 
people it works with highlight “what they perceive as the unfairness of the current 
situation”, and some of the rights and responsibilities which are currently available 
to 16-year-olds, for example to consent to medical treatment, obtain tax credits 
and welfare benefits in their own right or become a director of a company.146 
Conversely, Craig Johnson noted the lack of harmony in age thresholds, but stated 
that: 
 My submission is not to suggest that 16- and 17 year olds are 
cognitively incapable of exercising a right to vote. In fact, a fair 
response to somebody calling for votes at 16 would be to ask, “what 
do you have against 15 year olds”? It is to suggest that you have to set 
an arbitrary age, and at the moment most legal, political and social 
thresholds define adulthood as 18. I see no sufficient reason why the 
voting age should be any different.147 
15.13. We have considered the extent to which there is coherence or consistency 
in the age thresholds for different rights and responsibilities which apply in the UK 
(see Table 32). 
  
                                            
146 EP24 Children in Wales 
147 EP28 Craig Johnson, Research Officer 
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Table 32 Age thresholds 
Age Rights and responsibilities Where 
From birth Apply for a UK passport (person with parental 
responsibility generally has to sign an application from 
those under the age of 16) 
UK 
  Liable to pay certain taxes UK 
5 Drink alcohol at home or other private premises UK 
8 Held to be criminally responsible Scotland 
10 Held to be criminally responsible England, Northern 
Ireland and Wales 
12 Can be criminally prosecuted Scotland 
14 Register to vote in Scotland (but cannot vote until the 
age of 16 in Scottish elections, or 18 for other elections) 
Scotland 
  Vote in Scottish Youth Parliament elections if registered 
to vote in Scotland 
Scotland 
16 Drink (but not buy) beer, wine or cider with a meal UK 
  Join the Army as a regular soldier (parental consent 
required) 
UK 
  Join the Royal Navy (parental consent required) UK 
  Change your name without parental consent 
(someone with parental responsibility can override 
your wishes in exceptional circumstances) 
UK 
  Enter into a legally binding contract Scotland 
  Hold a licence to drive a moped UK 
  Vote in Scottish Parliament and Scottish local elections Scotland 
  Register to vote (but cannot vote until 18) England, Northern 
Ireland and Wales 
  Receive a National Insurance number just before 16th 
birthday, and become eligible to pay National 
Insurance from 16 (specific provisions apply in relation 
to those under 21) 
UK 
  Default age for the ending of child tax credit (although 
it continues in relation to those still in education or 
training) 
UK 
  Buy National Lottery tickets and place bets on the 
football pools 
UK 
  Marry or enter into a civil partnership with parental 
consent, and become eligible for marriage-related 
income tax reliefs 
England, Northern 
Ireland and Wales 
  Marry or enter into a civil partnership without parental 
consent 
Scotland 
  Apply for a UK passport without a signature from a 
person with parental responsibility 
UK 
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Age Rights and responsibilities Where 
16 Have piercings without parental consent (there is no 
minimum age of consent in England, Northern Ireland 
or Wales for piercings generally) 
Scotland 
  Consent to lawful sexual intercourse UK 
17 Hold a licence to drive a car, a motorbike or a tractor UK 
18 Buy alcohol in licensed premises and consume alcohol 
in a bar 
UK 
  Apply to become a regular officer in the Army or a 
reservist solider 
UK 
  Enter into a legally binding contract (under 18, 
contracts are legally binding only where they supply 
those under 18 with “necessaries” or goods and 
services which are deemed necessary or beneficial to 
them) 
England and Wales 
  Hold a licence to drive a medium-sized goods vehicle UK 
  Vote in all relevant elections and referendums UK 
  Place a bet UK 
  Serve as a juror in civil and criminal proceedings UK 
  Marry or enter into a civil partnership without parental 
consent 
England, Northern 
Ireland and Wales 
  Have an intimate piercing (as defined by the Public 
Health (Wales) Act 2017) without it being an offence to 
perform or make arrangements to perform the 
piercing 
Wales 
  Buy tobacco products or e-cigarettes UK 
  Receive tobacco, cigarette papers and nicotine 
products without it being an offence for them to be 
handed to you 
Wales 
  Get a tattoo UK 
21 Hold a licence to drive any vehicle subject to licensing 
requirements 
UK 
  Supervise a learner driver provided you have held a 
driving licence for at least three years 
UK 
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15.14. We conclude that the reality is that there is no single age at which a young 
person takes on all the responsibilities and rights of an adult citizen. While 
comparisons between the ages at which young people acquire rights and 
responsibilities, or start to exercise those rights and responsibilities, may be relevant, 
we do not find them compelling in making the case for or against a reduction in 
the voting age. 
Political participation 
15.15. A frequently cited concern about any extension of the franchise is that 
lowering the minimum voting age could reduce overall turnout, because young 
voters are less likely to vote than older voters. We therefore considered whether 
enfranchising 16- and 17-year-olds could harm overall levels of political 
participation. 
15.16. In his research on voter turnout and the dynamics of electoral competition, 
Franklin concluded that the reduction in the voting age from 21 to 18 in most 
democracies had the effect over time of reducing turnout by 5 percentage 
points.148 However, he suggested that a further reduction from 18 to 16 would have 
the opposite effect. It is reasonable to suggest that 16- and 17-year-olds are, for 
the most part, still living at home and in education, whereas 18- to 21-year-olds are 
often away from home for the first time, finding their feet in new environments such 
as university or full-time employment, and may therefore be isolated from their 
established networks. Franklin argued that a person would be more likely to vote in 
her or his first election—and thereby begin to form the habit of voting—if she or he 
were based within their established networks rather than in a more transitional or 
mobile period. 
15.17. A similar viewpoint was put forward by Children in Wales, which stated that 
its work with young people suggested that: 
 …many young people are very interested in politics, and want to be 
active citizens. However young people believe that the potential gap 
between currently being able to vote at 18, and the reality of possibly 
not voting until they are in their early 20s, when they may be working 
                                            
148 Franklin, M. (2004) Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established 
Democracies since 1945, Cambridge University Press/Cambridge 
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away from their family home or have a young family of their own, 
contributes to political disengagement.149 
15.18. In addition to the potential greater stability available to 16- and 17-year-
olds, the school and college environment also provides opportunities to embed 
preparation for voting into the curriculum. On these bases, Franklin stated: 
 …ironically, almost any other age [than 18] from fifteen to twenty-five 
would be a better age for individuals to first be confronted with the 
need to acquire the skills and knowledge necessary for casting a vote; 
and since it would be politically difficult or impossible to now re-
establish an older voting age, the most promising reform that might 
restore higher turnout would be to lower the voting age still further, 
perhaps to fifteen. Given the vote at fifteen, most children would face 
their first election while still in high school. They could then learn to vote 
in the context of a civics class project where they were graded on 
their ability to discover relevant information (including how to register 
and find the polling booth, where relevant) and assess party and 
candidate promises in the light of that information.150 
15.19. As few places have reduced the minimum voting age to 16, evidence 
allowing these arguments to be tested remains limited. However, what evidence 
there is tends to support the expectation that 16- and 17-year-olds are indeed 
more likely to vote than 18 to 24-year-olds, if their enfranchisement is part of a 
package that also includes the provision of information tailored specifically for this 
age group (see Figure 13). 
 
  
                                            
149 EP24 Children in Wales 
150 Franklin, M. (2004) Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established 
Democracies since 1945, Cambridge University Press/Cambridge, p.213. 
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Figure 13 Studies of rates of political participation 
SCOTLAND 
A study of two local pilots in 2010, in which 16- and 17-year-olds 
were allowed to vote in local elections, found this age group 
turned out at about half the rate of the electorate as a whole. 
However, the elections were low salience, and there appears 
to have been no effort to educate young voters.151 Evidence 
from later ballots carries more weight. 
The minimum voting age for the 2014 independence 
referendum was 16. The referendum had been widely 
discussed in schools and colleges,152 and a survey conducted 
for the Electoral Commission found that turnout was:153 
16- and 17-year-olds were able to vote in the Scottish
Parliament election of 2016 and the Scottish local council
elections of 2017. Research by the Electoral Commission
suggests that turnout in this age group was about the same as
for 18–24-year-olds in 2016154 and about 10 percentage points
higher than among 18–24-year-olds in 2017.155 In both cases,
the Electoral Commission ran extensive programmes designed
to raise awareness of the elections among 16- and 17-year-olds
through traditional media, social media and schools.156
151 Stewart, E., Wilson, I., Donnelly, P. and Greer, S., “‘I Didn’t Have a Clue What We Were Doing’: 
(Not) Engaging 16 and 17 Year Old Voters in Scotland”, Scottish Affairs 23, (2014), pp. 354–68. 
152 Hill, M., Lockyer, A., Head, G. and MacDonald, C., “Voting at 16: Lessons for the Future from the 
Scottish Referendum”, Scottish Affairs 26, no. 1 (2017), pp. 48–68. 
153 Electoral Commission, Scottish Independence Referendum: Report on the Referendum Held on 
18 September 2014, December 2014 
154 BMG Research, Post May 5th Public Opinion Polling, August 2016 and BMG Research, Post May 5th 
Public Opinion Polling, September 2016 
155 ICM, May 2017 Post-Poll research, 2017 
156 Electoral Commission, The May 2016 Scottish Parliament election: Report on the administration of 
the 5 May 2016 Scottish Parliament election, May 2016 and Electoral Commission, Scottish council 
elections 2017: Report on the administration of the elections held on 4 May 2017, September 2017 
Age group Reported turnout
16-17 75%
18-24 54%
35-54 85%
55+ 92%
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NORWAY 
A study of local election pilots in 2011 was inconclusive with 
regard to turnout. The elections were low salience, and the 
study does not mention any efforts to engage young voters.157 
AUSTRIA 
Studies in the only European country to have lowered the 
voting age to 16 for all elections find that turnout among 16- 
and 17-year-olds is higher than among 18 to 21-year-olds, 
although lower than for older voters.158 Citizenship education in 
Austria was changed when the voting age was reduced, and 
there have been substantial efforts to engage young voters.159 
157 Bergh, J., “Does voting rights affect the political maturity of 16- and 17-year-olds? Findings from 
the 2011 Norwegian voting-age trial”, Electoral Studies 32, no. 1 (March 2013), pp. 90–100 
158 Wagner, M., Johann, D. and Krytzinger, S., “Voting at 16: Turnout and the quality of vote choice”, 
Electoral Studies 31, no. 2 (June 2012), pp. 372–83; Zeglovits, E. and Aichholzer, J., “Are People More 
Inclined to Vote at 16 than at 18? Evidence for the First-Time Voting Boost Among 16- to 25-Year-
Olds in Austria”, Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 24 no. 3 (2014), pp. 351–61 
159 Schwarzer, S. and Zeglovits, E., “The Role of Schools in Preparing 16- and 17-Year-Old First-Time 
Austrian Voters for the Election”, in Simone Abendschön (ed.) (2013), Growing into Politics: Contexts 
and Timing of Political Socialisation, ECPR Press/Colchester, pp. 73–89 
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15.20. A key tenet of Franklin’s argument is that instilling the habit of voting in a 
cohort of young voters, as a result of their voting for the first time during a relatively 
stable period in their lives, will help to address the long-term decline in voter 
turnout. While there is evidence of increased turnout in the short term, evidence of 
a longer term impact is not yet available because those places that have 
reduced the voting age to 16 have done so only recently. For example, the 
minimum voting age was reduced to 16 on the Isle of Man in 2006, in Austria in 
2007, in Jersey in 2008, and in Scotland in 2014 for the independence referendum 
and 2015 for the Scottish Parliament and local elections in 2016 and 2017 
respectively. 
Political knowledge, maturity and independence of 
thought 
15.21. We considered whether a reduction in the minimum voting age for 
Assembly elections could be harmful to the quality of decision-making, for 
example if it would result in the extension of the franchise to people who were not 
yet ready to take on such responsibility. 
15.22. Concepts such as the political knowledge, maturity and independence of 
thought of 16- and 17-year-olds can be difficult to measure objectively. Studies of 
such matters can be divided into two categories: 
 Those conducted in places where 16- and 17-year-olds are not eligible 
to vote; and 
 Those conducted in places where the minimum voting age is 16. 
15.23. Studies in the former category—where 16- and 17-year-olds have not been 
given the vote—produce mixed results. For example, on the basis of survey data 
from the UK, Chan and Clayton have found that 16- and 17-year-olds had lower 
political knowledge, lower interest in politics, lower attitudinal consistency and 
lower attitudinal stability than older voters.160 The study included comparison of the 
16- and 17-year-olds with the youngest currently enfranchised voters. However, 
there are some weaknesses in their data: for example, they had to rely on different 
surveys for the different age groups. By contrast, a study which used US survey 
data (which were comparable across the age groups) found little difference in 
political knowledge, efficacy, skills and interest between 16-year-olds and young 
                                            
160 Chan, TW and Clayton, M. “Should the Voting Age be Lowered to Sixteen? Normative and 
Empirical Considerations”, Political Studies 54 (2006), pp. 533–58 
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adults (aged 18 to 30), and a marked difference between 16-year-olds and 14-
year-olds.161 
15.24. Studies conducted in places where the minimum voting age is 16 also vary 
in their findings, along similar lines to the variances in turnout highlighted in Figure 
13. For example, in his study of voters in Norway, Bergh found a poorer base of 
understanding among 16- and 17-year-olds than among 18-year-olds. However, 
the study makes no mention of any efforts to engage young voters.162 In our view, 
the key evidence comes from those countries where the minimum voting age has 
been reduced and there has been concerted effort, for example in schools, to 
ensure young people are provided with information and understanding. Austrian 
studies of young voters, for example, do not find such differences in voter 
understanding between 16- and 17-year-olds and slightly older voters.163 Zeglovits 
and Zandonella suggest that discussions in schools have been an important source 
of information and understanding for young voters in Austria. We are not aware of 
any comparable studies of understanding in Scotland. Nevertheless, research by 
the Electoral Commission finds that, in the 2017 local council elections, 16- and 17-
year-olds found it easier to access information on how to cast their votes than did 
18–24-year-olds, and that they were less likely to find it difficult to complete their 
ballot paper.164 
  
                                            
161 Hart, D. and Atkins, R., “American Sixteen- and Seventeen-Year-Olds Are Ready to Vote”, Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 633, no. 1 (January 2011), pp. 201–22 
162 Bergh, J., “Does voting rights affect the political maturity of 16- and 17-year-olds? Findings from 
the 2011 Norwegian voting-age trial”, Electoral Studies 32, no. 1 (March 2013), pp. 90–100 
163 Wagner, M., Johann, D. and Krytzinger, S., “Voting at 16: Turnout and the quality of vote choice”, 
Electoral Studies 31, no. 2 (June 2012), pp. 372–83; Zeglovits, E. and Zandonella, M., “Political interest 
of adolescents before and after lowering the voting age: the case of Austria”, Journal of Youth 
Studies, 16, no. 8 (2013), pp. 1084–1104 
164 Electoral Commission, Scottish council elections 2017: Report on the administration of the 
elections held on 4 May 2017, September 2017 
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Public opinion 
15.25. We considered whether extending the franchise to include 16- and 17-
year-olds could harm public confidence in the Assembly, if there were insufficient 
public support for such a change. 
15.26. The submissions we have received from organisations that represent young 
people, for example NUS Cymru, Children in Wales, EYST and Urdd Gobaith 
Cymru,165 indicate there is support from young people for a reduction in the 
minimum voting age. It should be recognised, however, that the responses are not 
necessarily representative of all young people. 
15.27. The Fourth Assembly’s Presiding Officer, Dame Rosemary Butler, led a 
consultation on whether 16- and 17-year-olds should be entitled to vote. Although 
not designed as a methodologically robust statistical exercise, over 10,000 young 
people from across Wales took part in the consultation. Of these, 53 per cent said 
yes to lowering the voting age, 29 per cent said no, and 18 per cent were unsure. 
The consultation also asked young people whether they would vote if they were 
eligible (58 per cent said they would and 23 per cent said they would not).166 
15.28. We considered a range of UK or Great Britain-wide surveys and polls on the 
minimum voting age (see Table 33). 
                                            
165 EP23 NUS Cymru, EP24 Children in Wales, EP29 Ethnic Minorities and Youth Support Team Wales 
and EP30 GirlGuiding Cymru 
166 National Assembly for Wales, Should the voting age be lowered to 16? Summary of responses to 
the Presiding Officer’s ‘Votes@16?’ consultation for 11-25-year-olds in Wales, July 2015 
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Table 33 Opinion polls and surveys on the minimum voting age 
 
Notes: ICM, The Age of Electoral Majority, November 2003, prepared for the Electoral Commission; 
Birch, S., Clarke, H. and Whiteley, P., “Should 16-Year-Olds Be Allowed to Vote in Westminster 
Elections? Public Opinion and Electoral Franchise Reform”, Parliamentary Affairs 68 (2015), pp. 291–
313, p. 302; YouGov, ‘Public against lowering voting age to 16’, August 2013; Electoral Commission, 
Scottish Independence Referendum: Report on the Referendum Held on 18 September 2014, 
December 2014, p. 65; Panelbase, Online omnibus survey of adults resident in the UK, January 2015. 
Note: In Scotland, Yes voters in the 2014 referendum favoured votes at 16 by 66 per cent to 27 per 
cent, while No voters opposed it by 66 per cent to 27 per cent; YouGov, Polling data, April 2017. 
Polling company (date) Question
Population 
(sample)
16 18%
17 3%
18 64%
19+ 13%
Other/Don’t know 2%
16 25%
17 6%
18 52%
19+ 3%
Other/Don’t know 14%
Lower to 16 16%
Keep at 18 61%
Raise to 21 16%
Raise to 25 2%
Don't know 5%
In favour 20%
Against 60%
Neither 16%
Don't know 4%
GB adults 18-24 Against 57%
Total support 60%
Of whom strongly 43%
Agree 43%
Disagree 49%
Don't know 7%
Agree 25%
Disagree 66%
Don't know 8%
Support 30%
Neither 14%
Oppose 48%
Don't know 8%
Support 29%
Neither 18%
Oppose 48%
Don't know 5%
Findings
ICM for Electoral 
Commission (November 
2003)
At what age do you think 
people SHOULD be able to 
vote in elections?
GB adults (1,089)
16-17 (279)
BES CMS (July 2013)
Whether “people should first 
become eligible to vote 
when they are: (a) 16 years 
of age, (b) 18 years of age, 
(c) 21 years of age, (d) 25 
GB adults (1,111)
YouGov (August 2013)
Whether in favour of 
“‘reducing the voting age to 
16 for all UK elections”
GB adults
YouGov (20 April 2017)
To what extent would you 
support or oppose reducing 
the voting age to 16 for all 
UK elections?
UK adults 
(3,318)
Midlands and 
Wales adults
ICM for Electoral 
Commission (post-Scottish 
referendum 2014)
Whether support allowing 
everyone to vote from age 
16
Scottish eligible 
voters (16+)
Panelbase (January 2015)
Broadly speaking, do you 
agree or disagree with each 
of the following? ... The 
voting age should be 
lowered to 16.
Scottish adults
Rest of the UK 
adults
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15.29. The results of such surveys and polls vary, but they consistently show limited 
support for a reduction. However, the issue would appear to be one of low 
salience to the majority of the public, and many people may be unlikely to have 
given much thought to the issue. It may therefore be misguided to presume that 
public opinion on this issue is fixed. We expect that the profile of the issue in Wales 
will be raised by our work, by any public consultation undertaken by the 
Commission in the development of its legislative proposals, and by the Assembly 
during its scrutiny of such proposals. 
15.30. In addition, the Welsh Government’s proposals to lower the minimum voting 
age for local government elections in Wales have highlighted this issue. In its 
response to its White Paper consultation, the Welsh Government noted that 19 of 
the 22 respondents who had expressed views on the minimum voting age for local 
elections in Wales had been in favour of a reduction to 16, with the main reason 
given for such support being that it would be a positive way to promote interest 
and participation among young people.167 
15.31. We asked groups who represent young people to share their views on: 
 What young people think about the minimum voting age; 
 Whether young people had made any comments about not being 
able to vote in recent elections and referenda; and  
 What impact any reduction in the voting age might have on political 
participation among young people. 
15.32. GirlGuiding Cymru carried out a survey of its senior section members 
(primarily aged between 15 and 25). Of the 53 people who responded, 68 per 
cent were in favour of a reduction in the voting age. Comments from those under 
18 who responded included: 
 I believe that without the right to vote, my future has been chosen for 
me, regardless of my opinion. The younger generation should have the 
right to choose our future and have our voices heard. 
 I would like to decide my own future rather than putting it into the 
hands of the older demographic. Realistically, 16/17 year olds are the 
                                            
167 Welsh Government, White Paper - Reforming Local Government: Resilient and Renewed: 
Summary of Responses, July 2017 
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future of this country and so we should have a say in what policies 
make it into Parliament etc. 
 It's our future—we are mature enough to make our decisions. 
 It is frustrating having others decide my future for me as I have no 
say.168 
15.33. The Ethnic Minorities and Youth Support Team Wales (EYST), which works 
with BME young people, families and communities, highlighted the frustration 
expressed by young people that they had not had the opportunity to vote in the 
2016 referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU.169 A similar frustration was 
highlighted by Children in Wales: 
 Through our contacts with young people we are aware of their recent 
frustration at being unable to vote in the referendum on exiting the 
European Union and also in the recent election. Young people report 
feeling very frustrated that they are unable to vote, and thus denied 
the opportunity to influence politicians who are making decisions that 
will affect their lives. In addition to the Brexit decision, other recent 
decisions that will have a significant impact on young people such as 
tuition fees and the living wage, have been made without the views of 
16 and 17 year olds being considered.170 
15.34. In its submission, EYST noted the importance of ensuring that young people 
have the right information, provided by people they trust, to help them understand 
how to engage in politics: 
 Once young people are given the opportunity to actively participate 
in an influential role they are interested but usually need this role to be 
clearly outlined and signposted from someone they trust. Regarding 
lowering the voting age, many young people had not thought about 
it prior to these sessions [at the EYST youth drop in centre]—mainly from 
Welsh Assembly outreach officers—as it isn’t something that is 
                                            
168 EP30 GirlGuiding Cymru 
169 EP29 Ethnic Minorities and Youth Support Team Wales 
170 EP24 Children in Wales 
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discussed through formal learning environments such as school. 
However, after discussing this and seeing it as a prospective 
opportunity, young people felt that they too should have the 
opportunity to vote, particularly as when they leave school they can 
get a job and pay taxes, actively contributing to society.  
 
[…] 
 
From working and supporting young people at EYST I have seen how 
they have many informed opinions and views about living in Wales 
and decisions made that affect them. However, many feel that their 
views are not important as they do not have the option to vote, to 
formally engage with politics.171 
Electoral administration 
15.35. We asked the Electoral Commission about the impact of the reduction in 
the minimum voting age in Scotland on the administration and conduct of 
elections, and what implications there might be of a similar reduction in Wales. 
15.36. In its submission, which took account of learning from the experience in 
Scotland as well as the potential implications for Wales, the Electoral Commission 
highlighted a range of considerations which would need to be taken into account 
should the Assembly decide to reduce the minimum voting age for Assembly 
elections, including: 
 The need for any legislative change to be made in good time—ideally 
at least six months—before the electoral canvass prior to the election at 
which the changes to the franchise come into effect in order to allow 
for effective planning and implementation; 
 The need for suitable public awareness campaigns and activities to 
take place, using a range of communications approaches, to ensure 
that young people were registered to vote; 
 Administrative and practical arrangements for the electoral register, 
including appropriate safeguards for the processing and holding of 
personal data relating to young people; 
 The requirements of the annual canvass as they relate to children and 
young people; 
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 The financial implications, for example in relation to the design and 
testing of forms, public awareness activity, Returning Officer costs, 
training for electoral staff, changes to the online digital service 
registration system,172 and procurement of or changes to election 
software. 
15.37. The Electoral Commission stated that: 
 The key consideration from the Commission’s perspective is that any 
change is introduced in good time. This would mean policy makers or 
legislators need to ensure that any future legislation concerning the 
extension of the franchise is commenced at least six months prior to 
the beginning of the canvass in order to allow for full and effective 
planning.173 
15.38. As noted above, the Welsh Government is currently consulting on proposals 
to reduce the minimum voting age for local elections in Wales. If such changes are 
made, then the administrative, practical and financial implications outlined by the 
Electoral Commission will need to be addressed in relation to local elections in any 
case. In these circumstances, there could be administrative, practical or political 
issues if the Assembly did not legislate to reduce the minimum voting age for 
Assembly elections. 
  
                                            
172 For example to mirror the arrangements in Scotland, under which applicants who are under the 
age of 16 do not have to provide either a National Insurance number or a reason why they cannot 
provide an NI number. Instead their applications are sent to the Electoral Registration Officer for 
verification against education records or other local data.  
173 EP13(a) Electoral Commission 
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What should the minimum voting age be for Assembly 
elections? 
15.39. The evidence we have considered suggests a reduction in the minimum 
voting age to 16 would be a powerful way to raise political awareness and 
participation among young people. In addition, if the Welsh Government legislates 
to reduce the voting age for local government elections in Wales from 2022, it 
would be extremely anomalous, and create additional administrative and political 
issues, if the voting age for Assembly elections from 2021 were not also reduced. 
The evidence suggests that higher salience elections are more likely to result in 
higher turnout and voter participation;174 it is therefore desirable that if the 
franchise is to be extended in Wales, it should first take effect at the higher 
salience Assembly election. 
 
Recommendation 14. The minimum voting age for Assembly elections should be 
reduced to 16 with effect from the 2021 election. 
 
  
                                            
174 See Figure 13. 
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Political and citizenship education 
Provision of political and citizenship education 
15.40. We are persuaded by Franklin’s argument, as set out above, that a 
reduction in the voting age to 16 could increase voter turnout over time. While a 
reduction in the voting age could reduce overall turnout initially (because 16- and 
17-year-olds are likely to vote at a rate below the average for the whole 
electorate), over time turnout should increase relative to where it would otherwise 
have been, as each successive cohort will be more likely to vote than it would 
otherwise have been. However, to ensure that young people are encouraged 
and supported to exercise their right to vote, any reduction in the voting age 
should be accompanied by appropriate and effective political and citizenship 
education. 
15.41. This was an issue raised during the Fourth Assembly’s Presiding Officer’s 
consultation on the minimum voting age, which asked young people whether they 
felt it was important for young people to learn about politics and the voting 
system; 79 per cent thought it was.175 Similarly, 27 of the 53 respondents to 
GirlGuiding Cymru’s survey of its senior section members highlighted the 
importance of learning and education for increasing political participation among 
young people, for example: 
 Include politics in schools, for example hold mock 
referendums/elections within the school, have political debates in 
schools, start a newspaper aimed at young people to get students to 
be more aware of politics and how it affects them. 
 We need more information, talks at schools, college or university. So 
that we know what is going on. 
 Active participation in politics during an election period within school 
would encourage younger people even further (mock elections, 
discussions of what the parties stand for). 
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 Educating young people at school or at youth groups would give 
young people a better understanding of what they are voting for and 
how the voting system works. 
 Teach them in school. I had zero teaching about modern day politics 
during school. It is an educational, interesting (if taught in the right 
way) and influential topic.176 
15.42. The need for high quality citizenship education to accompany any 
reduction in the voting age was also highlighted by the United Nations Committee 
on the Rights of the Child in its concluding observations on the fifth periodic report 
on the UK: 
 The Committee notes increasing demands from children for a right to 
vote from the age of 16 years and that in Scotland, voting age has 
been extended to 16- and 17 year olds for local and Scottish 
Parliament elections. 
 
32. The Committee encourages the [government] and devolved 
administrations to conduct consultations with children on the voting 
age. Should the voting age be lowered, the Committee recommends 
that the [government] ensure that it is supported by active citizenship 
and human rights education in order to ensure early awareness of 
children that rights are to be exercised as part of citizenship, with 
autonomy and responsibility, and that the measure does not lend itself 
to undue influence.177 
15.43. Similarly, NUS Cymru, which supports a reduction in the voting age to 16 for 
Assembly elections and the inclusion of citizenship education in the curriculum in 
Wales, stated that: 
 We believe that citizenship education is essential to equip young 
people with the knowledge and confidence to become active 
citizens. […] 
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5.4. In order to effectively equip young people to engage with 
democracy, citizenship education must include political education. 
We believe political education is essential for young people in Wales 
to gain an understanding how the decisions taken in Westminster, in 
the National Assembly and in their local councils affect their lives and 
how they can influence these decisions.178 
Political and citizenship education in Wales 
15.44. There are already a number of ways in which young people in Wales are 
taught about citizenship and politics, and legal requirements which apply to the 
way in which such education is provided. The Education Act 1996: 
 Requires head teachers, governing bodies and local authorities to 
ensure pupils receive balanced views if they are taught about 
democracy and politics; 
 Requires local authorities, governing bodies and head teachers to 
forbid pupils under the age of 12 from pursuing political activities at the 
school; 
 Forbids the promotion of partisan political views in the teaching of any 
subject to any pupil.179 
15.45. The new Welsh Baccalaureate was introduced in September 2015, and is 
the main way in which further education institutions in Wales provide citizenship 
education. It was intended to respond to concerns about duplication of learning 
or assessment, requirements for the language elements, a lack of recognition of 
different levels of achievement, and a low level of understanding. Some schools 
and colleges also offer citizenship qualifications at GCSE level, or government and 
politics qualifications at AS level and A level.180 
15.46. In 2015 the Welsh Government commissioned Professor Donaldson to 
review arrangements for the curriculum and assessment in Wales. In its response to 
the review, the Welsh Government announced it would introduce a new 
curriculum from September 2018, with full implementation taking place from 
September 2021. One of its four stated purposes is that children and young people 
should become: 
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179 Welsh Government, Teaching of politics in schools, January 2011 
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 …ethical, informed citizens who are ready to be citizens of Wales and 
the world.181 
15.47. In its submission, Urdd Gobaith Cymru highlighted a speech given at an 
event in the Senedd by the then 17-year-old vice chair of the Bwrdd Syr IfanC and 
president of the Urdd, Siwan Dafydd. In her speech, she stated: 
 If there is any doubt about young people’s ability to understand the 
importance and value of the right to vote, surely it would be a good 
idea to introduce this as part of life lessons in schools? I’m sure that 
Professor Donaldson, with his report on the new curriculum in Wales, 
would agree with this and that now is an appropriate time. 
Understanding the power equips the person to exercise that power.182 
15.48. We agree that high quality political and citizenship education should be 
available to young people in Wales. Such education would ensure that young 
people had opportunities to learn about the full range of political opinions. The 
implementation of the Donaldson review provides a potential opportunity for this. 
However, should the implementation be delayed, other approaches to enhancing 
the current citizenship and politics provision will be required. 
15.49. In addition, to ensure that suitable learning opportunities are available to 
all young people, consideration must be given to the availability and provision of 
training to young people in schools (building on the citizenship education already 
provided, for example as part of the Welsh Baccalaureate), and in other 
education or training settings. Other actions will also be required in the periods 
before elections, for example along the lines of the pre-election information and 
education campaigns undertaken by the Electoral Commission before the 2016 
Scottish Parliament election and 2017 Scottish local government elections. 
15.50. A reduction in the minimum voting age from 2021 would, therefore, need 
to be part of a broader range of actions taken by the Assembly, the Welsh 
Government and others to increase youth engagement and political 
participation. Such actions may be more effective if targeted at the higher 
salience Assembly election in 2021 rather than local government elections in 2022. 
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Recommendation 15. If the Assembly does legislate to lower the minimum voting 
age for Assembly elections to 16, the Assembly Commission should work with the 
Welsh Government, the Electoral Commission, political parties and others to 
support and encourage young people to exercise their right to vote, most 
importantly through appropriate political and citizenship education and public 
awareness-raising, but also by such other means as may be appropriate. 
 
15.51. It is not a matter for us to outline the potential content or format of the 
citizenship education which should accompany any reduction in the voting age; 
others are better placed than we to design the curriculum. Nevertheless, we have 
suggested some key principles which such a curriculum should reflect. 
 
Recommendation 16. The citizenship education put in place to accompany any 
reduction in the minimum voting age must: 
i Recognise the diversity of settings within which 16- and 17-year-olds 
may receive education and training, to ensure that those outside 
traditional school settings are also supported and encouraged to 
exercise their vote; 
ii Go beyond simply outlining democratic structures and formal 
processes, to engage and inform young people about the issues 
which matter to them; 
iii Ensure that young people have opportunities to learn about a full 
range of political opinions in a non-partisan way; 
iv Be delivered by teachers and educators who have themselves 
received high quality training in order to ensure that citizenship 
education is taken seriously, and to avoid both political bias and the 
perception of political bias; 
v Be subject to review after a suitable period to ensure its design and 
delivery met its objectives. 
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16. A PARLIAMENT THAT WORKS FOR 
WALES 
Background 
16.01. With effect from a Principal Appointed Day, expected to be 1 April 2018, 
the Wales Act 2017 will give the Assembly powers over its size, electoral 
arrangements and franchise. The Assembly Commission is leading work to explore 
how those powers could be exercised to ensure that the Assembly is an effective, 
forward-looking institution which delivers effectively for the people of Wales. 
16.02. To this end, we were appointed by the Llywydd and Assembly Commission 
as an Expert Panel in February 2017, and tasked with reporting by autumn 2017. 
Our remit is to provide robust, politically impartial, and evidence-based advice on: 
 The number of Members the Assembly needs; 
 The electoral system by which they should be elected; 
 The minimum voting age for Assembly elections. 
Capacity and size of the Assembly 
Our role 
16.03. The Fourth Assembly Commission published a report in January 2015 on the 
capacity of the Assembly, and concluded that: 
 With only 60 Members, the National Assembly is underpowered and 
overstretched.183 
16.04. The Fifth Assembly Commission agrees with its predecessor, and in 
November 2016 the Llywydd announced the Commission’s decision to take 
forward work to address the Assembly’s capacity. We were tasked with providing 
advice on the number of Members the Assembly needs. 
                                            
183 National Assembly for Wales Commission, The future of the Assembly and its capacity to deliver 
for Wales, January 2015 
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Issues we considered 
16.05. The role and powers of the Assembly have increased significantly since 
1999. The pressures on the Assembly are very likely to continue to increase as a 
result of a move to a reserved powers model of devolution, the devolution of 
taxation and borrowing powers (including income tax-varying powers), further 
devolution of other responsibilities, and Brexit. 
16.06. While not directly within our remit, we considered what has been, or could 
be, done to increase the capacity of the Assembly without more Members. A 
range of approaches have been taken by Assembly Members themselves, the 
Commission and the Assembly’s independent Remuneration Board to seek to 
enhance and maximise the capacity of a 60 Member Assembly. These have  
included changes to: working practices; the structure of the Assembly’s working 
week; the number of sitting weeks; induction, training and professional 
development; involvement of experts, the public and stakeholders in scrutiny; the 
resources available to committees; the configuration of the committee system; 
and the support and resources available to Members. Individually and collectively 
these approaches may have increased the capacity of the institution as a whole, 
but ultimately they have not and cannot address the fundamental issue that there 
are only 60 elected Members available to carry out their vital roles. 
16.07. Members’ roles are complex and varied; formal Assembly business is just 
one element. They are legislators, scrutineers of policy and finance, employers with 
responsibilities for staff, property and contracts, and, ultimately, elected politicians 
with important responsibilities to their constituents and to their parties. This includes, 
for example, representing their constituents by undertaking casework, leading or 
participating in local or national campaigns, and attending or arranging local 
events. We believe that such roles cannot and should not be separated from 
Members’ formal Assembly business roles, as casework or campaigning can 
provide valuable insight into the operation of policy or legislation on the ground. 
16.08. A key element of Members’ roles is their responsibility for policy, legislative 
and financial scrutiny and oversight of the Welsh Government and other public 
bodies in Wales. Although the impact of scrutiny is not easy to measure 
objectively, we are clear that it has a positive impact on the lives of the people of 
Wales. For scrutiny to be effective, there must be sufficient Members outside the 
government to fulfil these functions. 
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16.09. We gave particular attention to the capacity of the Assembly’s committee 
system as committees are a key vehicle for the Assembly’s scrutiny role. We 
considered the current committee structure, including the number of committees, 
their remits and the number of members they have. We also considered the 
capacity of the Assembly to populate the committee system, taking account of 
the need for preparation, research, informal engagement activity and formal 
meeting time, and the exclusion of office holders such as Ministers, the Llywydd 
and the Deputy Presiding Officer from the Members available to undertake 
committee roles. We concluded that as a point of principle chairs of policy and 
legislation committees or other significant committees, such as Finance or Public 
Accounts, should sit only on their own committee, and other Members should sit on 
no more than two committees. With only 60 Members, this is not achievable within 
the current committee system. 
16.10. We looked at UK and international comparators, comparing political 
representation at a devolved level in Wales with Scotland and Northern Ireland, 
and the size of the Assembly compared to sub-national legislatures internationally. 
Such comparisons are not straightforward, as the devolution settlements vary 
significantly (for example in areas such as home affairs and welfare). Nevertheless, 
it is clear that the Assembly is very small compared to most similar legislatures. The 
Assembly is also small when compared to local authorities in Wales. 
How many Members does the Assembly need? 
16.11. Alternative ways to maximise the capacity of the 60 Member Assembly 
have already been explored and implemented. Each has its merits and such 
alternatives should continue to be explored. Nevertheless, none of these 
approaches has addressed or can address the underlying limiting factor: the 
severely limited time available for just 60 elected Members to carry out their 
responsibilities—including preparation, research and participation in formal 
Assembly business, and their roles as representatives, campaigners, politicians and 
employers. There are, therefore, compelling arguments that the number of 
Members should be increased. 
16.12. Making the case for more politicians will be unpopular. However, as an 
independent, expert Panel, we believe we are well-placed to examine the case 
and make recommendations in a neutral and sustainable manner. We intend that 
our recommendations will provide the basis for a sustainable legislature which will 
not need to revisit these issues in the foreseeable future. It will be for the Assembly 
to establish appropriate structures and ways of working which ensure that the 
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additional capacity is deployed effectively to alleviate the current pressures while 
keeping the additional costs to an absolute minimum. 
16.13. There is no one authoritative method for determining the optimum size of a 
legislature. Nevertheless, our analysis points towards an appropriate size for the 
Assembly of between 80 and 90 Members. Increasing the Assembly to a size within 
that range would deliver meaningful benefits for the capacity of the institution and 
corresponding dividends for the people of Wales. Within this range, clearly, there 
would be a noticeable difference between the lower and upper ends. A figure 
close to 80 would undoubtedly strengthen the institution and make it better able 
to fulfil its responsibilities effectively. However, at the upper end of our range, the 
benefits would be greater, providing a meaningful difference in the ability of many 
Members to specialise, with consequent benefits for scrutiny and representation. 
The upper end of the range would also lessen the risk that the question of capacity 
would need to be revisited in the future, should the responsibilities of the Assembly 
increase further. Our preference, therefore, is for the size of the Assembly to be at 
the upper end of our recommended bracket. 
16.14. Clearly, there would be financial implications associated with an increase 
in the size of the Assembly. Table 34 provides the Assembly Commission’s estimate 
of the additional recurrent annual costs which could arise from an additional 20 or 
30 Assembly Members. For the purposes of these estimates, the Commission has 
split the additional recurrent annual costs into core and variable elements. 
Table 34 Estimated recurrent annual costs of an additional 20 or 30 Members 
  £000 
  20 additional Members 30 additional Members 
Core recurrent annual costs 5,970  8,860  
Variable recurrent annual costs 650  780  
Total recurrent annual costs 6,620  9,640  
 
16.15. The Commission’s estimate of the additional recurrent annual costs 
associated with our proposals ranges, therefore, from some £6.6 million to £9.6 
million per annum. In 2017–18, the Commission’s annual budget was £53.7 million. 
The additional recurrent annual costs in the table represent 12 and 18 per cent of 
that budget respectively. In addition, there would also be some one-off costs 
associated, for example, with adjustment of the Siambr and Members’ office 
accommodation. The Commission estimates that these would be approximately 
£2.4 million for 20 additional Members and £3.3 million for 30 additional Members. 
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16.16. The cost estimates provided to us are, necessarily, based on the services 
and system of financial support currently in place. The bulk of the recurrent costs 
identified are determined by the Assembly’s independent Remuneration Board, 
and driven directly by the number of Members, for example the salaries of 
Members and their support staff, allowances available to Members, and the cost 
of running constituency offices. A smaller, but nonetheless significant, proportion is 
dependent on decisions taken by a future Assembly about its working practices 
and the consequent cost of parliamentary support services provided to Members 
by the Assembly Commission. We urge both the Remuneration Board and the 
Assembly Commission to consider how the current total levels of staffing, service 
provision and financial resources provided to support Members should be altered 
in the case of a larger Assembly, so that the cost of implementing our 
recommendations is kept to an absolute minimum. Popular acceptance of a 
larger Assembly could be dependent on this. 
16.17. Ultimately, though, consideration of the costs must recognise that the 
scrutiny and oversight role of the Assembly, if carried out effectively, positively 
affects the lives of people in Wales by improving the quality of Welsh legislation, 
and influencing Welsh Government policy and decision-making. Moreover, 
although the cost of parliamentary democracy in Wales is significant in absolute 
terms, it amounts to a very small proportion of the sums expended by the 
government it oversees. Even marginal improvements in the scrutiny of the Welsh 
Government’s expenditure and policy-making would, therefore, reap significant 
dividends to the taxpayer. To this end, we agree with the view of the Silk 
Commission that: 
 Good scrutiny means good legislation, and good legislation pays for 
itself.184 
  
                                            
184 Commission on Devolution in Wales, Empowerment and responsibility: legislative powers to 
strengthen Wales, 2014 
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Electoral system 
Our role 
16.18. An increase in the size of the Assembly requires reform of the way in which 
Assembly Members are elected. Our conclusions on the number of Members the 
Assembly needs have driven and underpinned our consideration of the 
appropriate electoral system. 
Issues we considered 
16.19. We identified principles against which we evaluated electoral systems, to 
determine which could be appropriate for Wales: 
 Government accountability and effectiveness: the system should 
encourage the return of effective, accountable and stable 
governments, whether majorities or coalitions. 
 Proportionality: the system should be no less proportional than the 
Assembly’s current electoral arrangements, and preferably be more 
proportional. 
 Member accountability: the system should ensure that all Members are 
clearly accountable to voters and able to represent them effectively 
and appropriately in the national interest. 
 Equivalent status: as far as possible, the system should ensure that all 
Members are elected with broadly equivalent mandates which afford 
them equal status. 
 Diversity: the system should encourage and support the election of a 
body of representatives which broadly reflects the population. 
 Voter choice: where appropriate within its design, the system should 
allow voters to select or indicate a preference for individual candidates. 
 Equivalent mandates: the system should reflect the general principle of 
electoral system design that votes should have approximately the same 
value, with seats apportioned taking electorate numbers and 
geography into account. 
 Boundaries: the system should be based on clearly defined geographic 
areas which are meaningful to people and take into account existing 
communities of interest, and existing electoral and administrative 
boundaries. 
 Simplicity: the system should be designed with simplicity and intelligibility 
for voters in mind. 
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 Sustainability and adaptability: the system should be able to be 
implemented in 2021, and subsequently respond and adapt to 
changing political, demographic and legislative trends, needs and 
circumstances without requiring further fundamental change in the 
near future. 
16.20. Clearly, no single electoral system can fully deliver against every one of our 
principles. Nevertheless, taken together they provide a robust framework against 
which to assess different electoral systems and reach impartial, politically neutral 
conclusions and recommendations. 
16.21. We considered the Assembly’s current electoral arrangements, and the 
context for electoral reform in Wales. 
16.22. We considered the Assembly’s strong and commendable reputation on 
gender representation, and the mechanisms to safeguard progress made by 
parties in Wales to date. We concluded that legislative interventions—such as 
gender quotas—in addition to provisions to require the publication of anonymised 
candidate diversity information, and enabling candidates to stand for election on 
the basis of job sharing arrangements, will support and encourage the election of 
a diverse Assembly, both in terms of gender and broader diversity characteristics. 
16.23. By evaluating different electoral systems, we rejected those systems which 
we were not confident could adequately deliver against our principles and 
narrowed our focus to three systems which we concluded do meet those 
principles: 
 Our preferred option: Single Transferable Vote, with the flexibility to elect 
an Assembly of 80 to 90 Members on the basis of multimember 
constituencies while maximising voter choice and providing simplicity 
for voters, should local authorities in Wales adopt STV.185 
 A viable alternative: a Flexible List system, similarly flexible on the size of 
the Assembly it could elect and the constituencies upon which it could 
be based, but providing a balance between voter choice and party 
influence. 
 The ‘status quo’ option: a Mixed Member Proportional system, adapting 
the Assembly’s current system in a minimal way, with the advantage of 
familiarity for voters, but the limitation of a maximum Assembly size of 80 
Members in 2021. 
                                            
185 The Welsh Government is consulting on proposals that local authorities should be able to adopt 
STV for local elections. 
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16.24. We then considered the electoral boundaries on the basis of which our 
remaining systems could operate. We ruled out a full boundary review due to 
insufficient time before 2021. We also ruled out the 29 proposed Westminster 
constituencies on the basis that the Assembly’s boundaries should not be 
determined by factors of limited relevance to Wales. We therefore designed 
options which use existing electoral or administrative areas as building blocks. 
Such options provide the advantage of familiarity and simplicity for voters, as well 
as being able to be implemented for 2021. We propose two alternative sets of 
multimember constituencies: 
 Our preferred option: 20 constituencies based on existing Assembly 
constituencies, indicated by our modelling to be the most appropriate 
option for electing an Assembly of 89 or 90 Members, i.e. towards the 
upper end of our recommended bracket, with the advantage of similar 
electorate sizes and therefore district magnitudes, but the limitation that 
separate boundary review arrangements would be required. 
 A viable alternative: 17 constituencies based on local authority areas, 
which our modelling suggests could be appropriate for an Assembly of 
83 or 84 Members, i.e. towards the middle of our bracket, with the 
advantages of requiring no separate boundary review mechanism and 
providing familiarity for voters, but the limitation that the varying 
population sizes lead to wide variance in district magnitude. 
16.25. We also demonstrate how the existing Assembly constituency and regional 
boundaries could be used as the basis for the election of a larger Assembly via a 
Mixed Member Proportional system—the status quo option. 
16.26. We considered how to ensure that our proposed boundaries remained 
sustainable, highlighting the need for boundary or seat apportionment review 
mechanisms to be put in place to enable the Assembly’s electoral arrangements 
to respond to future demographic changes. 
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How should Assembly Members be elected? 
16.27.  We were tasked with making recommendations which could be 
implemented for the next Assembly election in 2021. Our preferred option, 
provided our recommendation for an integrated gender quota is implemented, is 
for an Assembly of 89 or 90 Members to be elected by Single Transferable Vote on 
the basis of 20 multimember constituencies formed by pairing the 40 current 
Assembly constituencies. 
16.28. Ultimately, we recognise that it is for the Assembly to determine the 
priorities and principles it wishes its electoral system to deliver. To this end, we have 
also identified a viable alternative electoral system and electoral boundary model, 
as well as a status quo option. 
Minimum voting age for Assembly elections 
Our role 
16.29. We were asked to consider what the minimum voting age should be for 
Assembly elections from 2021. 
Issues we considered 
16.30. We considered the context in Wales, the UK and internationally. In Wales, 
the Welsh Government is consulting on proposals to reduce the minimum voting 
age for local government elections to 16. The voting age in Scotland has been 
reduced to 16 for local government and Scottish Parliament elections, and 
pressure for a reduction in the voting age across the UK continues to increase. 
16.31. Much of the public discussion around the voting age focuses on whether a 
lower age threshold would fit better or worse with the ages at which other rights 
and responsibilities arise. We concluded that there is a lack of coherence and 
consistency in the age thresholds which apply in the UK and internationally, and 
that the reality is that there is no single age at which a young person takes on all 
the rights and responsibilities of an adult citizen. Comparisons between the ages at 
which young people acquire rights and responsibilities may be relevant, but we do 
not find them compelling. 
16.32. In respect of political participation there are good theoretical reasons for 
expecting that establishing the habit of voting at a young age, when many young 
people are still living at home, can lead to increased turnout in the longer term. 
There is evidence that, when supported by appropriate and effective citizenship 
education, and in relation to higher salience elections, a reduction in the voting 
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age can, in the short term, result in higher turnout among 16- and 17-year-olds 
than 18- to 21-year-olds. Evidence of a longer term impact is not yet available 
because those places that have reduced the voting age to 16 have done so only 
recently. We also considered other types of political participation, but found 
limited evidence as to whether a reduction in the voting age increases wider 
political participation beyond voting. 
16.33. We looked at studies of the political knowledge, maturity and 
independence of thought of 16- and 17-year-olds. Studies can be divided into two 
categories: those conducted in places where they have not been enfranchised, 
and those conducted where they have. The results vary, but the key evidence 
comes from those places where 16- and 17-year-olds can vote. For example, 
research by the Electoral Commission found that in the 2017 local elections in 
Scotland, 16- and 17-year-olds found it easier than 18- to 24-year-olds to access 
information on how to cast their votes, and were less likely to find it difficult to 
complete their ballot paper. 
16.34. Polls and surveys in the UK of public opinion on this issue consistently show 
limited support for an extension of the franchise. However, the issue appears to be 
one of low salience to the public, and many people are unlikely to have given 
much thought to it. The profile of the issue is likely to be raised by the Welsh 
Government’s proposals in relation to local government elections in Wales. While 
not representative of all young people, the responses we received from 
organisations who work with young people suggest there is support among young 
people for a reduction in the minimum voting age. 
16.35. We asked the Electoral Commission about the potential implications of a 
reduction in the voting age for electoral administration. It outlined some of the 
issues which would need to be taken into account if the minimum voting age were 
to be lowered, including costs, public awareness-raising, administration of the 
electoral register and training. It concluded that the key consideration was that 
any changes be introduced in good time before the relevant election. Should the 
Welsh Government proceed with its proposals for local government elections, 
these issues will need to be addressed in any case. 
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What should the minimum voting age be for Assembly elections? 
16.36. We have reviewed the existing evidence, research and literature, sought 
additional evidence and views from experts and key stakeholders, considered the 
current franchise and the wider context in Wales, the UK and elsewhere, and 
considered the risks and opportunities associated with any change. 
16.37. The evidence we have considered suggests that a reduction in the 
minimum voting age to 16 would be a powerful way to raise political awareness 
and participation among young people. In addition, if the Welsh Government 
legislates to reduce the voting age for local government elections in Wales from 
2022, it would be extremely anomalous, and create additional administrative and 
political issues, if the voting age for Assembly elections from 2021 were not also 
reduced. The evidence suggests that higher salience elections are more likely to 
result in higher turnout and voter participation; it is therefore desirable that if the 
franchise is to be extended in Wales, it should first take effect at the higher 
salience Assembly election. 
16.38. To ensure that young people are encouraged and supported to exercise 
their right to vote, any reduction in the minimum voting age should be 
accompanied by appropriate, effective and non-partisan political and citizenship 
education. Such education should be part of a broader range of actions taken by 
the Assembly, the Welsh Government and others to increase youth engagement 
and political participation. These actions may be more effective if targeted at the 
higher salience Assembly election in 2021 than the local government elections in 
2022. 
Implementation of our recommendations 
16.39. We were asked to make recommendations which could, if the necessary 
degree of political support is achieved, be implemented in time for the next 
Assembly election in 2021, as well as being both sustainable and appropriate for 
the Welsh context. 
16.40. We believe that we have done this. Our analysis of the role, capacity and 
size of the Assembly leads us to believe that the recommendations set out in our 
report should be implemented within this timescale. 
16.41. The Assembly’s role and responsibilities have been evolving since 1999, and 
are about to go through another period of significant change. The reserved 
powers model of devolution established by the Wales Act 2017, the devolution of 
taxation, borrowing and other policy areas, Brexit—each of these developments 
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alone would be challenging for any legislature. If the Assembly is to be able to 
respond effectively over time, and become the parliamentary body which Wales 
needs as it establishes its place in the constitutional landscape of a post-Brexit UK, 
then the capacity issues outlined in our report should be addressed without delay. 
16.42. Evidently, whether this happens is a matter for the Assembly and for 
political parties in Wales. We understand that it is not, and never will be, popular to 
call for more politicians, particularly against a challenging economic backdrop. 
Neither is it easy for politicians to do what the Llywydd and the Assembly 
Commission have done, namely to acknowledge openly what our analysis of the 
evidence has shown to be the case—that an Assembly of 60 Members is 
overstretched, and that all the alternatives to an increase in size have been tried 
and tested without adequately addressing the problems we have identified. 
16.43. However, the question is, if not now, then when? There is never a perfect 
moment for significant constitutional or electoral change. The Assembly is, without 
doubt, undersized and overstretched. The Richard Commission emphasised this 
thirteen years ago. The Silk Commission repeated the message in 2014. The 
Assembly Commission highlighted it two years ago. We are saying it just as clearly 
now. This issue will not simply resolve itself. If the Assembly does not take action to 
address the capacity gap, then it is only a matter of time before it is unable to fulfil 
its responsibilities to work for and represent the people of Wales effectively. 
16.44. The earliest our recommendations could be implemented is 2021. At best, 
therefore, the Assembly must, for the next four years, attempt to meet the 
enormous challenges it faces with only 60 Members. If the Assembly accepts the 
case for change, then the time to act is now. The Assembly Commission 
announced earlier this year that, following unanimous agreement by all parties in 
the Assembly, it would introduce legislation to change the name of the institution 
to the Welsh Parliament/Senedd Cymru. Our challenge to the Assembly is, 
therefore, to take this opportunity to reform the institution, to invigorate Welsh 
democracy, and to enthuse and energise voters by extending the franchise and 
establishing an electoral system founded on the principles we have identified, so 
that the 2021 election delivers a legislature with the capacity to represent the 
people and communities it serves. Our report is a call to action to the Assembly to 
ensure that it becomes a Welsh Parliament that truly works for the people of Wales. 
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ANNEX A: REMIT OF THE EXPERT PANEL ON 
ASSEMBLY ELECTORAL REFORM 
Our Terms of Reference are: 
 To review, and complement if necessary, the existing evidence and 
research relating to the size and electoral arrangements for the 
National Assembly; 
 From that evidence base, and in order to inform the preparation of any 
necessary legislation, to make recommendations to the Assembly 
Commission on what should be the size of the membership of the 
National Assembly, the electoral system that should be used to elect its 
Members and the minimum voting age for National Assembly elections; 
 The Expert Panel should report by autumn 2017 so that, provided the 
required degree of political support exists, any legislative changes could 
be made in time for the National Assembly election in 2021. 
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ANNEX B: MEMBERSHIP OF THE EXPERT 
PANEL  
Professor Laura McAllister CBE (Panel Chair) 
Laura McAllister is Professor of Public Policy and the 
Governance of Wales at the Wales Governance Centre at 
Cardiff University. Laura was previously Professor of 
Governance at the University of Liverpool.  
She is a graduate of the London School of Economics and 
Cardiff University. Laura was a member of the Richard 
Commission on the Powers and Electoral Arrangements for 
National Assembly for Wales (2002–04), and provided 
research advice to the Independent Panel on AMs’ Pay 
and Support in 2008–09. Laura chaired the Welsh 
Government’s expert group on Diversity in Local 
Government (2013–14). Until 2015, she was a member of 
the National Assembly Remuneration Board examining 
AMs’ pay and allowances.  
She is an Honorary Visiting Professor at the University of 
South Wales, Queensland University of Technology, 
Brisbane, Australia and the China National School of 
Administration, Beijing.  
A former Wales football international and national team 
captain with 24 caps, Laura is a vice-chairwoman of UEFA's 
Women's Football Committee and a Director of the 
Football Association of Wales Trust. She was Chair of Sport 
Wales until March 2016 and Board Member of UK Sport.  
Laura holds honorary degrees and fellowships from the 
Universities of Bangor, Cardiff, Cardiff Metropolitan, Trinity 
St. David’s, South Wales and Swansea, and is a Fellow of 
the Learned Society of Wales and the Royal Society of the 
Arts.  
She was awarded a CBE in the Queen's Birthday Honours in 
2016. 
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Professor Rosie Campbell  
(Job sharing with Professor Sarah Childs) 
Rosie Campbell is a Professor of Politics at Birkbeck, 
University of London.  
She has recently written on parliamentary candidates, the 
politics of diversity and gender voting behaviour and 
political recruitment.  
She is the principal investigator of the ESRC funded 
Representative Audit of Britain, which surveyed all 
candidates standing in the 2015 British General Election, 
and co-investigator of a Leverhulme funded study of British 
parliamentary candidates and MPs from 1945–2015 
(www.parliamentarycandidates.org).  
She has co-authored reports on gender and political 
participation for BBC Radio Four’s Woman’s Hour, The 
Electoral Commission, The Fabian Women’s Network and 
The Hansard Society.  
Rosie has presented three episodes of Radio Four’s Analysis 
programme on contemporary British politics. 
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Professor Sarah Childs 
(Job sharing with Professor Rosie Campbell) 
Professor Sarah Childs’ research expertise centres on 
women’s political representation, political parties and 
parliaments. Key articles have been published in Political 
Studies, Politics and Gender, Parliamentary Affairs and Party 
Politics. In 2015 she published two co-edited books: 
Gender, Conservatism and Representation and Deeds and 
Words with Karen Celis and Rosie Campbell respectively.  
Her most recent monograph is Sex, Gender and the 
Conservative Party: From Iron Lady to Kitten Heels (2012), 
with Paul Webb. Sarah is currently writing a book on gender 
and representation theory, with Celis. 
In 2009–10 Sarah was the gender Special Adviser to the UK 
Parliament’s ‘Speaker’s Conference’ on representation and 
in 2014 the Special Adviser to the All Party Parliamentary 
Group, Women in Parliament Inquiry. In 2016 she published 
The Good Parliament Report which makes more than 40 
recommendations for a diversity sensitive House of 
Commons. She is currently the special adviser to the newly 
created Commons Reference Group on Representation 
and Inclusion, and recently edited with Rosie Campbell a 
Fawcett Society report on job sharing for MPs.  
Sarah has received the Political Studies Association ‘Special 
Recognition Award’ for her work on women’s 
representation (2015). After more than a decade at the 
University of Bristol Sarah has recently joined the 
Department of Politics at Birkbeck, University of London. 
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Rob Clements 
Rob Clements retired from the House of Commons in March 
2011 after working in its information services for nearly 35 
years.  
He headed the House of Commons Research Service from 
2000 to 2009 and was subsequently Director of Service 
Delivery, with overall responsibility for the House’s research 
and other information services to both MPs and the public. 
He also played a leading role in developing the House’s 
strategic approach to issues of public information and 
access and improving engagement with the public.  
More recently, Rob has worked with a number of 
Parliaments in other countries to help them develop their 
research and information services.  
He is a Fellow and former Vice-President of the Royal 
Statistical Society and was a council member of the 
Hansard Society from 2002 to 2011. 
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Professor David Farrell MRIA 
Professor David Farrell was appointed to the Chair of Politics 
at University College Dublin in 2009, having returned to 
Ireland after two decades working at the University of 
Manchester.  
In 2013 he was elected a Member of the Royal Irish 
Academy. He has held visiting positions at the Australian 
National University, Harvard, Mannheim, and the University 
of California Irvine. A specialist in the study of 
representation, elections and parties, he has published 18 
books and 100 articles and book chapters. His most recent 
books include: Political Parties and Democratic Linkage 
(Oxford University Press, 2011; paperback 2013), which was 
awarded the GESIS Klingemann Prize for the Best 
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) Scholarship, 
and A Conservative Revolution? Electoral Change in 
Twenty-First Century Ireland (Oxford University Press, 2017).  
His current work is focused on constitutional deliberation, 
and in that capacity he was the research director of the 
Irish Constitutional Convention (2012–14) and is the 
research leader of the on-going Irish Citizens’ Assembly.  
He is the founding co-editor of Party Politics.  
In 2016 he was re-elected (for a second term) as the 
Speaker of the Council of the European Consortium for 
Political Research. From 2013–17 he was the Speaker of the 
Council of the European Consortium for Political Research.  
In summer 2017 he was invited by the Ceann Comhairle 
(Speaker) of Dáil Éireann to chair a Forum on Parliamentary 
Discipline, which will report its recommendations to the 
Ceann Comhairle in November 2017. 
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Dr Alan Renwick 
Dr Alan Renwick is the Deputy Director of the Constitution 
Unit at University College London. He is a leading expert on 
electoral systems and processes of electoral reform in the 
UK and around the world.  
His books include The Politics of Electoral Reform (published 
by Cambridge University Press in 2010), A Citizen’s Guide to 
Electoral Reform (Biteback, 2011), and Faces on the Ballot: 
The Personalization of Electoral Systems in Europe, co-
authored with Jean-Benoit Pilet (Oxford University Press, 
2016).  
He also conducts research into referendums and 
deliberative democracy and is currently working on a 
project analysing how referendum campaigns can best be 
conducted.  
He is a regular contributor to discussions of electoral and 
broader political reforms in the media, and he has 
previously advised on processes of electoral reform in 
places including Jersey, Egypt, and Jordan. 
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Sir Evan Paul Silk KCB 
Sir Paul Silk was Chair of the Commission on Devolution in 
Wales from 2011 to 2014. Paul is a former Clerk to the 
National Assembly for Wales, serving from March 2001 until 
December 2006. He was a Clerk in the House of Commons 
from 1975 to1977 and from 1979 to 2001, and Director of 
Strategic Projects in the Commons from 2007 to 2010. While 
a Commons Clerk, he contributed to drafting the first 
standing orders of the National Assembly for Wales.  
He has also worked as Presidential Adviser in the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and has 
written and lectured extensively on Parliament and the 
constitution.  
He is an honorary Professor at the Wales Governance 
Centre at Cardiff University, an Honorary Fellow of 
Aberystwyth University and a Fellow of the Learned Society 
of Wales.  
He is President of the Study of Parliament Group. Paul is also 
an Associate of Global Partners Governance, and a 
consultant to the Westminster Foundation for Democracy 
and the UNDP. In 2016–17 he has worked with these 
organisations in the Parliaments of Egypt, Honduras, Jordan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine and Venezuela. 
  
A PARLIAMENT THAT WORKS FOR WALES 
229 
ANNEX C: MEETINGS OF THE PANEL 
Date Meeting 
14 February 2017 Formal Panel meeting: introductions; the Assembly and the Welsh 
context, including discussion with Professor Roger Scully of Cardiff 
University’s Wales Governance Centre and Dr Elin Royles of 
Aberystwyth University; technical briefing on Welsh Government 
plans for electoral reform in the context of local government; terms 
of reference and forward work programme; ways of working; 
engagement with the Political Reference Group; communication 
and engagement strategy. 
7 March 2017 Formal Panel meeting: Chair’s update; co-terminosity; minimum 
voting age; capacity of the Assembly; forward work programme. 
21 April 2017 Formal Panel meeting: Chair’s update; capacity and size of the 
Assembly, including discussion with Greg Power from Global Partners 
Governance and Lord Norton of Louth; technical briefing from the 
Boundary Commission for Wales and the Local Democracy and 
Boundary Commission for Wales; electoral systems; media and 
communications; forward work programme. 
22 and 23 May 
2017 
Formal Panel meeting: Chair’s update; minimum voting age; 
capacity and size of the Assembly; electoral systems and areas; 
boundary review mechanisms; forward work programme. 
12 June 2017 Formal Panel meeting: Chair’s update; electoral systems: principles; 
diversity of representation; electoral systems; communication of the 
Panel’s work; forward work programme. 
14 July 2017 Formal Panel meeting: Chair’s update; minimum voting age; 
capacity and size of the Assembly; electoral systems, including 
discussion with Professor Roger Scully of Cardiff University’s Wales 
Governance Centre; forward work programme.  
22 September 2017 Formal Panel meeting: Chair’s update; report structure, minimum 
voting age; capacity and size of the Assembly; electoral systems; 
communication strategy; forward work programme.  
18 and 19 October 
2017 
Formal Panel meeting: Chair’s update; electoral systems; 
consideration of draft report, including publication arrangements. 
 
The minutes of each of the Panel’s formal meetings are available on the Panel’s 
website.  
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ANNEX D: COSTS OF THE PANEL’S WORK 
The total direct cost incurred during the course of the Panel’s work was £38,096. 
This figure includes remuneration and reimbursement of expenses incurred by the 
Panel Chair and members for eight formal meetings, associated preparatory work 
and additional specialist research, seven meetings of the Chair with the Political 
Reference Group, and associated discussions and consultation (see Table 35).186 
Also included within this figure is: specialist modelling of electoral systems 
undertaken by Cardiff University’s Wales Governance Centre at a cost of £5,250; 
hospitality associated with Panel meetings at a cost of £1,998; reimbursement of 
£221 expenses incurred by expert witnesses as a result of attending Panel 
meetings; and £281 for an online collaboration and communication tool to 
facilitate joint working. 
Table 35 Breakdown of fees and expenses by Panel member 
 
 
 
  
                                            
186 Daily rates were paid in line with those paid to other similar office holders advising the Assembly: 
£333 per day for the Chair and £267 per day for Panel members. 
Professor Laura 
McAllister (Chair)
Professor Rosie 
Campbell and 
Professor Sarah 
Childs (job 
sharing)
Rob Clements
Professor David 
Farrell
Dr Alan Renwick Sir Paul Silk Total
Fees  £                      8,159  £                      2,821  £                      3,551  £                      5,165  £                      4,058  £                           -    £                    23,753 
Air travel  £                           -    £                           -    £                           -    £                      1,088  £                           -    £                           -    £                      1,088 
Train and tube  £                           -    £                      1,006  £                         579  £                           -    £                         928  £                           55  £                      2,568 
Taxi  £                           -    £                         150  £                           32  £                      1,014  £                           -    £                           -    £                      1,196 
Car mileage and 
parking
 £                           -    £                           -    £                           -    £                           -    £                           -    £                         208  £                         208 
Subsistence  £                           -    £                           39  £                           64  £                           34  £                           -    £                           -    £                         137 
Accommodation  £                           -    £                         220  £                         691  £                         144  £                         144  £                         197  £                      1,396 
Total  £                      8,159  £                      4,235  £                      4,917  £                      7,445  £                      5,130  £                         459  £                    30,346 
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ANNEX E: CONSULTATION 
The Expert Panel invited written submissions from individuals and organisations on 
any aspect of its work, in particular: 
 issues relating to Assembly electoral areas, in particular co-terminosity 
with Westminster constituencies; 
 the minimum voting age for Assembly elections; and 
 the capacity and size of the Assembly, and the appropriate electoral 
system by which Members should be elected.   
Consultation responses can be viewed in full on the Panel’s website.  
Organisation Reference 
Daniel Greenberg EP01/EP01(a) 
Dr John Cox EP02/EP02(a) 
Lord Lisvane EP03 
Institute for Government EP04 
Professor John Coakley, Queen's University EP05 
Ralph Day EP06 
Dr Michael Cole, University of Liverpool EP07 
Alistair Doherty EP08 
Sir Bernard Crick Centre for the Public Understanding of Politics, Sheffield 
University 
EP09 
Electoral Reform Society Cymru EP10/EP10(a) 
Thomas Ehrhard EP11 
Professor Jean-Benoit Pilet EP12 
Electoral Commission EP13 
Professor Paul Chaney EP14 
States of Jersey EP15 
Professor Jonathan Bradbury EP16 
Isle of Man Government EP17 
Auditor General for Wales EP18 
Patrick Herring EP19 
Make Votes Matter EP20 
Tim Knight EP21/EP21(a) 
Llanllechid Community Council EP22 
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Organisation Reference 
NUS Cymru EP23 
Children in Wales EP24 
Dr Elin Royles, Aberystwyth University EP25 
Urdd Gobaith Cymru EP26 
Chris Rogers EP27 
Craig Johnson EP28 
Ethnic Minorities and Youth Support Team Wales EP29 
GirlGuiding Cymru EP30 
Chris Travis EP31/EP31(a) 
Equalities and Human Rights Commission EP32 
Peter Price, European Strategy Counsel EP33 
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ANNEX F: ESTIMATED COSTS OF 
ADDITIONAL MEMBERS 
The information in this annex has been provided by the Assembly Commission. It 
provides the Commission’s initial estimates of the costs of an additional 20 or 30 
Assembly Members. 
Assumptions 
Any estimate of the cost of a larger Assembly must be treated with caution. Actual 
costs will depend on a range of factors, from the political composition of the 
institution and decisions about committee and Plenary arrangements, to practical 
decisions on Assembly Commission staffing and priorities. Figures must, therefore, 
be seen as indicators of magnitude rather than as precise predictions. 
The estimates are based on the following assumptions: 
 All estimates are at current values and net of VAT; 
 Estimates for Members’ salaries and allowances are based on the 
Remuneration Board’s Determination on Members’ Pay and Allowances 
for 2017–18; 
 Additional office accommodation for Members will be provided in 
Cardiff Bay; 
 There will be no increase in the number of Plenary sessions or 
committees; 
 An additional 20 Members could result in two additional political party 
groups, and an additional 30 Members could result in three additional 
political party groups; 
 Estimates for Commission staff costs include on-costs. They are based on 
the midpoint of the team support salary scale and point 4 of the salary 
scales for other grades. 
Types of cost 
The estimates are broken down into three categories: 
 One-off costs 
 Core recurrent annual costs (approximately 90-92 per cent of the 
recurrent annual costs) 
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 Variable recurrent annual costs (approximately 8-10 per cent of the 
recurrent annual costs) 
One-off costs 
These costs reflect requirements which can be reasonably firmly identified, and 
relate to infrastructure, for example adaptation of the Siambr, office 
accommodation in Cardiff Bay, and ICT provision. 
Table 36 Estimated one-off costs187 
 
In addition to the assumptions outlined above: 
 Costs relating to the Siambr include estimated costs of adjustments to 
the current layout to accommodate additional Members. Costs of 
Siambr ICT provision assume the same set up as currently provided, 
although this could change depending on the nature of any 
conversion. 
 Estimates for Members’ office accommodation in Cardiff Bay are based 
on the assumption that space in Tŷ Hywel (the Assembly’s current office 
accommodation) would be converted to accommodate Members, 
with Commission staff being relocated to external accommodation. 
Figures include fit out and moves to vacate space in Tŷ Hywel and 
decant Commission staff. It should be noted that the Assembly 
Commission is currently considering its long-term accommodation 
needs, irrespective of any change to the size of the Assembly. 
 One-off costs associated with ICT provision for Members’ Tŷ Hywel 
offices, constituency and regional offices, and homes are based on the 
current provision. 
                                            
187 Totals may not sum due to rounding. 
20 additional 
Members
30 additional 
Members
Siambr: alteration 300                         400                         
Siambr: ICT 650                         720                         
Siambr: broadcasting 260                         260                         
Tŷ Hywel office accommodation 1,000                      1,650                      
ICT equipment and set up for Members' Tŷ 
Hywel offices, constituency/regional offices 
and homes
170                         250                         
Total one-off costs 2,380                      3,290                      
£000
One-off costs
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Core recurrent annual costs 
These costs reflect requirements which can be reasonably firmly identified for 
different numbers of Members, and which, in the main, are not directly dependent 
on formal Assembly business requirements. These include, for example, Members’ 
and their support staff’s salaries, pension contributions and National Insurance 
contributions, financial support and allowances provided to Members, and ICT 
equipment. Table 37 estimates the core recurrent annual costs. 
Table 37 Estimated core recurrent costs188 
 
In addition to the assumptions outlined above: 
 Costs relating to Member and support staff salaries and allowances are 
based on the Remuneration Board’s Determination on Members’ Pay 
and Allowances for 2017–18. Future changes in Members’ salaries will 
reflect changes in the index of median earnings in Wales as measured 
by the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE). Where budgets for 
specific allowances are capped, figures are based on the total budget 
for 2017–18. Where budgets are uncapped, figures are based on 
average costs incurred in 2016–17. Residential accommodation 
allowance estimates are based on the assumption that additional 
Members will reflect the same proportion of inner, intermediate and 
outer areas as existing Members. Estimated financial support provided 
to political parties assumes a proportionate increase in the total budget, 
which is divided between political parties. Estimates include allowances 
                                            
188 Totals may not sum due to rounding. 
20 Additional 
Members
30 Additional 
Members
Salaries and allowances: Members and support 
staff
5,030 7,520
Siambr: broadcasting 150 150
Tŷ Hywel office accommodation 460 750
ICT equipment and set up for Members' Tŷ 
Hywel offices, constituency/regional offices 
and homes
80 120
Car parking facilities 10 20
Staffing: ICT 130 160
Staffing: Members' Business Support 110 150
Total core recurrent annual costs 5,970 8,860
£000
Core recurrent annual costs
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for party leaders and business managers for each additional party 
group, including pension and National Insurance contributions. Party 
leaders’ allowances, which vary depending on the size of the group, 
are based on an average of the allowances which are currently paid. 
 Estimates for Members’ office accommodation in Cardiff Bay reflect 
rental costs for external office space to accommodate Commission 
staff. The costs assume that any additional Members and their staff 
would reflect current car parking facility usage, and that no additional 
car parking facilities would be associated with any alternative Cardiff 
Bay office accommodation. 
 Recurrent costs associated with ICT provision for Members’ Tŷ Hywel 
offices, constituency and regional offices, and homes are based on the 
current provision. Costs also include estimates for additional ICT staffing 
resource required to support additional Members (estimated to be four 
or five additional members of staff for an additional 20 or 30 Members 
respectively). The table does not take account of additional equipment 
and resources that would be required to support any increase in 
Commission staffing. 
 The work of the Members’ Business Support service is almost directly 
proportionate to the number of Members. Therefore, the estimated core 
costs include an estimated additional three or four members of staff for 
an additional 20 or 30 Members respectively. 
Variable recurrent annual costs 
These estimates reflect more discretionary costs, the extent of which will depend 
largely upon decisions taken by a future Assembly, Business Committee and 
Assembly Commission about working practices, priorities and the organisation of 
formal Assembly business. These include, for example, the cost of parliamentary 
support services provided to Members by the Assembly Commission. The estimates 
are based on the current nature and level of such services, and therefore reflect 
the potential cost of continuing to provide a broadly equivalent range and level of 
services. 
Table 38 shows the estimated annual costs associated with the provision of 
Assembly Commission services to a larger Assembly. These costs therefore depend 
on the volume and nature of Assembly business, and, crucially, the decisions of a 
future Assembly Commission in respect of service provision, priorities and value for 
money. 
The estimates are based on assessments made by Assembly services on the basis 
of the assumptions outlined above. For example, it is assumed that there is no 
change to the scheduling of formal business—business days, sitting times, 
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committee timetables etc. Robust cost estimates which incorporated such 
elements would require more complex scenario planning. 
The figures shown reflect the cost of 18 additional Commission staff for an 
additional 20 Members, and 22 for an additional 30 Members. The resource 
requirements for many services depend on the volume and nature of Assembly 
business, as well as the level of service the Commission determines is appropriate. 
The estimates assume increases in drivers such as the business tabled, the volume 
of legislation and the number of events. They do not take account of other 
associated costs which would arise from additional staff, for example ICT 
equipment, car parking or HR implications. 
Table 38 Estimated variable recurrent annual costs189 
 
In addition to the assumptions outlined above: 
 Take-up of training and development among additional Members and 
their staff remains similar to levels among current Members and support 
staff. 
 The current strategy of managing activity on the Assembly estate 
continues, with some increased demand for events and meeting 
spaces. Office accommodation is provided in accordance with the 
Commission’s long-term accommodation strategy. Estimates include 
additional security staff, but not the costs of training, body armour or 
uniforms. 
 Estimates for Assembly business services assume the increase in 
Members and party groups leads to increases in research enquiries and 
demand for proactive work relating to Assembly business. Estimates also 
assume increases in the work associated with the tabling of questions 
and motions/amendments, registration of Members’ interests, cross-
                                            
189 Totals may not sum due to rounding. 
20 additional 
Members
30 additional 
Members
Training and development for Members and 
support staff
                                50                                 50 
Estate, v isitor and security serv ices                               340                               380 
Assembly business serv ices                               210                               260 
Translation serv ices                                 50                                 80 
Total variable recurrent annual costs                               650                               770 
Variable recurrent annual costs
£000
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party groups and Plenary, and increases in queries and requests for 
legal advice from Members. 
 Estimates for translation services assume an increase in demand from 
Members for constituency/regional and Assembly business purposes, as 
well as additional requirements for Welsh language tuition. 
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ANNEX G: DIFFERENT PROCEDURES FOR 
TRANSFERRING SURPLUS VOTES IN STV 
Background 
A key factor in STV is the methodology by which surplus votes are transferred 
between candidates. There are four different procedures that can be used: 
 Transfer of ballots at their full value; 
 Basic Gregory; 
 Inclusive Gregory; 
 Weighted Inclusive Gregory. 
Table 39 Worked example of a hypothetical STV count 
Candidate First 
count 
Second count Third count Fourth count Fifth count 
Transfer of D’s 
votes (elected) 
Transfer of E’s 
votes (elected) 
Transfer of C’s 
votes (elected) 
Transfer of A’s 
votes 
(eliminated) 
A 215 3 218 1 219 1 220 -220 0 
B 310 6 316 2 318 5 323 80 403 
C 292 30 322 75 397 -12 385 0 385 
D 555 -170 385 0 385 0 385 0 385 
E 338 130 468 -83 385 0 385 0 385 
F 210 1 211 5 216 6 222 140 362 
Total valid 
votes 
1,920  1,920  1,920  1,920  1,920 
Notes: there are 1,920 valid votes and 4 seats. The resulting Droop quota is therefore 385. Elected 
candidates are shaded in green. Eliminated candidates are shaded in red. 
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Transfer of ballots at full value 
Originally, standard practice was that only those ballots surplus to the quota were 
transferred between candidates. This is still the practice in counting votes for Irish 
Dáil (lower house of parliament) elections.190 There are two problems that arise in 
this procedure. 
In the example presented in Table 39, Candidate D is elected in the first count with 
a surplus of 170 votes. A significant element of randomness in the process is that 
only those 170 voters whose ballot papers happen to be transferred have their 
second and subsequent preferences taken into account at the next and 
subsequent stages. If there is a close contest between two or more candidates, 
the particular pattern of preferences which happens to be transferred can have a 
significant impact on the eventual outcome. While ballot papers have been 
thoroughly mixed during the counting process, and the ballots which are 
transferred could therefore be expected to be a random sample, there is a risk 
that the pattern of preferences in the parcel of ballots which is transferred may not 
be representative of the overall pattern of preferences. 
A second potential anomaly results from the procedure adopted for the 
transferring of surpluses in later stages of the count. After the first transfer of ballots 
only the last parcel of ballot papers (the surplus which has been received) is 
transferred. In the example in Table 39, in Count 3 the 83-vote surplus of Candidate 
E that is transferred is taken solely from the 170 ballots she received from 
Candidate D. The rationale is that the votes that elected the candidate are 
precisely those votes received in the last round and, accordingly, it is these votes 
that should determine the destination of the surplus. But it can be argued that the 
procedure involves a potential distortion. Depending on which ballot papers were 
selected from the pile at an earlier stage in the counting process, in a close finish 
the fate of a candidate could be sealed by the particular pattern of preferences 
that predominated in those ballot papers. As we see in Count 5, Candidate A 
ends up with just two votes fewer than Candidate F, and is eliminated. It is possible 
that had a different set of ballot papers been selected for transfer from Candidate 
D’s pile the outcome could have been very different. 
  
                                            
190 Farrell, D. and Sinnott, R., ‘The Electoral System’, in Coakley, J. and Gallagher, M. (eds.), Politics in 
the Republic of Ireland, 6th edition, London: Routledge, 2018 
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Basic Gregory 
The first of these problems was addressed by the introduction of the Basic Gregory 
method, which is used in Northern Ireland Assembly elections and elections to the 
upper house (the Seanad) in Ireland.191 The Basic Gregory method takes account 
of all preferences when allocating a surplus, by transferring the ballot papers 
received by the candidate at a fraction of their full value. The transfer value is 
calculated as the surplus vote divided by the number of ballot papers in the 
elected candidate’s pile. For example, for Candidate D in Count 2 in Table 39 this 
is: 
Surplus vote
Total number of ballot papers in elected candidate's pile
=
170
555
=0.3063 
However, the second anomaly remains. Just as in the previous method, after the 
first transfer of ballots, only the last parcel of ballot papers (the surplus which has 
been received) is transferred; i.e. in Count 3, when transferring Candidate E’s 
surplus, the calculation of the transfer value is based solely on the ballots 
transferred in from Candidate D in Count 2. None of the other ballots in Candidate 
E’s original pile are used, again raising the same concern that this could distort the 
eventual outcome for the remaining candidates. 
Inclusive Gregory 
Concern about this risk led the Australian Senate to adopt the Inclusive Gregory 
method in 1983. Under this method, all ballot papers are transferred in all counts: 
the transfer value is calculated as the surplus vote divided by the total number of 
ballot papers in the candidate’s pile. The Inclusive Gregory method addresses the 
potential anomaly that the last batch of ballot papers may not be representative, 
but introduces another potential anomaly, which is that the value of certain ballot 
papers can increase. In the example presented in Table 39, Candidate E is elected 
in Count 2 with a surplus. The total number of ballot papers in her pile resulted from: 
 338 number 1 preference votes she received in Count 1; and 
 424 ballots transferred to her from Candidate D in Count 2 at a transfer 
value of 0.3063 (which is equivalent to the 130 ballots that she would 
have received under the full value transfer process outlined above). 
The next count, Count 3, entails the transfer of Candidate E’s surplus, which has a 
transfer value of 0.1089 (
83
762
= 0.1089). But 424 of those ballots had already had their 
                                            
191 For details on the various Gregory methods, see Farrell, D. and McAllister, I., ‘The 1983 change in 
surplus transfer procedures for the Australian Senate and its consequences for the Single 
Transferable Vote’, Australian Journal of Political Science. 38 (2003), pp. 479-91. 
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value reduced in Count 2 (using the transfer value of 0.3063). In effect, the slate 
has been wiped clean on those transfer values: the value of the 424 ballots she 
received from Candidate D were increased from 0.3063 back up to their original 
value of 1. The impact of this is that more weight is being given to some ballot 
papers than to others. 
Weighted Inclusive Gregory 
Finally, the Weighted Inclusive Gregory method, which is used in local government 
elections in Scotland and in some Australian state legislatures, attempts to address 
the anomalies which result from the Basic Gregory and Inclusive Gregory methods. 
It includes all ballot papers in the calculation of transfer values, but ensures that 
they are weighted appropriately to take account of the transfer values which 
were applied in previous counts. The transfer value is calculated in two parts: 
 Votes received by the candidate at full value are calculated as the 
surplus vote divided by the candidate’s total vote; 
 Votes received by the candidate from another candidate’s surplus are 
calculated as the surplus vote divided by the candidate’s total vote, 
and then multiplied by the transfer value that was applied in the transfer 
of the surplus votes to the previous candidate. 
Summary 
The vote transfer methodology used is clearly important, and the different 
methodologies are, undoubtedly, complex. However, these are neither matters 
which affect how voters cast their votes, nor which need complicate the system 
from a voter perspective. 
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ANNEX H: MODELLING OF ELECTORAL 
SYSTEMS 
We commissioned Professor Roger Scully and Jac Larner of Cardiff University’s 
Wales Governance Centre to undertake modelling of the potential outcomes of 
our proposed electoral systems on the basis of the 2011 and 2016 Assembly 
elections, and political polling undertaken in 2011, 2016 and 2017. 
The models provide illustrations of the potential outcomes which could have 
resulted had the Assembly elections in 2011 and 2016, and a simulated election in 
2017, been on the basis of an Assembly of 80 Members and contested using our 
proposed electoral boundaries and systems. However, it should be noted that: 
 The modelling is based on assumptions. While it provides an illustration of 
the potential level of proportionality for each system, seat totals should 
be seen only as indicative estimates. In addition, the modelling cannot 
take local factors or individual candidates into account. 
 The electoral system and boundaries used for any election can 
influence voter behaviour; voters might have cast their votes differently 
in 2011 and 2016 under different electoral systems. Similarly, the political 
polling in 2017 was undertaken shortly after a UK general election, 
which may have influenced respondents’ views. 
 For the purposes of modelling Flexible List and STV results, constituency 
votes from the relevant Assembly elections have been projected onto 
the 17 constituencies based on local authority areas and the 20 
constituencies based on the current Assembly constituencies.192 The 
constituency vote may, perhaps, be considered a more accurate 
indicator of how voters would cast a single vote. 
 For the purposes of the 2017 modelling, the results of polling undertaken 
in July 2017, and the changes since 2016 indicated by the data, have 
been projected onto the 2016 Assembly election results using Uniform 
National Swing. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
192 This was undertaken independently by Anthony Wells of YouGov, to whom we are grateful. 
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 For the purposes of modelling STV results, the constituency votes cast in 
the 2011 and 2016 general elections have been interpreted as first 
preference votes. For each of the potential constituencies, the electoral 
quota has been calculated. Where parties received multiples of the 
electoral quota (for example twice the quota) this has been interpreted 
as multiple candidates from the same party achieving the quota. 
Polling data has been used to estimate how votes might have 
transferred. These studies asked voters to indicate how they would have 
used second, third, etc. preference votes had they been able to 
express a preference. 
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Table 40 Modelling of potential electoral outcomes for an 80 seat Assembly prepared by Cardiff University's Wales Governance Centre 
 
 
 
 
2011
Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats %
Welsh Labour 30 50% 35 44% 41 51% 43 54% 39 49% 45 56% 37 46% 39 49% 43 54%
Welsh Conservatives 14 23% 20 25% 21 26% 21 26% 21 26% 18 23% 22 28% 20 25% 17 21%
Plaid Cymru 11 18% 16 20% 15 19% 12 15% 13 16% 13 16% 16 20% 14 18% 16 20%
Welsh Liberal Democrats 5 8% 6 8% 3 4% 4 5% 7 9% 4 5% 5 6% 7 9% 4 5%
UKIP 0 0% 2 3% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Green Party 0 0% 1 1% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Gallagher Index figure
STV
20 constituencies
10.4 6.9 11.9 9.6 5.3 11.0 4.6 4.9 9.4
Actual result
MMP:
5 regions
MMP:
10 regions
Flexible List
D'Hondt
17 constituencies
Flexible List
Sainte-Laguë
17 constituencies
Flexible List
D'Hondt
20 constituencies
Flexible List
Sainte-Laguë
20 constituencies
STV
17 constituencies
2016
Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats %
Welsh Labour 29 48% 31 39% 33 41% 36 45% 31 39% 35 44% 30 38% 33 41% 32 40%
Welsh Conservatives 11 18% 15 19% 16 20% 15 19% 15 19% 17 21% 17 21% 17 21% 17 21%
Plaid Cymru 12 20% 19 24% 18 23% 18 23% 16 20% 17 21% 17 21% 19 24% 19 24%
Welsh Liberal Democrats 1 2% 4 5% 2 3% 4 5% 4 5% 4 5% 4 5% 4 5% 4 5%
UKIP 7 12% 11 14% 11 14% 7 9% 14 18% 7 9% 12 15% 7 9% 8 10%
Green Party 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Gallagher Index figure
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2017
Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats %
Welsh Labour 31 52% 37 46% 36 45% 41 51% 37 46% 46 58% 37 46% 38 48% 41 51%
Welsh Conservatives 17 28% 24 30% 25 31% 22 28% 23 29% 21 26% 24 30% 22 28% 23 29%
Plaid Cymru 10 17% 14 18% 15 19% 12 15% 15 19% 11 14% 15 19% 15 19% 12 15%
Welsh Liberal Democrats 1 2% 3 4% 2 3% 4 5% 4 5% 2 3% 3 4% 4 5% 3 4%
UKIP 1 2% 2 3% 2 3% 1 1% 1 1% 0 0% 1 1% 1 1% 1 1%
Green Party 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Gallagher Index figure
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Figure 14 Modelling of potential electoral outcomes for an 80 seat Assembly prepared by Cardiff University's Wales Governance Centre 
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ANNEX I: GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
This glossary explains the terminology used in our report. 
Age threshold: the age at which a person takes on particular rights or 
responsibilities. 
Assembly Commission: the body established under section 27 of the Government 
of Wales Act 2006 which is responsible for providing the services, staff and 
resources the Assembly requires to carry out its functions. 
Boundary Commission for Wales (BCW): the body responsible for the review of 
Westminster parliamentary constituencies. Until 2011 the BCW was also responsible 
for Assembly constituencies, as a result of the automatic link between Westminster 
and Assembly constituencies. The BCW is a reserved authority under the Wales Act 
2017, meaning that the Assembly would require the UK Government’s consent 
before conferring any functions on it. 
Candidate threshold: for the purposes of our report, a mechanism for determining 
whether candidates within a Flexible List system have received sufficient personal 
votes to influence their position on their party’s list, for the purposes of identifying 
which candidates take up the seats won by the party. 
Casual vacancy: a seat which becomes empty between scheduled elections, for 
example as the result of the death or resignation of a Member. 
Closed List: electoral system or element of a Mixed Member Proportional system in 
which voters choose between lists of candidates proposed by political parties. 
Candidates take up seats won by the party in the order the party has included 
them on the list. 
Co-terminosity: the sharing of common boundaries for electoral areas used for 
electing different tiers of governance, for example Westminster parliamentary 
constituencies, Assembly constituencies or local authority wards. 
Countback: mechanism for determining the filling of a casual vacancy in which 
the count of the votes from the last general election to the legislature is rerun, 
excluding the outgoing Member. The seat is awarded to the next best-placed 
eligible candidate. In our proposals for STV, in order to be included in the count, a 
candidate would have to represent the same political party as the outgoing 
Member represented at the point at which they were elected. 
D’Hondt: an electoral formula used to allocate seats to parties in a List Proportional 
Representation system or the list element of a Mixed Member Proportional system. 
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District magnitude: the number of Members returned to represent each electoral 
area. 
Droop quota: the minimum number of votes required for a candidate to be 
elected in STV. Based on the number of valid votes cast and the number of seats 
to be filled: 
Valid votes
Seats+1
+1=Droop quota 
Dual candidature: the standing for election by a candidate both for a 
constituency seat and on the relevant regional list within a Mixed Member 
Proportional electoral system. 
Electoral Commission: the independent body which oversees elections and 
regulates political finance in the UK. 
Electoral formula: mechanism for translating votes cast into seats won. Examples 
include D’Hondt (which is currently used for calculating regional Assembly seats), 
Droop (which is used in Single Transferable Vote systems) and Sainte-Laguë. 
Electoral threshold: mechanism for preventing hyperproportionality resulting from 
electoral areas which return a large number of Members, by applying additional 
criteria which must be met before a party can win list seats. For example, a 
specified share of the national vote within a Flexible List system, or number of 
constituency seats within a Mixed Member Proportional System. 
Electoral ratio: the number of elected representatives per head of population. 
First Past The Post: electoral system which operates on the basis of single Member 
constituencies. Voters each cast a single vote, and the seat is awarded to the 
candidate who receives the most votes. 
Flexible List: electoral system in which voters choose between lists of candidates 
proposed by political parties. Mechanisms are included by which voters can 
influence the order in which candidates take up seats won by the party, but the 
degree of influence voters have is limited by the application of quotas, candidate 
thresholds or other mechanisms. 
Franchise: the right to vote in a particular election. 
Gallagher Index of disproportionality: measures the disproportionality of an 
electoral outcome; that is, the difference between the percentage of votes 
received and the percentage of seats a party gets in the resulting legislature. The 
lower the Gallagher figure, the more proportional the outcome. 
A PARLIAMENT THAT WORKS FOR WALES 
251 
Gender quota: a legislative intervention to apply additional criteria at the 
candidate or elected Member level in order to encourage or ensure balanced 
representation for women and men. See chapter 12 for details. 
Gregory (Basic/Inclusive/Weighted Inclusive) methodology: methodologies by 
which surplus votes are transferred between candidates in STV. See Annex G for 
details. 
Hyperproportionality: a degree of proportionality which results in parties or 
candidates with very low levels of public support securing seats in the legislature. 
Consequences can include the securing of seats by extremist parties, and 
fragmentation of representation which results in difficulties in forming stable 
governments. 
List zipping: the practice within List Proportional Representation systems of ordering 
candidates on a list alternately according to their gender. 
Llywydd: the Presiding Officer of the National Assembly for Wales. The role of the 
Presiding Officer is, among other things, to chair Plenary meetings and determine 
questions over the interpretation of Standing Orders. 
Local Democracy and Boundary Commission for Wales (LDBCW): the body 
responsible for reviewing the boundaries of local authorities and their constituent 
electoral divisions, and identifying the appropriate number of councillors to 
represent each. The Assembly already has full legislative competence over the 
LDBCW in relation to local government, and will have legislative competence to 
confer functions on it in relation to Assembly elections with effect from the Principal 
Appointed Day for the purposes of the Wales Act 2017 (expected to be 1 April 
2018). 
Mixed Member Proportional system: also known as the Additional Member System, 
the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system has been used in Wales since 1999. 
The area represented by the legislature is divided into regions, which are 
subdivided into constituencies. A single Member is elected for each constituency 
by First Past The Post. Multiple Members are returned to each region on the basis of 
List Proportional Representation. Lists may be open or closed. An electoral formula 
is used to allocate regional seats to parties according to their regional vote share 
and the number of constituency seats won by the party within that region. In this 
way, parties which do not win constituency seats are ‘compensated’ for the 
disproportionality of the constituency results. See chapter 11 for further details. 
Open List: electoral system in which voters choose between lists of candidates 
proposed by political parties. Voters have complete influence over the order in 
which candidates take up seats won by the party. 
Plenary: meetings of the full Assembly. 
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Proportionality: the degree to which the distribution of seats within a legislature 
reflects the share of votes won by parties/candidates. 
Recess: the periods agreed by the Business Committee during which the Assembly 
does not formally sit. Assembly committees may still meet or carry out activities 
during these periods, and the Assembly may, under certain circumstances, be 
recalled to meet in Plenary during recess periods. See chapter 06 for further details 
about recess periods. 
Regional Authority Index: a method for assessing the relative autonomy of regions, 
based on assessment of the autonomy of regional government, range of policy 
responsibility, fiscal autonomy, and independence of the regional legislature and 
executive. See chapter 09 for further details. 
Remuneration Board: the independent body established by the National Assembly 
for Wales (Remuneration) Measure 2010 which is responsible for determining pay, 
allowances and other financial support for Assembly Members and their staff. 
Sainte-Laguë: an electoral formula used to allocate seats to parties in a List 
Proportional Representation system or to apportion seats to constituencies or 
regions on the basis of the size of the electorate. 
Seat apportionment: the allocation of seats to electoral constituencies or regions 
on the basis of the size of the electorate or other factors. We have used Sainte-
Laguë divisors for our modelling. 
Scrutiny and oversight: the process by which Members hold the government and 
other public bodies to account for their spending, decisions, policies and 
administration. May include scrutiny of policy, legislation or financial matters. See 
chapter 07 for further details. 
Siambr: the Assembly’s main debating chamber, used primarily for Plenary 
meetings. 
Single Transferable Vote: an electoral system in which voters express preferences 
for individual candidates to represent multimember constituencies. Each voter has 
a single vote, which can be transferred from the voter’s first preference to their 
second, and so on, if their preferred candidate has either been eliminated or has 
sufficient votes already to be elected. Voters express their preferences for 
individual candidates; therefore votes can be transferred across parties. In order to 
be elected, candidates must achieve a quota based on the number of seats and 
the number of valid votes cast—the Droop quota. 
Standing Orders: the formal rules which set out the Assembly’s procedures. 
